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1 Catch Id If You Can: The Introduction 
“Catch Me If You Can” was the title of a movie that was released last Christmas, 
2002. The main characters were a FBI Agent, Carl Hanratty, and a young con artist, Frank 
W. Abagnale, who were engaged in a cat and mouse game all throughout the film. In the 
1960’s, Frank W. Abagnale became known as an extremely successful master at forging 
IDs as well as personal and commercial checks. Since Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic 
theory became public at the beginning of the last century, catch id if you can attracts the 
attention of lay and scientific psychology. Freud (1923) considered the id to be the deep, 
inaccessible part of personality. One may hypothesize about the id impulses that made, for 
example, someone like Frank W. Abagnale pretend to be someone else at any costs, 
including the forgery of official documents. 
In the last five decades, Social Cognition research has made progress towards 
finding the tools to identify and measure the “deep, inaccessible” aspects of individuals 
(e.g., Bless, Fiedler, & Strack, 2003; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Wyer & Srull, 1994). 
Current models conceptualize human behavior and experience as the function of two 
different systems of information processing, that is, the reflective and the impulsive system 
(Strack & Deutsch, in press). In the present work, knowledge representations in the 
reflective and the impulsive system are conceptualized as explicit and implicit 
representations, respectively. Recently, indirect measures were developed that allow for 
the assessment of implicit representations. Indirect measures, in contrast to direct 
questionnaire measures, are chronometric procedures that avoid directly asking the 
respondents about their judgments. The most influential class of indirect measures used to 
this date are the Implicit Association Tests (IATs) by Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 
(1998). 
In the present work, I employ indirect measures to assess the implicit personality 
self-concept, that is, implicit representations of one’s own personality. In three studies, I 
explore the following psychometric properties of indirect measures using the traits of 
shyness, anxiousness, and angriness as examples. First, are indirect measures less fakable 
than direct measures? Second, what is the convergent validity between the IATs and a new 
class of indirect measures, the Implicit Association Procedures (IAPs)? Third, do indirect 
measures increase the prediction of behavior? Fourth, do indirect measures allow for the 
concurrent assessment of different personality traits? 
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Before I try to answer these questions I wish to thank the following persons who 
helped me in my work. First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to Elina 
Yagudayev-Guralnik for stylistic corrections, thoughtful comments, and helpful 
suggestions concerning my writing. I also would like to thank the lab members of the 
department of Personality Psychology at Humboldt University, particularly Rainer Banse 
(now at the University of York), Jaap Denissen, Franz Neyer, and Sarah Teige who shared 
their theoretical and practical knowledge of psychology during countless collegial chats.  
I thank Harald Schneider for technical support, and the following students for their 
help as experimenters or role play partners: Stefanie Bublitz, Jekatarina Cechini, Andrea 
Grasse, Susanne Hillenkamp, Vincenzo Kreft, Stephanie Krumnow, Sebastian Kunert, Jana 
Lüdtke, Dennis Mocigemba, Kristin Müller, Moritz Röhl, Susanne Scheibe, Ulrike Schild, 
Tanja Schneider, Anja Sussujew, Sarah Teige, Benjamin Uebel, and Anja Weyl.  
I am also deeply grateful to Miguel Brendl and Claude Messner for offering the 
EMA’s Turbo Pascal software, and to Boris Egloff and Monika Wiedig for their helpful 
comments on the emotion inductions that were used in Study 2. My special thanks to the 
participants whose willingness to engage in the lab experiments made this research 
possible.  
Last but never least, I wish to thank my advisor, Professor Asendorpf, for all his 
guidance as well as knowledge shared during the preparation of this work. Considering 
explicit and implicit representations, I think that I learned a great deal. 
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2 Theory 
The first sections of the Theory chapter are devoted to the theoretical 
conceptualization of the explicit and the implicit personality self-concept. Following this, 
different indirect measures are discussed, and the Implicit Association Tests are presented 
in detail. The final section deals with the personality traits of shyness, anxiousness, and 
angriness that were assessed in the present studies. 
2.1 Explicit and Implicit Personality Self-Concept 
Individuals process information in two different ways (e.g., Strack & Deutsch, in 
press). For instance, a person may feel optimistic about her or his life deliberately as a way 
of positive thinking or automatically due to positive bias. Deliberate thinking and 
automatic bias, however, differ with respect to how information is processed and how 
information is made available. In one way, information is processed reflectively, and is 
accessible through introspection. In the other way, information is processed impulsively, 
and is accessible only indirectly. The deliberate and the automatic way may be assigned to 
different systems of information processing, that is, the Reflective and the Impulsive 
System (Strack & Deutsch, in press). To differentiate between the information 
representations of both systems at the construct level, representations in the Reflective 
System are labeled as explicit representations, and representations in the Impulsive System 
as implicit representations. Generally, this work deals with the differences and similarities 
between explicit and implicit representations.  
Specifically, the goal of this work is to study explicit and implicit representations of 
the personality self-concept. The personality self-concept may be defined as an associative 
network containing all of the associations between the concept of self and personality-
describing attributes (Asendorpf, Banse, & Mücke, 2002). Personality-describing attributes 
refer to individual, relatively stable characteristics of the person, yet, do not include 
pathological attributes (e.g., agoraphobic) as well as cultural or human universals (e.g., 
German, vertebrate).  
This definition of the personality self-concept is in line with Greenwald, Banaji, 
Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, and Mellot (2002) who argued that information about social 
objects, social groups, and the self is stored in Social Knowledge Structures. Social 
Knowledge Structures consist of concepts, that is, representations of persons, groups, or 
attributes, and associations between these concepts. Thus, the representation of one’s own 
Theory 4 
personality, that is, the personality self-concept, is part of the Social Knowledge Structures. 
Unlike Greenwald et al.’s (2002) self-concept definition, the personality self-concept 
includes aspects of self-esteem. Thus, associations between the concept of self and 
attribute concepts containing a positive or negative valence (e.g., agreeable, disagreeable) 
are also part of the personality self-concept as long as these attributes describe stable, 
nonpathological interindividual differences. Shyness, anxiousness, and angriness are 
examples of personality-describing attributes that are not neutral with respect to valence. 
These attributes or personality traits were studied both as explicit and implicit 
representations within the personality self-concept. 
In brief, explicit and implicit representations are considered as interacting entities 
that have different ways of transcribing information from the associative store (for a 
different conceptualization cf. Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). Thus, explicit and 
implicit representations are not analogous to the distinction between explicit and implicit 
memory (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Implicit memory refers to learning effects for which 
individuals lack awareness (e.g., Schacter, 1987). In contrast, implicit representations are 
not unaware by definition, and differ from explicit representations with respect to how they 
provide access to the associative store. The associative store contains all of a person’s 
knowledge in terms of elements that are associated by episodic or semantic links (Strack & 
Deutsch, in press). Social Knowledge Structures (Greenwald et al., 2002) are the part of 
the associative store that refers to social objects, social groups, or the self. A more specific 
definition of explicit and implicit representations will be given in the following section, 
after the Reflective-Impulsive Model from Strack and Deutsch is discussed. 
2.2 Reflective and Impulsive Information Processing 
Recently, Strack and Deutsch (in press) presented an exemplary two-systems model 
that comprises and expands previous dual-process models (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; 
Epstein, 1994; Fazio, 1990; Smith & De Coster, 2000; Wilson et al., 2000; Sloman, 1996). 
The model proposes that perception, thinking, and behavior are functions of two different 
systems of information processing: the Reflective and the Impulsive System (see 
Figure 1).  
In the Reflective System, behavior is the result of a decision process. The process 
starts with a perceptual input that is translated into knowledge, that is, a propositional 
categorization. This induces a reasoning process that leads from a noetic, that is, conscious, 
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decision to a behavioral decision. For instance, if a young man notices an elderly person in 
a bus, he generates the proposition “this is an elderly person” by combining the concepts 
“elderly” and “person” with the relation “is a”. This propositional categorization may be 
extended with the concepts “standing” and “tired”, and could induce a reasoning process 
that, for example, it is not good for an elderly person to stand. The reasoning process then 
leads to the noetic decision that the elderly person had better take a seat. Before the young 
man makes a behavioral decision, he looks around for a free seat, checks out whether 
somebody else is ready to offer it, and reflects upon offering his own seat. Finally, he 
decides to give up his seat and stands up. Intending is what controls his behavior then, until 
his aim is realized. Intending will eventually stop his behavior when the elderly person gets 
off at next station. 
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Figure 1. Strack and Deutsch’s (in press) Reflective-Impulsive Model of information 
processing. 
 
In the Impulsive System, behavior is generated by the spread of activation from 
perception and imagination to motor schemata, and by motivational orientations. For 
instance, the young man on the bus may himself move more slowly than he usually does, 
because the elderly person activated such a stereotype (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). 
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His willingness to offer his seat may be strengthened by approach motivation if the elderly 
person looks amiable. In contrast, the young man may abstain from offering his seat if the 
person strengthens his avoidance motivation by looking very unfriendly. 
The two systems differ with respect to their structural components, processes, and 
states. The structural components of the Reflective System are concepts that are retrieved 
from the Impulsive System. These concepts are linked by assigning a truth-value to their 
relation, whereby the relation is classified as either true or false. The outcome is a 
propositional categorization. In contrast, the structural components of the Impulsive 
System are concepts that are associated by episodic and semantic links. These links emerge 
due to activation in close temporal and spatial contiguity without the assignment of any 
truth-value. This means that the Impulsive System, in contrast to the Reflective System, is 
not able to negate information. Whereas the Impulsive System is considered as a long-term 
storage, the Reflective System has properties of a short-term memory.  
Information processing in the Reflective System is a sequence of several decisions 
that include reasoning and intending. This decision process is flexible, and is able to 
construct and transform knowledge. Yet, it is slow as it requires intentional resources. In 
the Impulsive System, information is processed associatively whereby activation spreads 
using the episodic and semantic links within the associative store. This process is rigid and 
inflexible but fast. 
The state of awareness in the Reflective System is described as noetic, that is, it 
consists of knowledge about the information that is processed. For instance, the young man 
on the bus knows that he thinks about offering a seat to the elderly person and what kind of 
behavior he regards to be more polite. In contrast, he may feel tired because he had a hard 
day at work without necessarily knowing it. This state of awareness accompanies the 
Impulsive System, and is described as experiential. It consists of a feeling like being tired, 
happy, sad, and so forth.  
The Reflective and the Impulsive System have a final common pathway to behavior 
represented by motor schemata. Motor schemata are subsumed to the Impulsive System. 
They comprise frequently co-occurring motor-representations in sensory-motor clusters. 
Motor schemata are activated by input of the Reflective and the Impulsive System and 
elicit overt behavior if a given threshold is exceeded. Depending on the compatibility of 
the motor schemata, the Reflective and the Impulsive System may interact synergistically 
or antagonistically. For instance, participants judged foreign statements as more 
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convincing, when they nodded rather than shook their head. This was true even if the 
nodding and shaking was disguised as testing headphones for use on dance floors (Wells & 
Petty, 1980). In most cultures, nodding is a nonverbal signal for agreement. Therefore, the 
Impulsive System associates motor-schemata for nodding with agreement behavior. 
Consequently, nodding strengthens the persuasive power of arguments that are processed 
within the Reflective System and makes the arguments more convincing. On contrary, 
shaking one’s head is associated with disagreement, and, therefore, weakens the persuasive 
power of arguments. The ways of interaction between the Impulsive and the Reflective 
System are manifold, and may take place at every step of information processing. 
However, there is an asymmetry such that the Reflective System always involves the 
activation of the Impulsive System, whereas the Impulsive System is able to process 
information without inferences from the Reflective System. 
To summarize the characteristics of both systems, the Reflective System generates 
knowledge through propositional categorization and allows for the intentional control of 
behavior. In contrast, the Impulsive System represents an associative network that binds 
together frequently co-occurring perceptual or behavioral features without any intentional 
controllability. Nevertheless, reflective operations may have an effect on the Impulsive 
System. Since information processing in the Reflective System is based on elements that 
are retrieved from the Impulsive System, reflective operations also influence the 
associative links in the Impulsive System. As a consequence, frequent propositional 
categorizations reorganize the associative store and form associative clusters that differ in 
abstractness. Thus, the associative clusters may represent concrete perceptual concepts or 
more abstract semantic concepts or schemata. However, the clusters are not assumed to 
comprise any semantic meaning by themselves, and their elements are only related due to 
frequently co-occurring activation.  
Returning to the conceptualization of explicit and implicit representations, the 
Reflective-Impulsive Model is convenient to elaborate on their specific characteristics. 
Explicit representations correspond to the propositional categorizations of the Reflective 
System, that is, explicit representations consist of concepts that are linked by assigning a 
truth-value to their relationship. Therefore, explicit representations are introspectively 
accessible. Implicit representations correspond to the associative clusters of the Impulsive 
System, that is, implicit representations consist of concepts that are linked as a result of 
frequent co-activation. Therefore, implicit representations are accessible only through 
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procedures that are sensitive for the effects of frequent co-activation. Indirect measures are 
assumed to represent such procedures.  
The manifold interaction between the Reflective and the Impulsive System does not 
imply that explicit and implicit representations are always different from each other with 
respect to the content of information they comprise. However, explicit and implicit 
representations are always different with respect to the form in which information is made 
available. To illustrate the differences between explicit and implicit representations a 
painting may help, e.g. Caravaggio’s “Amor Victorious”. Consider a thought experiment in 
which a person goes in an art gallery, looks at the painting, and tries to make notes. 
Writing a description of the painting stands for explicit representations. Preparing a pencil 
drawing of the painting stands for implicit representations. The pencil drawing, if it’s well 
done, is a fairly analogous representation of the painting. That means, the pencil drawing 
represents the objects and their locations as they are on the painting, e.g. that Cupid sits on 
a bed next to a crown, upon a celestial globe, with music instruments and pieces of a body 
armor next to his feet. In contrast, the written description may list all of these things, and 
additionally tell that Cupid celebrates a triumph over the symbols of power, science, art, 
and glory. Thus, the written description is a fairly abstract representation of the painting. 
In order to elaborate this metaphor, consider that the person prepared both a pencil 
drawing and a written description of the painting. At home, the person tells a friend about 
the painting and shows her or him the drawing and the text. The drawing gives a direct 
impression about the original whereas the text gives useful comments. The text may be 
improved from looking at the drawing, but it is rather hard to improve the drawing only 
with the information provided in the text. The relation between the drawing and the text 
stands for the interactions between explicit and implicit representations. Explicit 
representations, the text, consist of concepts that are retrieved from implicit 
representations, the drawing, and that undergo a process of reasoning and intending. The 
outcome of this process is a series of propositions, i.e. clear statements about what and why 
is depicted on the painting. The friend who reads the text and looks at the drawing stands 
for a psychologist who employs either direct questionnaire measures or indirect assessment 
procedures. Obviously, the best thing is to use both. 
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2.3 Direct and Indirect Measures of the Personality Self-Concept 
There is confusion about a common terminology for direct and indirect measures 
(Fazio & Olson, 2003). To resolve the confusion, in this work, the terms explicit and 
implicit representations are used as labels for the constructs, whereas the procedures to 
assess these constructs are labeled as direct and indirect measures, respectively. It should, 
nevertheless, be noted that, in current literature, direct measures are also referred to as 
explicit measures, and indirect measures as implicit, unobtrusive, non-reactive, or 
projective measures. Direct measures openly ask individuals to inform about their 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. In contrast, indirect measures draw inferences from the 
individuals’ reactions in different types of tests and procedures.  
Whether direct or indirect, both measures have to meet psychometric criteria to 
serve as instruments that are apt to assess interindividual differences. Psychometric criteria 
refer to aspects of objectivity, reliability, and validity. Objectivity indicates the 
independence of a measure from situational effects. Reliability refers to the internal 
consistency or test-retest stability of a measure. Validity informs about what is assessed or 
predicted by a measure. (Different aspects of validity are discussed in Chapter 2.5.) 
Examples of direct measures to assess different aspects of the personality self-
concept are manifold, for example, the Revised NEO Personality Inventory from Costa and 
McCrae (1992). Direct measures are based on verbal self-report and rely on information 
that is intentionally given to inform about the self. In various domains, direct measures 
were shown to possess satisfactory psychometric properties (e.g., Pervin & John, 2001).  
Examples of indirect measures are projective procedures, procedures that are based 
on linguistic effects, and chronometric procedures. Projective procedures, like the 
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT, Murray, 1943), employ the presentation of ambiguous 
stimuli. Respondents are assumed to project their own thoughts, feelings, and behaviors 
onto these stimuli. Projective procedures are criticized to be overly susceptible to 
contextual influences, and to show poor or moderate inter-rater reliability, as well as low 
reliability and validity (e.g., Aiken, 1996). Additionally, projective procedures are usually 
very time consuming.  
A procedure that explores linguistic effects is the Adult Attachment Interview 
(George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985). In this interview, the detailed and specific report of 
experiences with one’s own parents indicates secure rather than insecure attachment styles. 
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The interview is very time consuming. Nevertheless, the results of interviewed parents 
show good predictive validity for the attachment behavior of their child (van Ijzendoorn, 
1995).  
Chronometric procedures are based on response latencies. Examples of 
chronometric procedures are priming methods (e.g., Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
Kardes, 1986) and the Implicit Association Tests (Greenwald et al., 1998). Priming 
methods explore whether the presentation of a stimulus, that is, the prime, influences the 
speed of response to a different stimulus, that is, the target. Priming methods were shown 
to be valid for the study of sample means and group differences (for a review, see Fazio & 
Olson, 2003). However, priming methods reach only low effect sizes, and show small to 
moderate reliability at best (e.g., Kawakami & Dovidio, 2001). In contrast, the Implicit 
Association Tests or IATs (Greenwald et al., 1998) were shown to meet psychometric 
criteria for the assessment of the personality self-concept (e.g., Asendorpf et al., 2002; 
Egloff & Schmukle, 2002). I refer to IAT measures in plural to make it clear that they 
represent different applications of a general procedure rather than a specific test (cf. 
Fiedler, Messner, & Blümke, 2003). The general IAT procedure is described in detail in 
the following section. 
Although indirect measures revealed weaker psychometric qualities than direct 
measures in most cases, indirect measures were always a matter of enormous interest in 
psychological research (for a review, see Fazio & Olson, 2003). The reasons for this 
fascination refer to two limitations of direct measures (Greenwald & Farnham, 1995). 
First, direct measures rely on verbal report that is intentionally given to inform about the 
self. Therefore, direct measures are susceptible to self-presentational biases. Second, direct 
measures rely on representations of the personality self-concept that are accessible through 
introspection. Therefore, direct measures may not reflect the entirety of an individual’s 
knowledge about his or her personality.  
Altogether, direct measures of the personality self-concept aim to assess the 
knowledge about one’s personality that is embodied in explicit representations. Indirect 
measures aim to assess the knowledge about one’s personality that is embodied in implicit 
representations. The next section describes an indirect chronometric procedure, the Implicit 
Association Tests, in more detail. 
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2.4 Implicit Association Tests (IATs) 
This section deals with the Implicit Association Tests (IATs) that had an enormous 
impact on psychological research since the initial publication five years ago (Greenwald et 
al., 1998). The IATs are referred to in plural to indicate that they represent a general 
measurement procedure rather than a specific test. The first section of this section presents 
the sequence of tasks that is realized by all IATs. In the second section, different accounts 
for the effects of IATs are discussed. 
2.4.1 The Procedure of IATs 
Implicit Association Tests are designed to compare speed of response between two 
different pairings of a double discrimination task. One discrimination task asks for the 
categorization of a binary target concept, for example, ‘flower’ versus ‘insect’ The other 
discrimination task asks for the categorization of a binary attribute concept, for example, 
‘positive’ versus ‘negative’. An IAT pairs both categorizations within a double 
discrimination task, and implements the two possible pairings. One pairing requires one 
response for one target and one attribute category, and another response for the alternative 
target and the alternative attribute category. The other pairing leaves responses for the 
attribute categories the same but exchanges the responses for the target categories.  
An IAT starts by introducing participants to the target, and, subsequently, to the 
attribute concept. For instance, an IAT that assesses attitudes toward flowers and insects 
first trains participants to press the left response key when a flower name is presented on 
the screen and the right response key when an insect name is presented on the screen (see 
Table 1). In the second sequence, participants are trained to press the left key for positive 
words and the right key for negative words. The third sequence combines the target and the 
attribute discrimination, and asks participants to respond left to flower names or positive 
words, and right to insect names or negative words. The fourth sequence reverses the target 
discrimination, and assigns the left response to insect names and the right response to 
flower names. Finally, the fifth sequence combines the attribute and the previously 
reversed target discrimination, and asks participants to respond left to insect names or 
positive words, and right to flower names or negative words.  
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Table 1 
Task Sequence and Stimuli of an Implicit Association Test to Measure Attitudes toward 
Flowers and Insects 
  Response key assignment 
Sequence Task Left key Right key 
1 Target discrimination Flower Insect 
2 Attribute discrimination Positive Negative 
3 Initial combined task Flower, positive Insect, negative 
4 Reversed target discrimination Insect Flower 
5 Reversed combined task Insect, positive Flower, negative 
 Target concept Attribute concept 
Categories Flower Insect Positive Negative 
Sample stimuli aster fly caress abuse 
 hyacinth cockroach freedom crash 
 crocus mosquito health filth 
 iris wasp love murder 
 rose termite peace sickness 
Note. Sample stimuli correspond to Greenwald et al. (1998). 
 
For the calculation of IAT scores, or IAT effects, only response latencies within the 
combined tasks are relevant. Various variants of IAT scores are based upon the difference 
in mean response latencies in sequence 5 minus sequence 3. Thus, if participants are 
quicker in combining flower names + positive words and insect names + negative words 
relatively to the reverse pairing, they attain low latencies in sequence 3 and high latencies 
in sequence 5. This would result in a positive IAT score. Normally, participants evaluate 
flowers more positively than insects on direct attitude measures (Greenwald et al. 1998). 
This was equally indicated in the indirect measure by a positive IAT effect. Greenwald and 
colleagues (1998) concluded that quicker responses plausibly reflect stronger associations 
for flower + positive and insect + negative relatively to flower + negative and insect + 
positive. The combined task that reveals quicker responses in most respondents is often 
referred to as the ‘compatible’ task. Thus, in the flower-insect attitude IAT, the flower + 
positive and insect + negative pairing would represent the ‘compatible’ task. 
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The conventional IAT scoring algorithm was presented in the initial publication of 
IAT data (Greenwald et al., 1998). This procedure discarded training trials from the 
combined blocks, and was based on log-transformed latencies. Recently, Greenwald, 
Nosek, and Banaji (2003) proposed an improved algorithm for IAT scores that are referred 
to as D measures. D measures (a) employ untransformed response latencies from all trials 
of the combined blocks, (b) include a latency penalty for error trials, and (c) are 
individually calibrated by each respondent’s standard deviation of latencies. D measures 
outperformed the conventional IAT scores with regard to several criteria. In contrast to 
conventional scores, D measures were more resistant to contamination by response speed 
differences, and less affected by prior experiences with the IAT procedure. D measures are 
also yielded in larger effect sizes and higher correlations with direct self-report measures. 
One limitation that results from the procedure of IATs is that it is confined to 
relative association strength: An IAT effect reflects the association strength of one pairing 
of target and attribute categories relatively to the reverse pairing. For instance, a positive 
flower-insect IAT score in the above example merely reflects that one evaluates flowers 
more positively, or less negatively, than insects. This does not illuminate whether one 
endorses either positive or negative attitudes toward either flowers or insects. Thus, IATs 
assess associations between an attribute concept and a target category only in relation to an 
opposing target category. 
Therefore, alternatives to the IAT were developed to allow for single target 
categories, that is, the EASTs (“Extrinsic Affective Simon Tasks”, De Houwer, 2003a), the 
EMAs (“Evaluative Movement Assessments”, Brendl, Markmann, & Messner, 2003), the 
GNATs (“Go/No-Go Association Tasks”, Nosek & Banaji, 2001), and the STIATs 
(“Single Target IATs”, Wigboldus, 2003). A variant of the EMA, the Indirect Association 
Procedure (IAP) was developed in Study 1 to assess the implicit self-concept of shyness. 
This procedure is described in the pilot studies of Study 1. The other procedures are not 
discussed in more detail because they are not directly related to this research. The common 
goal of all of these measures is to assess associations between concepts by contrasting 
opposing pairings of the concepts. 
A second limitation of the IAT is that it may not be unquestionably qualified as an 
indirect or an unobtrusive measure. Indirectness usually refers to (a) unawareness, and 
therefore (b) uncontrollability of what is measured by a certain procedure (Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995). However, the first aspect, unawareness, is not true for IATs as they 
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explicitly introduce the target and the attribute concept. Concerning the second aspect, 
uncontrollability, empirical evidence shows that IATs can be both robust against (Banse, 
Seise, & Zerbes, 2001; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Kim, 2003) and susceptible to (Fiedler 
& Blümke, 2003) volitional influences. Nevertheless, IATs were fakable only when 
participants were informed beforehand how the calculation of the IAT score works (Fiedler 
& Blümke, 2003). In addition, IAT results can be influenced by mind sets of the 
participants that they more or less deliberately acquire before the test (see the special issue 
of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 2001). Among the new tests only 
the EAST (De Houwer, 2003a) does not explicitly introduce the target concept. In this 
work, IATs are labeled as indirect measures because they aim to assess implicit 
representations. However, this does not imply that the procedure and the outcome of IATs 
are necessarily unaware and uncontrollable. 
The third limitation of IATs is that they do not allow for the simultaneous 
assessment of multiple target or attribute concepts. Particularly in research on personality 
differences, one is often interested in simultaneously assessing numerous personality-
describing attributes with the IAT, as it is possible in direct questionnaire measures. 
Among the new tests, the EMA (Brendl et al, 2003) and the EAST (De Houwer, 2003a) 
allow for multiple concepts although right now empirical evidence is lacking that these 
procedures assess multiple implicit concepts without major confounds between them. 
2.4.2 Accounts for the IAT effect 
IATs operate on the basic premise that it is easier to pair two highly associated 
concepts in one response than to separate them in different responses (Greenwald & 
Nosek, 2001). However, this does not elucidate (a) how the pairing of associated concepts 
facilitates the response, (b) whether this is uniquely driven by association strength or by 
other aspects of conceptual propinquity, and (c) what the method-specific influences of the 
IAT are. In contrast to the manifold research on the validity of IATs (for reviews see, e.g., 
Fazio & Olson, 2003; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2003), only a 
few studies have looked at the underlying cognitive mechanisms that produce the IAT 
effect.  
Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) accentuated the similarities between IATs and 
evaluative priming (Fazio et al., 1986). According to the authors, both kinds of tasks are 
based on the assumption that attitudes are activated automatically, and, therefore, facilitate 
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the processing of evaluatively congruent stimuli. For both tasks, the strength of response 
facilitation is considered to be a measure of the strength with which the attitude object is 
automatically associated with a positive or negative evaluation. However, Mierke and 
Klauer (2001) outlined differences between IATs and priming, considering both the 
semantic and the evaluative priming task. These authors mentioned that the spreading 
activation account that was shown to explain semantic (Neely, 1991) and evaluative 
(Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; for a different explanation, see De Houwer, 
Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002; Klauer & Musch, 2003) priming effects is 
incapable of explaining IAT effects. Originally, the spreading activation theory was used to 
describe information processing in semantic networks as a spread of activation between 
interconnected nodes that represent units of conceptual knowledge (Collins & Loftus, 
1975). Given this conceptualization, the spreading activation model is unable to explain 
differences between the compatible and the incompatible IAT pairing, because both are 
identical with respect to stimulus composition, and, thus, also with respect to stimulus-
triggered activation patterns (Mierke & Klauer, 2001). 
Nevertheless, spreading activation may still be an appropriate metaphor for 
describing differences between IAT pairings in regards to the broader view of the two-
systems model of Strack and Deutsch (2003). According to this model, spreading 
activation is the universal method of information processing within the Impulsive System, 
and provides, more or less, direct links between perceptual inputs and motor schemata. 
These links may be offered more easily if associated inputs - that is, inputs producing 
somehow similar activation patterns - are matched to identical motor schemata. In contrast, 
if unassociated inputs - that is, inputs producing different activation patterns - have to be 
matched to identical motor schemata, direct stimulus-response links may be hindered.  
This view corresponds to the assumption of learned associations between the 
response keys and the assigned attribute category (Neumann et al., 1998) as well as to the 
stimulus-response compatibility mechanism (De Houwer, 2001, 2003b). This mechanism 
argues that there is a compatibility between stimulus and response in the compatible 
pairing because responses are unambiguously associated with an evaluative or semantic 
meaning. In contrast, stimulus-response compatibility is missing in the incompatible 
pairing because response representations are ambiguous with respect to a certain meaning. 
According to De Houwer, stimulus-response compatibility stems from the relevant feature 
rather than from the irrelevant feature of target exemplars. The relevant feature reflects the 
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assignment of the target exemplars to a target category, for example, “flower” or “insect”. 
The irrelevant feature reflects the overlap of the target exemplars with an attribute 
category, for example, “positive” or “negative”. Although the relevant and the irrelevant 
features are perfectly confounded in typical IATs, the relevant feature of target exemplars 
seems to be also relevant for the IAT effect. De Houwer (2001) showed that the positive or 
negative valence of target exemplars had little or no impact on the IAT effect. Therefore, 
he employed an IAT that assessed the attitudes of British participants towards British 
versus foreign names. This IAT revealed a preference for combining British names with 
positive attributes that was not distorted by the valence of British (e.g., Princess Diana or 
Margaret Thatcher) and foreign (e.g., Albert Einstein or Adolf Hitler) names. 
The stimulus-response compatibility model may also account for the frequently 
replicated finding that the IAT effect is smaller if the incompatible pairing is completed 
before the compatible pairing (Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji, 2003). If participants are first 
trained in the incompatible pairing that there is no contingency between the response keys 
and evaluative or semantic meanings, this has to be extinguished in the compatible pairing. 
In contrast, if participants first learn that there is stimulus-response compatibility and 
afterward have to ignore stimulus-response incompatibility, they show larger IAT effects. 
Recently, the effect of task order was shown to be considerably reduced if additional trials 
in the reversed target discrimination (sequence 4 in Table 1) were added (Nosek, 
Greenwald, & Banaji, 2003). Thus, the impact of a preceding compatible or incompatible 
pairing on the second combined task seems to be minimized, if participants spend more 
time training the reversed target discrimination. This provides further evidence for a 
stimulus-response compatibility model, that is, the influence of learned associations 
between the concept categories and the response keys. 
Of course, whether a pairing may be referred to as compatible or incompatible 
depends on the responses of the participant. Usually, the ‘compatible’ pairing is 
operationally defined as the IAT task that is completed the quickest for the majority of 
participants. Therefore, differential effects of task order are not only relevant to interpret 
IAT scores for participants with different task order, but also for participants with the 
identical task order. Importantly, for participants with positive IAT scores, that is, 
participants that are quicker in the first and ‘compatible’ pairing, the differences between 
the compatible and the incompatible pairing are maximized through the task order effect. 
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For participants with negative scores, that is, participants that are quicker in the second and 
‘incompatible’ pairing, the differences between the pairings are minimized.  
Consequently, if one is interested in employing the task order effect to maximize 
differences within a group of participants, the pairing which is compatible for the 
respective group should be placed first. For instance, if one explores differences between 
shy and moderately shy participants, that is, participants which are all quicker in 
combining ‘me’ + ‘shy’ and ‘others’ + ‘nonshy’ relative to the reverse pairing, the ‘me’ + 
‘shy’ pairing should be put first. However, if one explores differences that are 
symmetrically distributed around zero, the differential effect of task order should be 
removed through additional trials in the reversed target discrimination (Nosek et al., 2003). 
Anyhow, if interindividual differences in addition to cross-group groups differences are the 
matter of interest, the task order should never be counterbalanced across participants. 
Otherwise, order variance is confounded with interindividual variance. 
Karpinski and Hilton (2001) suggested that IATs are influenced by environmental 
associations. These authors employed an IAT to explore the malleability of attitudes 
toward youth and elderly. When participants were exposed to youth + negative and 
elderly + positive word pairings, the IAT effect was less biased toward youth + positive. 
Direct attitude measures, in contrast, were unaffected by the manipulation (Karpinski & 
Hilton, 2001, Study 3). The authors concluded that IATs reflect associations one has 
encountered in environment. These associations, however, do not reveal personal attitudes 
of participants. Importantly, in this study, the IAT effect was only modified by the 
manipulation but not completely reversed. Moreover, even if IATs are susceptible to 
learning experiences, this may also indicate the effects of these experiences on the 
individual’s implicit attitudes rather than merely environmental associations (cf. Dasgupta 
& Greenwald, 2001). 
Mierke and Klauer (2001, in press) reported a task-switching account of the IAT 
effect that also explains method-specific variance in IATs. The model states that attribute-
related information is sufficient for fast and accurate responding within the compatible 
condition. Therefore, in this condition participants neglect to switch between target-based 
and attribute-based decision on a substantial proportion of trials. As participants neglect to 
switch, they also avoid task-switching costs. However, task-switching costs cannot be 
evaded and therefore affect response latencies in the incompatible condition. 
Consequently, Mierke and Klauer (2001) showed that switching between target and 
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attribute discrimination produced significantly more costs in the incompatible than in the 
compatible IAT pairing.  
More importantly, task-switching performance was also shown to represent stable 
interindividual differences in another set of experiments. Mierke and Klauer (in press) 
demonstrated that IAT effects could be obtained with an IAT that was not based on pre-
existing associations between targets and attributes. In that instance, the IAT 
experimentally imposed a contingency between the target category (color) and the attribute 
category (size) of geometrical objects, so that all blue objects were big and all red objects 
were small. The geometrical objects IAT revealed an internally consistent IAT effect that 
correlated even with the absolute scores of an extraversion IAT, r = .39. The correlation 
was calculated using absolute scores because interindividual differences in task-switching 
performance were expected to predominantly affect the incompatible IAT pairing. Whether 
a pairing is incompatible, however, is a function of a participant rather than a function of 
an IAT. Thus, participants with poor task-switching performance slow down their 
responses in the incompatible pairing, and add an extremity bias to their IAT scores. This 
extremity bias is better represented by absolute scores rather than by IAT raw scores. Since 
no participant showed negative scores in the geometrical objects IAT, absolute scores and 
raw scores were identical for this IAT. In sum, the correlation between the geometrical 
objects IAT and the extraversion IAT could not be interpreted in terms of convergent 
validity, and indicated a reliable contamination of both IATs with method-specific 
variance. 
Interestingly, the correlation between the geometrical objects IAT and the 
extraversion IAT was rendered not significant when IAT scores were computed as D 
measures. D measures are individually standardized for latency variability and refer to the 
improved scoring algorithm from Greenwald et al. (2003) (see Chapter 2.4.1). This 
individual calibration seems to control for method-specific variance that is produced by 
task-switching costs. 
Brendl, Markman, and Messner (2001) suggested a random walk model with 
variable response thresholds in order to explain IAT effects. The model posits that 
information on incoming IAT stimuli is accumulated until a certain response threshold is 
reached. In the compatible pairing, valence and concept information on target stimuli 
contributes simultaneously to reach the response threshold. In the incompatible pairing, 
valence information and concept information on target stimuli are conflicting, and 
Theory 19 
contribute oppositely to reach the threshold. According to the authors, this leads to a 
criterion shift and higher response thresholds for targets and attributes, thus, to generally 
slower responses within the incompatible condition. However, the notion of a general 
criterion shift would not explain differential effects of task-switching that were reported by 
Mierke and Klauer (in press). 
Rothermund and Wentura (2001, 2003) suggested a figure-ground model of IAT 
effects. According to this model, the two target categories as well as the two attribute 
categories differ with respect to salience. The salient category of a target and an attribute 
concept serve as “figure” on the “ground” of the opposing nonsalient category. During the 
compatible IAT pairing, both salient categories are mapped to one response key, and both 
nonsalient categories to the other response key. Therefore, participants can base the 
discrimination of categories on the figure-ground information alone. In a series of different 
experiments, Rothermund and Wentura (2001, 2003) dissociated effects of salience from 
effects of association strength, and showed that salience asymmetries may produce IAT 
effects. The authors concluded, that IAT effects do not necessarily rely on associations 
between categories. However, this does not rule out that associations may produce IAT 
effects as well, and that salience asymmetries themselves may be the result of associations. 
For instance, in the flower/insect IAT, insects may be the salient category because they are 
associated with negative valence. Thus, salience asymmetries may simply reflect different 
associations of flowers and insects with positive and negative attributes. Furthermore, 
Mierke and Klauer (in press) showed that salience asymmetries, as well as associations, are 
not a necessary precondition for IAT effects. 
Steffens et al. (2003) proposed a two-factor model and classified previous accounts 
of the IAT effect into those that are concept-based and those that are stimulus-based. 
Concept-based accounts concentrate on target-attribute associations at the concept level, 
whereas stimulus-based accounts concentrate on individual features of target and attribute 
exemplars. Steffens et al. (2003) concluded that both accounts contribute to the IAT effect, 
and labeled the former as task factor, and the latter as stimulus factor. The task factor and 
the stimulus factor are similar to the relevant and irrelevant feature account from De 
Houwer (2001, 2003b), respectively, but they refer to features of both, the target and the 
attribute concept. The task factor accounts for a simplified task representation throughout 
the compatible IAT pairing because of a dimensional overlap (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & 
Osman, 1990) between the target and the attribute concept. Thus, in the compatible 
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pairing, participants do not need to base their discriminations on target and attribute 
information, but may simply employ the overlapping dimension (e.g., valence). Therefore, 
participants are faster in the compatible than in the incompatible pairing.  
The stimulus factor accounts for a modification of the task factor because of 
consistent or inconsistent cross-category associations. For consistent cross-category 
associations, there is a dimensional overlap between the target exemplars and the attribute 
concept, or between the attribute exemplars and the target concept, that goes beyond the 
dimensional overlap between the two concepts. For inconsistent cross-category 
associations, there is a dimensional overlap between the exemplars and the nonrelevant 
concept, which is the opposite of the dimensional overlap between the two concepts. 
To illustrate different cross-category associations, I employ the categories and 
stimuli that I already discussed about in De Houwer’s (2001) experiment. As one may 
recall, British participants were quicker in pairing the target category ‘British name’ with 
the attribute category ‘positive’ and the target category ‘foreign name’ with the attribute 
category ‘negative’ than in the reverse pairing. However, exemplars of both target 
categories differed with regards to their associations with the attribute categories. For 
consistent cross-category associations, these associations equaled the association between 
the target and the attribute concept, that is, British names represented positive persons 
(e.g., Princess Diana) and foreign names represented negative persons (e.g., Adolf Hitler). 
For inconsistent cross-category associations, these associations were in opposition to the 
association between the target and the attribute concept, that is, British names represented 
negative persons (e.g., Margaret Thatcher) and foreign names represented positive persons 
(e.g., Albert Einstein). Thus, cross-category associations of stimuli are described as 
consistent when they match the compatible pairing of the two concepts, whereas they are 
described as inconsistent when they match the incompatible pairing of concepts.  
The notion of a dimensional overlap between targets and attributes corresponds to 
Fiedler et al.’s (2003) redundancy model of the IAT effect. Redundancy arises in a 
discrimination task if stimuli constantly differ with regard to more than one aspect (Garner, 
1969). Due to redundancy in the compatible IAT task, the discrimination of attributes 
facilitates the discrimination of targets, because the features of both concepts are 
correlated. However, the dimension in which target and attribute features correlate may be 
equally described as dimensional overlap. This overlap can occur on both, the concept 
level (i.e., the task factor) and the stimulus level (i.e., the stimulus factor). 
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Steffens and colleagues (Steffens & Plewe, 2001; Steffens et al., 2003) conducted 
several experiments to explore the influence of the task and the stimulus factor. These 
experiments differed from De Houwer’s (2001) experiment with regard to the following 
points: Steffens and colleagues (a) manipulated the cross-category associations for both 
target and attribute exemplars, (b) made sure that these manipulations were true at an 
explicit level for every single participant, (c) explored effects of different cross-category 
associations both in separate IATs and within mixed IATs, (d) employed IATs that 
assessed attitudes towards women or Germans, and (e) conducted experiments with larger 
sample sizes and more trials in the combined IAT tasks. Results showed an influence of the 
stimulus factor, that is, cross-category associations, in all experiments. As expected, the 
IAT effect was larger for consistent rather than for inconsistent cross-category 
associations. However, inconsistent cross-category associations never completely reversed 
the IAT effects. Therefore, Steffens et al. (2003) concluded that the task factor, that is, the 
dimensional overlap between the concepts, played a major role in the IAT effect but may 
be modified by stimulus features. Nevertheless, other authors showed that IAT effects may 
be even reversed for inconsistent cross-category associations (Blümke & Friese, 2003; 
Govan & Williams, 2003).  
Mitchell, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) and Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2003) 
reported results that are in agreement with the two-factor model. Mitchell and colleagues 
(2003, Experiment 1) showed that IATs with identical target exemplars (liked Black 
athletes versus disliked White politicians) revealed a more positive evaluation for Black 
athletes or for White politicians dependent on whether participants had to discriminate 
occupation (athletes versus politicians) or race (Black versus White) in the IAT. These 
results clearly underline the importance of the task-factor, that is, the concept categories. 
However, the same authors revealed that the IAT is equally sensitive to individual stimulus 
features. The effect of a racial attitude IAT was influenced dependent on whether target 
stimuli were liked Whites and disliked Blacks or disliked Whites and liked Blacks 
(Mitchell et al., 2003, Experiment 2). This is in line with the results of Nosek and 
colleagues (2003, Study 3). In this study, the effect of an IAT that assessed attitudes 
towards homosexuals was less negative when both male-male and female-female couples 
were used as targets. Therefore, Mitchell et al. (2003) came to the same conclusion as 
Steffens et al. (2003). The IAT effect depends on both the category frame, that is, the 
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target and attribute categories, and the individual exemplars, that is, the features of the 
individual stimuli. 
Concerning practical applications, one should employ stimuli that (a) well represent 
all relevant aspects of the category frame, and (b) may not be categorized according to 
concepts that differ from the category frame (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Nosek et al., 
2003). When these criteria are fulfilled, there is a good reason to assume that an IAT effect 
relies on what is represented by the category frame. Stimuli features may provide 
contextual meaning (cf. Nosek et al., 2003). However, stimuli features are unlikely to 
severely distort the IAT effect.  
To summarize the accounts for the IAT effect, the dimensional overlap between 
targets and attributes seems to play an important role in most of these accounts. The more 
dimensional overlap exists between targets and attributes, the more similar are the 
activation patterns that they produce. If similar activation patterns are matched to identical 
responses in the compatible IAT pairing, responses are facilitated. However, dimensional 
overlap is just a broader term than association strength, and does not in turn specify the 
underlying cognitive mechanisms of the IAT. Nevertheless, this notion clarified that IAT 
effects may not uniquely stem from associations but also from any features that cause 
dimensional overlap, e.g., salience, similarity, familiarity, and so forth. Salience 
asymmetries (Rothermund & Wentura, 2003) and stimulus similarity (Mierke & Klauer, in 
press) were shown to produce IAT effects, whereas familiarity has yet been ruled out as an 
alternative explanation for the IAT effect (Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000; 
Ottaway, Hayden, & Oakes, 2001, Rudman, Greenwald, Mellot, & Schwartz, 1999). 
Concerning method-specific influences, the absolute IAT scores seem to be affected by 
task-switching costs (Mierke & Klauer, 2001, in press), and the IAT effect depends upon 
features of both the employed concepts and the individual stimuli (Mitchell et al., 2003; 
Steffens et al., 2003). 
It should be noted that most of these accounts refer to effects on the IAT score. 
Only a few studies included correlations between an IAT and direct measures or between 
different IATs. Importantly, correlations between an IAT and direct measures were 
unaffected or tended to be somewhat higher even if the IAT effect was reduced by 
procedural variations or stimulus features (Mierke & Klauer, in press; Nosek et al, 2003; 
Steffens & Plewe, 2001). Task-switching costs did not only affect absolute IAT scores but 
also reliably contaminated correlations between conventionally calculated absolute IAT 
Theory 23 
scores (Mierke & Klauer, in press). One should be careful when models concerning the 
IAT effect are employed to draw conclusions about the correlations of IAT scores (cf. 
Asendorpf, 1992). 
2.5 Multitrait-Multimethod Validation of Indirect Measures 
Campbell & Fiske (1959) pointed out the employment of the multitrait-multimethod 
matrix for the validation of personality measures. Multitrait-multimethod validation means 
that more than one trait as well as more than one method are included in the validation 
process. Traits and methods are completely crossed in a matrix, such that every trait is 
assessed with every method. Nevertheless, completely crossed multitrait-multimethod 
matrices are the exception rather than the rule in the study of interindividual differences 
(Fiske, 1987). Within completely crossed designs two different aspects of validity, that is, 
convergent and discriminant validity, are analyzed simultaneously. 
Convergent validity is calculated as monotrait-heteromethod correlations, thus, as 
correlations of a single trait that was measured with different methods. Discriminant 
validity is calculated as heterotrait-monomethod and as heterotrait-heteromethod 
correlations, thus, as correlations of different traits that were measured with the same and 
with different methods, respectively. Desirably, the monotrait-heteromethod correlations 
are larger than the heterotrait-monomethod correlations. If this is not the case, data 
variance is dominated by method-specific effects rather than by trait-specific effects. 
Ideally, the heterotrait-heteromethod correlations are zero, indicating an independence of 
both traits and methods. (I ignore here that traits and methods may be inversely correlated, 
see Campbell and Fiske, 1956.) Monotrait-heteromethod correlations can than be 
unequivocally interpreted as convergent validity, and heterotrait-monomethod correlations 
can be interpreted as method-specific effects. 
Consequently, multitrait-multimethod validation implies contrasting convergent 
and discriminant validity. Convergent validity is only accepted when it is higher than 
discriminant validity, that is, when convergent validity outperforms the variance that 
methods share while assessing different traits. An example for shared method variance of 
direct questionnaire measures is their susceptibility to social desirability concerns. An 
example for shared method variance of indirect chronometric procedures – yet not for the 
IATs (Greenwald et al., 2003) – are shared interindividual differences in response latency. 
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Finally, extremity biases may represent a method factor that affects both direct and indirect 
measures (cf. Mierke & Klauer, in press). 
Following the conceptualization of explicit and implicit representations (see 
Chapter 2.2), direct and indirect measures are assumed to assess constructs that are 
partially overlapping but not identical. Thus, regarding correlations between direct and 
indirect measures it is not clear whether these correlations should be interpreted as 
convergent or as discriminant validity (cf. Greenwald et al., 2003). As a possible solution, 
direct-indirect correlations may be viewed either as convergent or as discriminant validity 
depending on whether one aims at assessing the overlap or the disparity between explicit 
and implicit representations. Nevertheless, to evaluate the specific characteristics of 
explicit and implicit representations, an effort has to be made to identify variables that are 
correlated with indirect but not with direct measures and vice versa. Therefore, other 
methods than direct measures, e.g., behavioral variables, should be included in the 
validation of indirect measures. 
Such an approach was recently chosen by Asendorpf et al. (2002) who showed a 
double dissociation between a direct shyness questionnaire and an indirect shyness IAT for 
the prediction of shy behavior. The shyness questionnaire uniquely predicted controlled 
(but not spontaneous) shy behavior, whereas the shyness IAT uniquely predicted 
spontaneous (but not controlled) shy behavior. Dissociations between direct and indirect 
measures for the prediction of controlled and spontaneous behavior were also found for 
racial attitudes (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; McConnell & Liebold, 2001) and 
for consumer attitudes (Plessner, Wänke, Friese, & Haar, 2003). Thus, the validation of 
indirect measures should include the study of convergent and discriminant validity using 
both direct measures and behavioral observations as methods.  
Additionally, the validation of indirect measures should comprise more than one 
trait, to make sure that results are not restricted to a specific trait. More importantly, in 
order to correctly evaluate the convergent validity of an indirect measure for the 
assessment of implicit representations, more than one indirect measure is needed. A 
comparison between different indirect measures is also necessary to judge the method 
effects of any specific indirect assessment procedure. In sum, not only different traits but 
also different indirect methods are crucial for the validation of the implicit self-concept. 
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2.6 Shyness, Anxiousness, and Angriness 
The following two sections deal with shyness, anxiousness, and angriness that were 
used as dependent variables for the validation of the implicit personality self-concept. The 
constructs were labeled as shyness, anxiousness, and angriness to make it clear that they 
refer to personality traits, that is, relatively stable response dispositions, and do not 
describe emotional states in specific situations (cf. Leary, 1991). Chapter 2.6.1 refers to 
Lazarus’ (1991) emotion theory and explains how personal and situational factors interact 
to develop shy, anxious, and angry behavior. Chapter 2.6.2 describes how shyness, 
anxiousness, and angriness are related to neuroticism, extraversion, and agreeableness. 
2.6.1 Shyness, Anxiousness, and Angriness and Lazarus’ Emotion Theory 
Lazarus’ (1991) emotion theory defines the formation of emotions as a function of 
a multi-level appraisal process. Appraisals are considered as reflective or impulsive 
decisions that estimate a given person-environment relationship and evolve a particular 
emotion. Each emotion is qualified by its unique core relational theme. The core relational 
theme summarizes personal harms or benefits that result from the person-environment 
relationship. The core relational theme for anxiety is defined as “facing uncertain, 
existential threat”, and for anger as “a demeaning offense against me and mine” (p. 122).  
To construct the core relational theme, an appraisal process generates different 
evaluative patterns that discriminate among emotions. Therefore, the appraisal process 
involves a set of primary and secondary appraisals. Primary appraisals concern the 
motivational aspects and the personal stakes in a person-environment encounter. Primary 
appraisals include three components, which are goal relevance, goal congruence or 
incongruence, and type of ego-involvement. Goal relevance refers to whether an encounter 
affects personal goals. Goal congruence or incongruence is concerned with whether the 
encounter facilitates or thwarts personal goals. Type of ego-involvement deals with aspects 
of ego-identity, e.g., self- and social-esteem, moral values, or life goals.  
Secondary appraisals concern options for coping behavior, that is, the prospects to 
preserve positive or to avoid negative emotional states. Again, secondary appraisals 
include three components, which are credit or blame, coping potential, and future 
expectancy. Credit or blame derives from knowing who is held responsible for a 
frustration or a success. Coping potential refers to whether an individual can deal with 
situational demands and whether a situation offers possibilities to actualize personal goals. 
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Future expectancy refers to the probability of coping behavior changing things for better or 
worse. 
In order to develop an evaluative pattern that specifies an emotion, one doesn’t 
require all six of the appraisal components for each emotion. For instance, all the necessary 
and sufficient components for anxiety comprise only the three primary appraisal 
components. For anger, the three primary appraisal components and the blame are essential 
(see Table 2). Both, anxiety and anger refer to person-environment relationships that are 
incongruent with their goal. Consequently, anger and anxiety are conceptualized as 
negative emotions. For anxiety, the type of ego-involvement concerns with an existential 
threat or a threat to self- or social-esteem. According to Lazarus’ model, these appraisal 
components are necessary and sufficient for the construction of anxiety. To experience 
anxiety, blame is irrelevant, yet the coping options and future expectations are 
characterized by uncertainty.  
 
Table 2 
The Formation of Anxiety or Anger and Resulting Action Tendencies (Lazarus, 1991) 
 Anxiety Anger 
Primary appraisals  
Goal relevance (1) If there is goal relevance, any emotion is possible. 
Goal incongruence (2) If there is goal incongruence, negative emotions are possible. 
Ego-involvement (3) If ego involvement concerns threat to self- or social-esteem, … 
or existential threat, then emotion 
possibilities narrow to anxiety. 
then emotion possibilities 
include anger and anxiety.  
Secondary appraisals 
Blame (4) Irrelevant 
(4) If there is other- or self-
blame, anger occurs.  
Coping potential (5) Uncertain (5) If attack is viable, anger is facilitated. 
Future expectancy (6) Uncertain (6) If attack seems success-ful, anger is facilitated. 
Action tendencies Avoidance, escape Approach, attack 
Note. Essential appraisal components are 1 through 3 for anxiety, and 1 through 4 for anger. 
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For anger, the type of ego-involvement concerns with a threat to self- or social-
esteem. When others or the self are blamed for the threat to self- or social-esteem, anger 
occurs. The anger is directed externally or internally, dependent on whether the blame is 
directed at another person or at oneself. These appraisal components are necessary and 
sufficient for the construction of anger. However, anger is facilitated, when coping options 
favor an attack, and if future expectations are positive about the environmental response to 
attack. 
Although the appraisal components are in hierarchical order like in a decision-tree 
(see Table 2), the model argues that appraisals are not necessarily sequential. Thus, the 
appraisal process does not represent a step-by-step scan of the reported components in any 
fixed order. Moreover, the core relational theme of each emotion is identified very rapidly 
and, possibly, even simultaneously with the appraisal components. Interestingly enough, 
this construction of emotional meaning may have been evolved through a reflective, self-
controlled, and abstract cognitive analysis and via an impulsive, unconscious process. 
Thus, in regards to the reflective and impulsive information processing model from Strack 
and Deutsch (in press; see Chapter 2.2), the appraisal process may be accompanied by both 
a noetic, that is, conscious, and an experiential, that is, unconscious, state of awareness. 
Furthermore, Lazarus’ (1991) model embraces behavioral aspects. Behavioral 
aspects are represented by different action tendencies that result from each emotion. The 
action tendencies that rise from anxiety are avoidance or escape. For anger, the action 
tendencies are approach or attack (see Table 2). In the model from Strack and Deutsch (in 
press), these action tendencies are considered to be the aspects of motivational orientation. 
In both models, action tendencies or motivational orientations and behavior are activated 
reciprocally. Thus, strong action tendencies are more likely to elicit the compatible 
behavior. Similarly, any given behavior may reinforce the action tendency and the 
emotional state consistent with the behavior.  
Even though Lazarus’ (1991) model deals with the formation of emotional states in 
different situations, the model does not neglect interindividual differences. Interindividual 
differences are represented by different appraisal styles. An appraisal style summarizes 
appraisals of person-environment relationships that are consistent across different 
situations. These transsituationally consistent response dispositions may also be considered 
as traits. For instance, someone who gets anxious, both, when trying to get around in a new 
place, and when delivering a speech in front of an audience, may be described as an 
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anxious person. The feeling of anxiety within both situations refers to an emotional state, 
whereas the readiness to appraise both situations as a threat to oneself refers to a 
personality trait, that is, anxiousness. 
Thus, Lazarus’ emotion theory considers anxiety, and anger as the outcome of a 
person-environment relationship. Appraisal styles represent the effects of interindividual 
differences on this person-situation interaction. For instance, individuals high in 
anxiousness consistently tend to appraise person-environment relationships in terms of 
threat to self- or social esteem or even in terms of existential threat. Similarly, individuals 
high in angriness consistently tend to appraise person-environment relationships in terms 
of threat to self- or social-esteem, yet, hold others or themselves responsible for their 
harmful experiences.  
Lazarus’ emotion theory does not explicitly refer to shyness. Nevertheless, Lazarus’ 
theory allows for the inclusion of shyness. According to Asendorpf (1989a), shyness is 
associated with two types of concern - fear of the unfamiliar and fear of being negatively 
evaluated by others. Within Lazarus’ theory these concerns may be considered as appraisal 
styles referring to shyness. These concerns may be also part of the appraisal styles for 
anxiousness (cf. Crozier, 2001). However, the shyness appraisal styles are more situation-
specific and refer, in particular, to two kinds of inhibitions, that is, fear of strangers and 
fear of social evaluation. More importantly, self-descriptions and behavioral observations 
in shyness-inducing situations provided empirical evidence that shyness was independently 
elicited by both kinds of inhibitions (Asendorpf, 1989a). 
The strength of Lazarus’ emotion theory is in its conceptualization of emotions as 
the result of a person-environment relationship. Thus, the model embraces both individual 
and situational aspects. In other words, the model refers to emotions as traits and as states. 
Moreover, the model includes the adaptational effects of emotions, since it incorporates 
coping aspects. The weak point of the model is reflected in the appraisal components 
which do not clearly and fully narrow down the possible emotional outcomes to a 
particular emotion. For instance, appraisal components for both anxiety and anger may 
include the experience of threat to self- or social-esteem. Additionally, anger may not only 
occur due to threat to self- or social-esteem, but also due to threat to bodily integrity. In 
summary, Lazarus’ emotion theory has not yet been empirically tested concerning all of 
the appraisal components eliciting particular emotions. Therefore, it remains “something of 
a mystery” (Lazarus, 1991, p. 151) how and why a particular emotion arises. This is 
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especially the case, as long as the appraisal process itself is not defined as either sequential 
or simultaneous. Nevertheless, the model stands for the successful application of a 
psychological stress theory to a person-environment theory of emotions. 
2.6.2 Shyness, Anxiousness, and Angriness in Relation to 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Agreeableness 
Presently, the most prominent system for the categorization of personality traits is 
the five-factor, or Big Five, model of personality (e.g., John & Srivastava, 2001). The Big 
Five model proposes that interindividual differences can be classified along five basic 
personality dimensions that are both broad (i.e., including a maximum spectrum of 
different traits) and efficient (i.e., managing this with a minimum set of dimensions). These 
personality dimensions were labeled as neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience 
(or intellect), agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Whereas openness to experience and 
conscientiousness are not directly relevant for the present studies, neuroticism, 
extraversion and agreeableness are well suitable for the categorization of shyness, 
anxiousness, and angriness. Neuroticism comprises traits like nervous, anxious, and 
emotional. Extraversion describes traits like gregarious, assertive, and outgoing. 
Agreeableness refers to traits like warm, conciliatory, and helpful.  
According to the Big Five model, neuroticism, extraversion, and agreeableness are 
conceptualized as orthogonal, that is, uncorrelated factors. Thus, the factors describe a 
three-dimensional space that allows for the categorization of shyness, anxiousness, and 
angriness. Shyness represents a combination of neuroticism and introversion, that is, 
shyness correlates intermediately with both neuroticism and extraversion (cf. Asendorpf, 
1989b). However, shyness is independent from agreeableness. Anxiousness is highly 
correlated with neuroticism, moderately correlated with introversion, and uncorrelated with 
agreeableness. In contrast, Angriness is highly negatively correlated with agreeableness 
and is weakly positively correlated with both neuroticism and extraversion (Ostendorf, 
1990).  
The correlation pattern of neuroticism, extraversion, and agreeableness with 
shyness, anxiousness, and angriness also informs about the correlations between shyness, 
anxiousness, and angriness. Thus, shyness and anxiousness are positively correlated 
because they are both correlated with neuroticism and introversion. In contrast, shyness 
and anxiousness do not correlate with angriness, because angriness is weakly correlated 
with extraversion and strongly correlated with agreeableness. The correlation pattern of 
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shyness, anxiousness, and angriness facilitates the study of convergent and discriminant 
validity of direct, indirect, and behavioral measures. In particular, the comparison of 
shyness or anxiousness with angriness allows to estimate method-specific effects since 
these traits are expected to be uncorrelated at least at the level of direct questionnaire 
measures.  
The present studies employed shyness, anxiousness, and angriness as traits under 
investigation in order to explore the similarities and the differences between the explicit 
and the implicit personality self-concept. In two Pilot Studies, a new indirect measure (the 
Implicit Association Procedures, IAP) was adapted to assess the implicit personality self-
concept of shyness. Study 1 explored the convergent and discriminant validity between the 
shyness IAP, the shyness IAT, and direct shyness self-ratings for the prediction of shy 
behavior. Additionally, Study 1 contrasted the fakability of direct and indirect shyness 
measures. Study 2 investigated the convergent and discriminant validity of an anxiousness 
IAT and an angriness IAT for direct measures and for the prediction of anxious and angry 
behavior after emotion inductions. Study 3 explored further method-specific effects of the 
anxiousness IAT and the angriness IAT that were found in Study 2. 
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3 Two Pilot Studies for the Adaptation of a New Indirect 
Measure for Shyness 
3.1 Introduction 
Depending on the context, a moderate correlation between direct and indirect 
measures is sometimes interpreted as convergent validity, sometimes as discriminant 
validity. However, direct measures were considered to assess explicit representations, and 
indirect measures to assess implicit representations. Explicit and implicit representations 
were conceptualized as elements of two different, but interacting systems (see 
Chapter 2.2). Thus, correlations between direct and indirect measures can neither be 
unambiguously interpreted as convergent nor as discriminant validity. Instead, in order to 
correctly evaluate the convergent validity of an indirect measure, a correlational analysis 
with another indirect measure is needed. Also, a comparison between two different indirect 
measures is necessary to judge the method effects of any specific indirect assessment 
procedure. Therefore, an additional indirect measure was developed. The measure was 
adapted to assess the implicit personality self-concept of shyness, and was pre-tested for 
the purpose of the next study (Study 1). 
Priming methods have only partially been shown to be an adequate referent to the 
IAT from an individual assessment perspective (see Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 
2001, for successfully, and Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000, for unsuccessfully 
correlating priming methods with the IAT). As an alternative the Evaluative Movement 
Assessment (EMA) from Brendl, Markman, and Messner (2003) was adapted to the study 
of the implicit personality self-concept. 
The EMA was designed to employ automatic movement tendencies for the 
assessment of implicit preferences and motivations. The procedure induces automatic 
movement tendencies by two joystick movements that represent either approach behavior 
(pulling the joystick toward a target) or avoidance behavior (pushing the joystick away 
from a target). In cooperation with Brendl and Messner the EMA was noticeably modified 
in order to assess the associative strength between the concept of self and attribute 
concepts (e.g., shy). The modification of the EMA was named the Implicit Association 
Procedure (IAP). Its main difference to the IAT is that already the response (pulling the 
joystick toward a target or pushing it away from a target) has its own valence by triggering 
an automatic movement tendency. Another difference is that it is possible to specify 
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unipolar target categories (such as self without specifying an opposite category such as 
others). 
The detailed procedure of the IAP is described in the method section. In line with 
the EMA methodology it was hypothesized that attributes that play an important role in the 
self-concept could be responded to more quickly with a joystick movement towards 
oneself than away from oneself. The opposite should be true for attributes that are not 
associated with the concept of self. The psychometric properties of three different IAP 
variants for shyness were pre-tested in two pilot studies. The IAP variant that would be 
considered for further studies was expected to meet the following criteria. First, its internal 
consistency should be at least α = .70. Second, it should show a substantial correlation with 
the shyness IAT, that is, at least r = .40. Third, it should, like the shyness IAT, correlate 
intermediately with direct self-ratings of shyness, that is, .30 < r < .50. Forth, it should, 
like the shyness IAT, not correlate with social desirability. These criteria were explored in 
the pilot studies. 
3.2 Pilot Study 1: The Bipolar and the Unipolar IAP Variant 
In Pilot Study 1 a bipolar and a unipolar IAP variant was examined. Their main 
difference was that the bipolar variant included Shy and Nonshy words but no Me and 
Notme words whereas the unipolar variant included Shy, Me, and Notme words but no 
Nonshy words. 
3.2.1 Methods 
Participants and design. Participants were 32 (25 female and 7 male) psychology 
students that received research participation credit for an experiment on computer aided 
personality assessment. Their mean age was M = 22.3 years, with a range from 19 to 29 
years. Since the joystick was situated on the right side of the keyboard and was operated 
with the right hand, we made sure to select only right-handed participants. Due to technical 
shortcomings of the first joystick that was used, data from 10 participants of the bipolar 
IAP version and from 7 participants of the unipolar IAP version had to be excluded.  
All participants completed (a) self-ratings on bipolar personality-describing items, 
(b) the bipolar or unipolar shyness IAP, (c) other personality items, (d) the shyness IAT, 
(e) two social desirability scales, (f) the IAP variant different from (b), and (g) were 
interviewed about the experiment. The shyness items of the IAPs and the IAT were 
included as direct ratings in step (a). The application of the unipolar and the bipolar IAP in 
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step (b) and (f) alternated between participants, such that half of participants completed the 
bipolar IAP in step (b) and the unipolar IAP in step (f). The other half of participants 
completed the IAPs in the reverse order. 
Direct self-ratings. All direct self-ratings were assessed on the computer and were 
presented in a fixed random order. In step (a), participants had to rate their shyness on 10 
bipolar adjective pairs (e.g., “shy 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 nonshy”) that were mixed with 30 
conscientiousness, intellect, and irritability pairs. Step (c) comprised 28 personality-
descriptive items on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all true for me, 5 = completely true for me). 
Five items referred to shyness and were the same used by Asendorpf et al. (2002). In 
step (e), participants responded to the 39 items of the social desirability scales from Lück 
and Timaeus (1969; English version by Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) and Stöber (1999; 
without the Item “Have you ever consumed drugs”). These scales contain 16 and 23 items, 
respectively, and measure socially desirable responding by asking for socially desirable but 
infrequent or socially undesirable but frequent behaviors on a true-false format. To obtain a 
score for socially desirable responding items of both scales were aggregated. 
Implicit Association Test (IAT). The shyness IAT was identical to Asendorpf et 
al.’s (2002) studies. Task sequence and stimuli are depicted in Table 3. IAT scores were 
computed as the difference between mean response latencies in sequence 5 and sequence 3 
(see Table 3). These sequences carried out different combinations of the two target 
categories (Me versus Others) with the two attribute categories (Shy versus Nonshy). Thus, 
high IAT scores represented quicker associations of Me-Shy and Others-Nonshy as 
opposed to Me-Nonshy and Others-Shy.  
Throughout the five discrimination tasks, category labels assigned to the right or 
left response key were displayed in the right or left upper screen corner, respectively. 
Response keys were the number “5” of the right-side numeric keypad and the letter “a” on 
the left side of the keyboard. On each trail, a stimulus word was displayed in the center of 
the screen. Participants were instructed to categorize the stimulus as quickly and accurately 
as possible. Responses were recorded using ERTS software (Behringer, 1994). After 
correct responses the interstimulus interval was 300 ms. After incorrect responses, the 
stimulus was immediately replaced by the word FEHLER (German for error) for 1000 ms, 
resulting in a 1300 interstimulus interval. Since this study focused on interindividual 
differences, and I did not want to confound interindividual variance with order variance, 
the stimulus order was the same for all participants. In the two combined tasks, the stimuli 
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alternated between target and attribute discrimination. The 10 target and 10 attribute 
stimuli were randomized in order within 4 blocks of 20 trials. Internal consistency was 
evaluated across these 4 subtests. Trials with incorrect responses were excluded from 
analysis, and response latencies above 3000 ms were recoded as 3000 ms. Since the 
adaptation of the shyness IAP was based on this data reduction procedure (raw instead of 
log-transformed latencies, inclusion of first two trials of combined blocks), the reported 
results refer to such procedure. 
Table 3 
Implicit Association Test for Shyness: Task Sequence and Stimuli 
   Response key assignment 
Sequence N of trials Task Left key Right key 
1 40 Target discrimination Me Others 
2 40 Attribute discrimination Shy Nonshy 
3 80 Initial combined task Me, shy Others, nonshy
4 40 Reversed target discrimination Others Me 
5 80 Reversed combined task Others, shy Me, nonshy 
Stimuli 
Me Others Shy Nonshy 
I  they  inhibited uninhibited 
self  them insecure secure 
My your daring daring 
Me you candid candid 
Own other open open 
Note. The original German stimuli can be found in the appendix. 
 
Implicit Association Procedure (IAP). The IAP was based on the Evaluative 
Movement Assessment (EMA), developed by Brendl, Markman and Messner (2003). 
Within Pilot Study 1, two earlier EMA versions were adapted to assess the self-concept of 
shyness. The two shyness IAP variants were similar to the shyness IAT in that they 
combined discriminations of Shy versus Nonshy (attribute discrimination) with 
discriminations of Me versus Notme (target discrimination). Contrary to the IAT, only Me 
was explicitly shown on the computer screen and no label for alternative targets was given. 
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Therefore, Notme described the nonself-relevant alternatives better than Others. However, 
the main difference to the IAT was that participants responded by moving a joystick 
instead of pressing an answer key. With the joystick stimuli had to be pushed toward or 
away from the word Me depending on whether the stimuli had to be associated with Me or 
Notme. In the two IAP variants of Pilot Study 1 the joystick was situated before the 
participant, on the right side of the keyboard. The word Me was displayed in the center of 
the screen, whereas stimuli were presented on its right or left side. For stimuli to appear on 
the right side the joystick had to be pushed to the left, if the stimulus had to be associated 
with Me, and to the right, if the stimulus had to be associated with Notme. For stimuli to 
appear on the left side the opposite was true. 
A bipolar and an unipolar IAP variant were adapted in Pilot Study 1. The task 
sequence of both is depicted in Table 4. In the bipolar version, there was a discrimination 
of Shy and Nonshy but not of Me and Notme words. Participants first had to push Shy 
words toward Me and Nonshy words away from Me. Then, the answer direction was 
reversed and Shy words had to be pushed away from Me and Nonshy words toward Me. 
The IAP score was computed as the difference in mean latency between both tasks 
(sequence 2 minus sequence 1, see Table 4). The Shy and Nonshy words were identical to 
the IAT and were randomized in order within 10 blocks of 10 trials. Internal consistency 
was evaluated across 5 subtests with 20 trials each. In the unipolar version there were Me, 
Notme, and Shy but no Nonshy words. First, participants learned to discriminate the target 
concepts that consisted of three Me (self, my, own) and three Notme (your, them, other) 
words that were identical to the IAT target stimuli. In the following initial combined tasks, 
the five Shy words from the bipolar version were added and had to be pushed toward Me. 
Finally, the answer direction for the Shy words was reversed. The IAP score was computed 
as the difference in mean latency between both combined tasks (sequence 3 minus 
sequence 2, see Table 4). Stimuli were randomized in order within 10 blocks of 11 trials. 
Internal consistency was evaluated across 5 subtests with 22 trials each.  
As in the IAT, participants were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible. The correct answer directions for the Me words (ME WORDS = TOWARDS 
ME) and/or the Shy words (SHY WORDS = towards ME or SHY WORDS = AWAY 
FROM ME) were presented in green color in the middle of the upper screen line. During 
all trials the word Me (white letters) with a frame around it was displayed in the center of 
the screen. Trials began by displaying the stimulus mask XXXX (red letters) for an interval 
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of 500 ms at the right or left side of the Me. Next, a target or attribute word (red letters) 
was presented in the same place. The stimulus disappeared when participants moved the 
joystick clearly in one direction, whereas the reaction time was registered immediately at 
the beginning of the movement. Reaction time was measured as the time passed from the 
beginning of the stimulus presentation. After correct responses the interstimulus interval 
was 600 ms. After incorrect responses the stimulus was immediately replaced by (a) the 
word FEHLER (German for ‘error’) if the joystick was moved in the wrong direction, (b) 
the words ZU LANGSAM (German for ‘too slow’) if there was no response after 3000 ms, 
or (c) the words ZU FRÜH BEWEGT (German for ‘moved too early’) if there was any 
response during the presentation of the stimulus mask. All error announcements were 
displayed in yellow in the center of the screen for 200 ms and were followed by the 600 ms 
interstimulus interval. Within both IAP variants stimulus order was not randomized 
between participants. All trials with incorrect responses were excluded from analysis. As 
the presentation of the stimulus stopped after 3000 ms, there were no response latencies 
longer than that. 
 
Table 4 
Implicit Association Procedure for Shyness: Task Sequence of the Bipolar and Unipolar 
Variant (Pilot Study 1) 
   Joystick direction assignment 
Sequence N of trials Task To me Away from me 
Bipolar Variant 
1 100 Attribute discrimination Shy Nonshy 
2 100 Reversed attribute discrimination Nonshy Shy 
Unipolar Variant 
1 24 Target discrimination Me Notme 
2 121 Initial combined task Me, shy Notme 
3 121 Reversed combined task Me Notme, shy 
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Interview. Finally, participants were asked to comment on the experiment and 
whether they had difficulties with the IAT or the IAPs. In addition, they estimated the 
difficulty of the IAT and the two IAP variants on five-point scales ranging from 1 = easy to 
5 = very demanding. 
3.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Error rates and distribution of test scores. Error rates were for the bipolar IAP 
M = 7.9%, SD = 5.2%, for the unipolar IAP M = 4.9%, SD = 4.2%, and for the IAT 
M = 6.8, SD = 4.0%. Differences were tested by a 2x3 ANOVA with order (bipolar vs. 
unipolar IAP at first) as the between-subjects, and test (bipolar IAP, unipolar IAP, IAT) as 
the within-subjects factor. Results showed no main effect of order, but a marginal main 
effect of test, and a marginal interaction effect, F(1, 19) = .72, n.s., F(2, 38) = 2.80, p < .10, 
F(2, 38) = 3.16, p < .10. Post hoc comparisons with Bonferoni correction (p < .005) indicated 
that when the bipolar IAP was the first test its error rates were higher than for the unipolar 
IAP, t(11) = 4.00, p < .005, d = 1.64 , as well as error rates for the IAT were higher than for 
the unipolar IAP, t(11) = 4.05, p < .005, d = 1.65. (The effect size d for repeated measures 
was computed as √2(M1 - M2)/SD where SD is the standard deviation of the difference 
scores; see Cohen, 1988). All other differences were not even marginally significant, all 
|t|(11) < 2.30, n.s.. For all three indirect tests, no participant had error rates higher than 19%, 
and the distributions of the test scores were not even marginally different from a normal 
distribution, Z < 1.  
Reliabilities and correlations of indirect and direct measures. As it can be seen 
in Table 3, the two IAPs only partially met the criteria for a new indirect procedure. First, 
reliability for both IAP variants was satisfactory and comparable to the IAT, although it 
tended to be lower for the bipolar IAP. Inspection of scatterplots (first test half against 
second test half) revealed that the somewhat higher reliability of the unipolar version was 
driven through one outlier. When this participant was discarded from analysis, Cronbach’s 
α decreased to .73 for the unipolar variant, too. However, exclusion of this participant did 
not affect the correlations of the unipolar IAP. Together, reliability was slightly smaller for 
the IAP than for the IAT but still on an acceptable level. Second, neither of the IAP 
variants even marginally correlated with the IAT. Although this correlation was somewhat 
higher for the bipolar IAP, it still did not reach the substantial convergent validity that was 
expected. Moreover, the two IAPs were only intermediately correlated, indicating small 
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convergent validity between both variants. Third, concerning direct shyness measures, the 
bipolar IAP showed high correlations, whereas the unipolar IAP tended to correlate only 
marginally. Thus, the intermediate correlation of the IAT with direct measures was only 
replicated for the unipolar IAP, while the bipolar IAP showed high convergent validity 
with direct self-ratings. Fourth, like the IAT, the IAPs did not correlate with social 
desirability. However, this was also true for direct measures, what may very well be a 
matter of chance finding, as shyness self-ratings are usually correlated with social 
desirability (Jones, Briggs, & Smith, 1986), and were so in Pilot Study 2. Finally, the two 
shyness self-ratings were highly correlated, replicating the convergent validity of the 
bipolar items, which were used in the indirect tests (Asendorpf et al., 2002). 
 
Table 5 
Reliabilities and Correlations of Indirect and Direct Shyness Measures in Pilot Study 1 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Bipolar shyness IAP (n = 22)   .71 .37a+  .25 .68*** .58** -.13 
2. Unipolar shyness IAP (n = 25)  .84  .13 .33 .38+  .31 
3. Shyness IAT (n = 32)    .85 .37* .27 -.06 
4. Bipolar shyness self-rating (n = 32)    .88 .75*** -.08 
5. Shyness questionnaire (n = 32)     .80  .00 
6. Social desirability (n = 32)       .90 
Note. The reliabilities (Cronbach’s α) are shown in italics along the diagonal. IAP = Im-
plicit Association Procedure, IAT = Implicit Association Test.  
a n = 21.    +p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001. 
 
According to an advice of the EMA authors (C. Messner, personal communication, 
December, 2000), the unipolar IAP score may be better calculated when considering 
response latencies for only the Shy without the Me and Notme words. However, this had 
almost no effect on the results. If reaction times for Me and Notme words were excluded 
rather than included, the unipolar IAP’s reliability was virtually the same, α = .86 versus 
α = .84. The correlation with the bipolar IAP – that was completely without Me and Notme 
words – was slightly higher, r = .45 versus r = .37. All other correlations tended to be 
smaller, such as in the correlation with the IAT (r = -.15, versus r = .13), the bipolar 
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shyness self-rating (r = .32, versus r = .33), and the shyness questionnaire (r = .32, versus 
r = .38). Together, this illustrated, that inclusion of the Me and Notme trials into the scoring 
algorithm did not decrease the validity of the unipolar IAP. 
Interview. A 2x3 ANOVA with order (bipolar vs. unipolar IAP at first) as the 
between-subjects and test (bipolar IAP, unipolar IAP, IAT) as the within-subjects factor 
was performed on the difficulty estimates that participants reported for the three indirect 
tests. Results showed significant main effects for both factors and a marginally significant 
interaction effect, F(1, 19) = 4.52, p < .05, F(2, 38) = 13.74, p < .001, F(2, 38) = 3.01, p < .10. 
Post hoc comparisons with Bonferoni correction (p < .005) revealed that across the two 
order groups the unipolar IAP was judged as marginally easier when it was the last rather 
than the first test, t(19) = -2.93, p < .01, d = 1.34. This was not true for the bipolar IAP, 
t(19) = -.06, n.s.. The IAT, that was always the second test, was not judged differently 
between both groups, t(19) = -1.49, n.s.. Post hoc comparisons within the two order groups 
indicated that when the bipolar IAP was the first test it was judged as more difficult than 
the IAT and the unipolar IAP, t(11) = 4.42, p < .005, d = 1.80, t(11) = 3.80, p < .005, 
d = 1.55. In contrast, when the unipolar IAP was the first test it was not judged as more 
difficult than either the IAT or the bipolar IAP, t(8) = 2.63, n.s., t(8) = .00, n.s.. Neither the 
bipolar nor the unipolar IAP were judged as more difficult than the IAT when these were 
the last test, t(8) = 2.86, n.s., t(11) = 1.08, n.s.. 
What made the bipolar IAP - at least when it was the first test - more difficult and, 
as observed before, more susceptible to errors than the unipolar IAP? In the interview, 
participants reported that they had difficulties to associate the horizontal joystick 
movement to the right or to the left with a movement toward or away from Me. A 
movement toward versus away from Me could have been more directly associated with a 
vertical joystick movement, that is, with pulling the joystick towards oneself versus 
pushing it away from oneself. In the unipolar IAP version, the, although horizontal, Me-
Notme dimension was continuously practiced by including the Me-Notme words. In both 
IAP versions, the Me-Notme discrimination might have been additionally difficult because 
Me-Notme could not be constantly assigned to a movement to the right versus to the left. 
Thus, the correct movement direction changed depending on whether the stimulus 
appeared on the right or the left side of the Me. For example, when Shy words had to be 
associated with Me, the joystick had to be pushed to the right, if a Shy word was presented 
on the left, versus to the left, if a Shy word was presented on the right. Whereas the 
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assignment of response keys stayed constant during the combined tasks of the IAT, the 
assignment of movement directions in the IAP did not. As a consequence, the IAP required 
not only a discrimination of categories but also a consideration of presentation side. Both, 
the horizontal movement to the right versus to the left and its changeable mapping to Me 
versus Notme might have made the categorization within the bipolar IAP more difficult, 
especially since this was not trained by the presentation of Me and Notme words.  
The task difficulty of the bipolar IAP may also account for its high correlation with 
direct shyness measures that reached almost the level of the bipolar IAP’s internal 
consistency. Due to the task difficulty, participants might have been forced to react more 
reflectively rather than spontaneously. Therefore, the bipolar IAP might have been more 
consistent with the direct measures than with the IAT. Evidence for this assumption was 
obtained through a 2x3 ANOVA with order (bipolar vs. unipolar IAP at first) as the 
between-subjects and test (bipolar IAP, unipolar IAP, IAT) as the within-subjects factor 
that was performed on mean reaction times within the tests. Results showed no main effect 
of order, but a main effect of test, and an interaction effect, F(1, 19) = 2.11, n.s., 
F(2, 38) = 13.74, p < .001, F(2, 38) = 6.21, p < .01. Post hoc comparisons with Bonferoni 
correction (p < .005) revealed the same pattern as for the difficulty estimates within the 
two order groups. When the bipolar IAP was the first test, it was completed more slowly 
than the IAT and the unipolar IAP, t(11) = 4.07, p < .005, d = 1.66, t(11) = 6.78, p < .001, 
d = 2.77. All other differences were not even marginally significant, all |t|(11) < 2.26, n.s.. 
Thus, when the bipolar IAP was the first test, participants needed more response time than 
for the other tests that may indicate that their reactions were more influenced by the 
reflective system. Another reason for the high correlations between the bipolar IAP and 
direct shyness measures could be that it was not confounded by task-switching accounts 
(Mierke & Klauer, 2001), as there was only a discrimination of Shy-Nonshy but not of Me-
Notme. However, one would rather expect shorter instead of longer response latencies in 
the absence of task-switching (Mierke & Klauer, 2001). Thus, although the reported 
response latency differences were significant only for the first IAP and the sample size was 
small in this study, it would be an interesting topic for further research to explore whether 
correlations between indirect and direct measures increase with task difficulty and 
reflection time for the indirect test. 
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Conclusion. The IAPs’ satisfactory internal consistency as well as their congruent 
validity with direct measures showed that the IAPs are an acceptable procedure for the 
assessment of interindividual differences. Nevertheless, the interview and the correlation 
pattern made it clear that three main features had to be changed. First, the joystick had to 
be moved vertically rather than horizontally, as this would better represent a Me-Notme 
dimension. Second, Shy and Nonshy words should be included in the IAP, since the bipolar 
IAP showed higher correlations with the IAT and direct measures. Third, Me and Notme 
words should also be included, because task difficulty seems to be more comparable with 
the IAT. These changes were realized in Pilot Study 2. 
3.3 Pilot Study 2: The Final IAP Variant 
In Pilot Study 2 the final IAP variant was examined. It included like the IAT Shy, 
Nonshy, Me, and Notme words. 
3.3.1 Methods 
Participants and design. Participants were 31 (27 female and 4 male) psychology 
students that had not participated in Pilot Study 1. They were recruited for an experiment 
on computer aided personality assessment, and received research participation credit. Their 
mean age was M = 21.6 years, with a range from 19 to 32 years.  
All participants completed (a) the shyness IAP, (b) two social desirability scales, (c) 
the shyness IAT, (d) personality-describing items, (e) a retest of (a), (f) self-ratings on 
bipolar personality items, and (g) were interviewed about the IAP. The shyness items of 
the IAP and the IAT were included as direct ratings in step (f). Contrary to Pilot Study 1, 
there were no direct shyness self-ratings before the indirect tests. 
Direct self-ratings and interview. Again, direct self-ratings were assessed on the 
computer and were presented in a fixed random order. In step (b), participants responded to 
the Social Desirability Scales identical to Pilot Study 1. Step (d) comprised a 32-item self-
monitoring scale and a 8-item irritability scale that were not analyzed for the purpose of 
the present study. Bipolar adjective pairs in step (f) were identical to Pilot Study 1 and 
included the shyness self-rating. The interview at the end of the experiment was the same 
as in Pilot Study 1. 
Implicit Association Test (IAT) and Implicit Association Procedure (IAP). The 
shyness IAT was identical to Pilot Study1. For the shyness IAP, the main difference to the 
preceding variants was that the joystick was moved vertically rather than horizontally. The 
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joystick had to be pulled toward oneself for words that were associated with Me, and to be 
pushed away from oneself for words that were not associated with Me. The task sequence 
for the final IAP version is depicted in Table 6. Identically to the unipolar variant of Pilot 
Study 1, participants first learned to discriminate the three Me and Notme words. In the 
following initial combined task, the five Shy and Nonshy words from the bipolar variant 
were added and had to be pulled to or pushed away from the participant, respectively. 
Finally, the direction for the Shy and Nonshy words was reversed, assigning Shy words to a 
movement away from the participant and Nonshy words to a movement toward the 
participant. The IAP score was computed as the difference in mean latency between both 
combined tasks (sequence 3 minus sequence 2, see Table 6). Stimuli were randomized in 
order within 8 blocks of 16 trials. Internal consistency was evaluated across 4 subtests with 
32 trials each. 
 
Table 6 
Implicit Association Procedure for Shyness: Final Task Sequence (Pilot Study 2) 
   Joystick direction assignment 
Sequence N of trials Task To the 
participant 
Away from the 
participant 
     
1 24 Target discrimination Me Notme 
2 128 Initial combined task Me, shy Notme, nonshy 
3 128 Reversed combined task Me, nonshy Notme, shy 
 
 
Trial presentation was identical to Pilot Study 1, except for the following points. 
The word Me with a frame around – representing the participant – was presented in the 
center of the lowest screen line (see Appendix). Stimuli appeared above it in the center of 
the screen. Stimuli and the stimulus mask were displayed in white to make the screen 
design more comparable to the IAT. The correct answer directions for the Shy (SHY = ME 
in sequence 2) or Nonshy (NONSHY = ME in sequence 3) words were presented in a 
subtle red in the left upper corner of the screen and only during the combined tasks. The 
joystick was located on the table directly in front of the participant, right in front of the 
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keyboard and the screen (see Appendix). The joystick could be operated with the right or 
the left hand, allowing for both right-handed and left-handed participants. 
3.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Error rates and distribution of test scores. Error rates were for the first IAP 
M = 5.3%, SD = 4.3%, for the retest IAP M = 4.1%, SD = 3.7%, and for the IAT M = 5.1, 
SD = 3.3%. A one-way ANOVA with test (IAP, IAT, retest IAP) as a within-subjects 
factor revealed that they were not even marginally different, F(2, 60) = 2.36, n.s.. For all 
three tests, no participant had error rates higher than 17% and the distributions of the test 
scores were not even marginally different from a normal distribution, Z < 1.  
 
Table 7 
Reliabilities and Correlations of Indirect and Direct Shyness Measures in Pilot Study 2 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1.  Shyness IAP .82 .67*** .60*** .39*  .14 
2.  Shyness IAP retest  .87 .47** .27  .02 
3.  Shyness IAT   .83 .40*  .00 
4.  Bipolar shyness self-rating    .93 -.40* 
5.  Social desirability      .83 
Note. IAP = Implicit Association Procedure, IAT = Implicit Association Test.  
N = 31.    *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001. 
 
Reliabilities and correlations of indirect and direct measures. The reliabilities 
and correlations, which are depicted in the first line of Table 7, met the criteria that were 
expected from the new IAP. First, the IAP’s internal consistency was completely 
satisfactory. Second, the IAP correlated highly with the IAT. Third, it correlated 
intermediately and as high as the IAT with the direct self-rating. Fourth, the IAP did not, 
similar to the IAT, correlate with social desirability, whereas this was the case for the 
direct self-rating. Furthermore, the test-retest reliability of the IAP was lower than its 
internal consistency, which replicated results for the IAT in other studies (cf. Egloff, 
Schwerdtfeger, & Schmukle, 2003). Finally, the second IAP showed lower correlations 
with both the IAT and the direct self-rating. A decrease in validity for the second test was 
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also shown for the IAT (Asendorpf et al., 2002). Together, the correlational pattern of the 
IAP met all criteria and was highly comparable to the IAT. 
Interview. A one-way ANOVA with test (IAP, IAT, retest IAP) as a within-
subjects factor revealed that the difficulty estimates for the three indirect tests were not 
even marginally different, F(2, 60) = 2.39, n.s.. When the same ANOVA was performed on 
mean reaction times a significant main effect emerged, F(2, 60) = 7.98, p < .001. Post hoc 
single comparisons with Bonferoni correction (p < .015) indicated that the first IAP was 
completed more slowly than the IAT and the retest IAP, t(30) = 3.18, p < .01, d = .85, 
t(30) = 3.64, p < .01, d = .81. However, reaction times between the IAT and the retest IAP 
were not even marginally different, t(30) = 1.24, n.s.. Since I did not vary the order of the 
IAT and the IAP between subjects, I could not examine whether the difference between the 
first IAT and the subsequent IAT was due to learning effects. Nevertheless, when the order 
of the IAT and the IAP was counterbalanced across participants in the subsequent study 
(Study 1), their mean response latencies were not even marginally different, t(295) = 1.59, 
n.s.. More importantly, the first IAP in Pilot Study 2 was completed significantly quicker 
than the first bipolar IAP of Pilot Study 1, t(41)= 4.67, p < .001, d = 1.46.  
Conclusion. The correlational pattern as well as the difficulty estimates by the 
participants revealed a correspondence between IAT and IAP. This is also illustrated by the 
high correlation (r = .60) between both tests that reached almost the level of the IAP’s 
retest reliability (r = .67). In general, the IAP seemed to be a good candidate for the 
purpose of replicating results of the IAT and estimating the method-specific variance of 
both tests.  
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4 Study 1: Reliability, Validity, and Fakability 
of a Shyness IAP and a Shyness IAT 
4.1 Introduction 
Recently, Asendorpf et al. (2002) adapted an IAT to assess the implicit personality 
self-concept of shyness. They showed that the shyness IAT (a) reliably assesses individual 
differences that (b) are partly independent from traditional direct self-ratings, and (c) 
increase significantly the prediction of spontaneous behavior in a realistic social situation. 
In Study 1, a total of 139 participants were observed in a naturalistic lab situation that 
induced shyness, and completed an Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 
1998) and direct self-ratings of shyness. The IAT correlated moderately with the direct 
self-ratings, and uniquely predicted spontaneous (but not controlled) shy behavior, whereas 
the direct ratings uniquely predicted controlled (but not spontaneous) shy behavior (double 
dissociation). 
The robustness of the IAT against faking was investigated in Asendorpf et al.’s 
Study 2 through the experimental variation of participants' self-presentation of being non-
shy. A control group of 18 females participated in a shyness-inducing role play allegedly to 
study social perception. Their shyness IAT scores, direct self-ratings of shyness, observer-
judged shyness, and coded behaviors were contrasted with an experimental group of 23 
females who completed the same procedures except that they were presented as part of a 
simulated job application procedure and that the participants were instructed to act non-shy 
in order to "get the job". As expected, the direct self-ratings and the controlled shy 
behaviors were much lower in the experimental group whereas the shyness IAT scores and 
the spontaneous shy behaviors were not lower. 
The present study was an attempt to replicate the results of Asendorpf et al.’s 
(2002) Study 2 with a much larger, sex-balanced sample and to extend this approach into 
four different directions. First, the study attempted to replicate the findings for the shyness 
IAT with a different, new indirect procedure. Second, the study explored dissociations 
between direct and indirect measures of shyness under faking instructions not only with 
regard to the group means but also with regard to the correlates of these measures. Third, 
the effects of faking were explored also on observer judgments of shyness. Fourth, the 
state dependence of the indirect measures was examined by contrasting both their mean 
levels and their correlates between participants who completed them either before or after 
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the shyness-inducing role play. The next sections discuss each research question in more 
detail. 
4.1.1 Research Question 1: A New Indirect Assessment Procedure 
A new measurement tool, the Indirect Association Procedures (IAPs), was 
employed in the present study in order to estimate the convergent validity of the IAT and a 
different indirect measure for the assessment of the implicit personality self-concept of 
shyness. The shyness IAP was pre-tested in two pilot studies (see Chapter 3). The final 
IAP variant showed good internal consistencies, correlated highly with the IAT, and, 
similarly to the IAT, intermediately with direct shyness self-ratings. The main difference to 
the IAT is that the IAP induces automatic movement tendencies and already the response 
has its own valence by triggering approach (pulling the joystick toward oneself) or 
avoidance (pushing the joystick away from oneself) behavior. The detailed procedure of 
the IAP is described in Chapter 3. 
4.1.2 Research Question 2: Dissociations of Indirect and Direct Measures 
Under Faking 
Job applicants produce more socially desirable self-descriptions than research 
participants under most conditions (see, e.g., Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998; Rosse, Stecher, 
Miller, & Levin, 1998). Similarly, laboratory experiments have shown that revealing one's 
self-descriptions to the public and faking good instructions increase the social desirability 
of participants' self-descriptions (Paulhus, 1984). These situational effects on the mean 
social desirability of self-descriptions are commonly interpreted as a threat to the validity 
of these descriptions. Less often it has been noted, however, that such mean effects do not 
necessarily imply a lower validity of the interindividual differences in the self-descriptions. 
If all individuals fake good to the same extent, the rank order of the individuals and hence 
the validity of the self-descriptions is perfectly preserved. Only if different individuals fake 
to a different degree (differential faking), the validity is threatened. There is good evidence 
for substantial differential faking both in job application and in research settings (Ones & 
Viswesvaran, 1998; Paulhus, 1984; Rosse et al., 1998). 
The present study investigated both the main effect of faking good and the effect of 
differential faking on indirect and direct measures. Faking was studied by contrasting these 
measures between an experimental group that was instructed to appear non-shy, and a 
control group that was instructed to act naturally. The between-group difference in the 
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means informs us about the general faking susceptibility of the indirect versus direct 
measures. In contrast, the between-group differences in particular correlates of the indirect 
versus direct measures can be informative about the amount of differential faking. 
According to the findings by Asendorpf et al. (2002), Study 1, a moderate 
correlation close to .40 is expected between the indirect and direct measures of shyness in 
the control group. To the extent that differential faking occurs, and affects only the direct 
self-ratings, the direct–indirect correlation should become much smaller in the 
experimental group. Furthermore, direct shyness is expected to correlate in the control 
group somewhat negatively with social desirability tendencies because shyness is a 
somewhat undesirable personality trait (e.g., Jones, Briggs, & Smith, 1986). To the extent 
that differential faking occurs, this negative correlation should become much stronger in 
the experimental group because the more participants fake good, the higher will be their 
social desirability score, and the lower their shyness score. Such a between-group 
difference is not expected for the correlations between the indirect measures and social 
desirability tendencies. These correlations should be low in both groups. 
Finally, it was expected that the double dissociation between indirect and direct 
measures with regard to spontaneous versus controlled behavior reported by Asendorpf et 
al. (2002), Study 1, would be found not only in the control group but also in the 
experimental group because the direct self-ratings would be less predictive of spontaneous 
shy behavior and the indirect measures would be less predictive of controlled behavior. 
4.1.3 Research Question 3: Validity of Observer Judgments 
In Asendorpf et al.'s (2002) Study 1, the observer judgments of shyness correlated 
.58 with the controlled shy behavior and .48 with the direct self-ratings, but only .35 with 
the spontaneous shy behavior and .31 with the IAT. Thus, they seem to reflect more 
strongly controlled behavior. However, the participants in this study were not particularly 
motivated to control expressions of shyness. Participants who were instructed to fake non-
shyness in Study 2 received only slightly lower shyness ratings by observers of their social 
interaction despite the fact that they talked much more. It is not clear from this pattern of 
correlational and mean effects what one should expect for differential faking. 
It could be that the observers are strongly influenced by participants' self-
presentation in the role play as being non-shy; in this case, the strong correlation with the 
direct self-ratings would be preserved, and the lower correlation with the indirect measures 
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would decrease even more because it is less susceptible to faking. Such a pattern would 
suggest that the validity of the observer judgments for participants' true shyness is 
undermined by the participants' self-presentation in the role play. However, because 
behavior in role play situations can be faked less easily than answers in a questionnaire, it 
seems more likely that the participants' true shyness in the role play perspires to the 
observers to a great extent. In this case, the direct shyness - observer correlation should 
decrease, and the indirect shyness – observer correlation should be less affected. Thus, the 
difference between the faking-induced decreases in the self - observer correlations for 
direct versus indirect measures informs us about the validity of the observer measures. 
4.1.4 Research Question 4: State Influences on the Indirect Measures 
Research in Spielberger's state-trait anxiety tradition suggests stability of trait 
anxiety and increase of state anxiety when assessed immediately after anxiety induction 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; Spielberger, Auerbach, Wadsworth, Dunn, & 
Taulbee, 1973). In line with these results, investigations with the German version of the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
revealed that state affect is a better predictor for affect report regarding closer and shorter 
periods whereas trait affect is a better predictor for affect report regarding more prolonged 
periods (Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996). 
Recently, a study by Schmukle and Egloff (2003) provided evidence that an anxiety 
IAT was, in contrast to direct state anxiety measures, not influenced by an anxiety 
induction. Thus, whereas situational or contextual effects on implicit prejudice and 
stereotypes were demonstrated in several recent studies (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001; 
Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001, Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001; Rudman, Ashmore, & 
Gary, 2001; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001), state influences on implicit personality self-
concept measures have not yet been shown. In order to make sure that the IAT and the new 
IAP procedure reflect interindividual differences in the enduring self-concept rather than in 
fluctuating affective states, it is important to show empirically that state influences are 
negligible. 
This is particularly important because earlier studies have consistently found that 
the retest or parallel test reliability of IATs is lower than the internal consistency of the 
IAT (Asendorpf et al., 2002; Bosson et al., 2000; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Egloff, & 
Schmukle, 2002; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). This lower retest reliability could be due 
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to differential learning effects that occur between test and retest (e.g., some participants 
develop a more efficient cognitive strategy for the more difficult part of the IAT where 
they must associate self with incompatible attributes whereas others do not develop such a 
strategy). Alternatively, the lower retest reliability could be due to effects of state changes 
between the two tests (e.g., when a first shyness IAT is assessed immediately after a 
shyness-inducing situation and the retest 20 minutes later, the retest correlation could be 
lowered by the fact that the first IAT was influenced by the actual shyness experienced in 
the immediately preceding situation whereas the retest reflected more one's enduring self-
concept of shyness). This latter interpretation could be ruled out if it could be shown that 
the IAT is unaffected by state changes. The robustness of both indirect measures was 
studied with regard to their mean level and their correlates by contrasting them between 
participants who completed the indirect measure before or after the shyness-inducing role 
play. 
4.2 Design of the Present Study 
In order to answer these 4 research questions, the design of Asendorpf et al.'s 
(2002) Study 2 was extended in two main respects. First, the new IAP was included in 
addition to the IAT. Second, both females and males were included and sample size was 
much larger to be able to detect significant differences between correlations. Statistical 
power considerations suggest that in order to detect significant between-group differences 
of approximately .30 with one-tailed tests and a power of .80 (Cohen, 1988), a size of 
N=120 for each group is required. Because I wanted to experimentally vary both 
participants' faking tendency and the position of the two indirect tests (before/after the role 
play situation), a complete between-subjects design would include 2 (faking) × 2 (position) 
× 2 (indirect procedure) × 120 = 960 participants. 
To avoid such an unrealistically large study, I (a) restricted the analysis of the 
position effect to the faking condition which thus required 240 participants, (b) chose only 
60 participants for the control group which still provided sufficiently reliable correlations 
within this condition and a sufficient power for the faking effects, and (c) had each 
participant complete one indirect procedure before and the other indirect procedure after 
the role play, with a between-participant variation of the order of the tests, because I 
assumed that there would be only minimal transfer effects between different procedures. In 
this way the total sample size was reduced to 2 (position) × 120 + 60 = 300. 
Study 1 50 
Additionally, I included two social desirability scales to study the effects of faking 
on the responses to these two scales, and interviewed the participants in the faking 
condition about possible faking strategies in the indirect procedures. 
4.3 Hypotheses 
Study 1 tested the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 (Main faking effects). Under faking, the social desirability scores 
increase, and the direct self-ratings of shyness and the controlled shy behaviors decrease. 
In contrast, the spontaneous shy behaviors and the two indirect measures are unaffected by 
the faking instruction, replicating Asendorpf et al. (2002), Study 2. 
Hypothesis 2 (Main position effects). Whether the indirect tests are completed 
before or immediately after the shyness-inducing role play has no effects on their mean 
level. 
Hypothesis 3 (Differential coherence). The indirect and explicit self-concept 
measures are less strongly correlated in the faking condition than in the control condition. 
Hypothesis 4 (Differential relation to social desirability). The direct self-ratings 
correlate more negatively with the social desirability scores in the faking condition than in 
the control condition. In contrast, both indirect measures do not correlate with social 
desirability scores under both experimental conditions. 
Hypothesis 5 (Robustness of observer judgments to differential faking). Under 
faking, the correlation of the observer judgments of shyness with the direct self-ratings 
decreases more strongly than their correlations with the two indirect procedures. 
Hypothesis 6 (Double Dissociation). Both indirect procedures uniquely predict 
spontaneous (but not controlled) shy behavior whereas the direct self-ratings uniquely 
predict controlled (but not spontaneous) shy behavior when the alternative predictor is 
statistically controlled, replicating Asendorpf et al., 2002, Study 1. 
4.4 Methods 
4.4.1 Participants 
Participants were 300 university students (150 female, 150 male; age M = 24.5 
years, range 20-34 years), none of whom were psychology students or had participated in 
the lab’s earlier studies. All participants were claimed to be native speakers of German. 
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Most participants were approached on the campus of Humboldt University, Berlin. The 
remaining were recruited using postings at the university buildings.  
Following Asendorpf et al.'s (2002) Study 2 procedure, participants were asked to 
participate in either "a job application procedure" (faking condition, n = 240, 120 of either 
sex) or "a study on social perception" (control condition, n = 60, 30 of either sex). In the 
first case, they were motivated for participation by informing them that the study included 
a simulated job assessment center and video feedback on their performance. In addition, 
they were offered DM 20 (approximately US $ 10) for their cooperation in the 1.5 hour 
study. In the second case, they were motivated by informing them that they would receive 
individual feedback on their results after the study. In addition, they were offered DM 15 
(approximately US $ 7.5) for their cooperation in the 1 hour study. 
4.4.2 Assessments and Measures 
Overall procedure and design. The overall procedure and design of Study 1 is 
shown in Table 8. All participants (a) completed an indirect shyness test (either IAT or 
IAP), (b) judged themselves on bipolar personality-describing items, (c) were video-taped 
in a shyness inducing role play, (d) completed a different indirect shyness procedure (IAP 
or IAT), (e) judged themselves on other sets of personality items, (f) completed a retest of 
(d), and (h) were interviewed about the indirect tests. Participants in the assessment center 
condition additionally (g) judged themselves on the personality items of step (e) under a 
honesty instruction and (i) received video feedback on their performance in the role play 
by the role play partner. The shyness items were identical for both indirect procedures and 
were included as direct self-ratings in steps (b), (e), and (g). Thus, the first indirect test was 
completed before the direct ratings. This excluded possible transfer effects from the direct 
to the indirect measures. The direct shyness ratings, the IAT, the instructions for the faking 
and control group, and the role play were identical with the procedures in Asendorpf et al.'s 
(2002) Study 2. 
As can be seen in Table 8, there were two between-subject variations: faking 
instruction and position of the two indirect tests. Consistent with their invitation, 
participants received either the faking instruction (assessment center group) or the honesty 
instruction (social perception group). Invitations were scheduled such that approximately 
every fifth participant was in the social perception group. Within each group, half of the 
participants completed first the IAT and later IAP and IAP retest; the other half completed 
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first the IAP and later IAT and IAT retest. Assignment to the 2 orders alternated between 
successive participants. Finally, the participants were thanked, asked for permission of 
analyzing the videotapes (all gave permission), and were promised individual feedback 
about their results (only participants in the social perception condition). Four months after 
the study was finished, all participants received a letter explaining the procedures and 
general findings of the study, and the control participants were invited for a feedback 
session where they were informed about their individual results. 
 
Table 8 
Overall Procedure and Design of Study 1 
  Cover story 
 Assessment center: Faking instruction 
 Social perception: 
 Honesty instruction 
Duration
(Min.) 
(a) Indirect shyness test IAT IAP IAT IAP 10 
(b) Bipolar self-ratings Shyness, irritability, conscientiousness, intellect 5 
(c) Behavior observation  Shyness inducing role play 5 
(d) Different indirect shyness test IAP IAT IAP IAT 10 
(e) Direct self-ratings - Self-monitoring scale 
- Bipolar items for shyness and irritability 
- Social desirability scales 
12 
(f) Retest of (d) IAP IAT IAP IAT 10 
(g) Retest of (e) Honesty instruction - 12 
(h) Interview about indirect tests - Problems with IAT or IAP 
- Answer or faking strategies 7 
(i) Video feedback Role play performance - 20 
 n 120 120 30 30 ~1.5/1h
Note. IAT = Implicit Association Test, IAP = Implicit Association Procedure. 
 
Instructions. All instructions were identical to Asendorpf et al.’s Study 2 (2002) 
Upon arrival at the lab, the participants in the assessment center condition received the 
following instruction: “The following assessment center assesses your ability to present 
yourself as successfully as possible for a position in a company that you are very interested 
in. An important part of your future job is to present the company as successfully as 
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possible in interactions with new clients. Therefore, you must be able to warm-up strangers 
quickly and to avoid insecure behavior because such insecurity could easily make an 
unprofessional impression." Then, the experimenter explained the different steps of the 
assessment center and stressed the point that in order to get the job the participant should 
make a favorable impression in all parts of the assessment, including both the role play and 
the personality tests. The instruction “Please do not forget to present yourself in a way that 
you get the job.” was repeated before each set of direct ratings and each indirect test.  
The participants in the social perception condition were informed that they would 
participate in a study on social perception, that is, "how you perceive yourself and how 
others perceive you". After explaining the different steps of the experiment, the 
experimenter continued "Please describe yourself in all personality tests as honestly and 
realistically as possible and act in the role play simply as you would do in real life". The 
instruction “Please do not forget to present yourself as honestly and realistically as 
possible.” was repeated before each set of direct ratings and each indirect test. 
Role play instructions. Before participants of the assessment center condition were 
shown into the observation room, they were reminded that "it is very important for getting 
the job that you show in the role play that you can easily and openly approach strangers". 
In the control condition, the participants were informed that "the role play is informative 
about particular personality characteristics" and that they would be evaluated by their role 
play partner after the role play. All participants were informed that the role play would be 
recorded by two cameras. Then, the role play situation was described: "You are an 
employee in a company. In your company, the boss will be replaced by a new one. This 
new boss, your future boss, was supposed to meet the present boss now, but unfortunately 
the present boss is still in another meeting for about 10 minutes. You have been asked to 
fill in for these 10 minutes and to make the situation as comfortable for your future boss as 
possible." In the assessment center condition, this instruction was continued: "You should 
present yourself as favorably as possible. Have in mind that your role play partner will be 
your future boss." In the control condition, the instruction was continued differently: "Act 
in the role play just as you would do in real life."  
Role play. The role play situation was identical for all participants. In the 
observation room, an older-looking, unfamiliar, opposite-sex, advanced psychology 
student, dressed in a business suit, was sitting at a low table. The participant was asked to 
take place on a chair, that was put at a 90° angle to the confederate's chair. The confederate 
Study 1 54 
was blind to the experimental condition. S/he was trained to play the role of the future boss 
described in the instruction. The confederate was instructed to act slightly indignant at the 
delay of the meeting with the present boss and to slightly patronize the participant. This 
procedure was designed to induce shyness by (a) the unfamiliarity and (b) the status 
difference of the boss, (c) the assumed evaluation by the boss, (d) the opposite sex of the 
boss, and (e) the videotaping. 
The role play was videotaped with two cameras that were operated from another 
room using S-VHS recorders. One camera filmed the participant and the confederate from 
a 45° angle. These tapes were used for behavioral analyses. A different camera directly 
looked toward the participant and recorded a zoomed-up view of the participants face. 
When participants interrupted the role play (e.g., by talking about the role play or walking 
around), the confederate tried to get them back in the role play as quick as possible. The 
time period until the role play was continued was defined as missing. For the judgments 
and codings of shy behavior secondary tapes were prepared that contained the first three 
minutes of noninterrupted role play of each participant. 
Implicit Association Test (IAT) and Implicit Association Procedure (IAP). The 
same procedures as in Pilot Study 2 were used. Following Greenwald et al. (1998) three 
aspects were modified concerning data reduction. First, latencies below 300 ms were 
recoded as 300 ms, as well as IAT latencies above 3000 ms were recoded as 3000 ms. 
Given that in the IAP the presentation of the stimulus stopped after 3000 ms, there were no 
response latencies longer than that. Second, the first two responses in the combined tasks 
were not analyzed. Third, calculations of the internal consistencies and the test scores were 
based on log-transformed latencies to correct for the skewed latency distribution. However, 
for presentation purposes, descriptive statistics of the IAT and the IAP are reported in 
milliseconds.  
This data reduction procedure was identical to that used by Asendorpf et al. (2002). 
To maximize comparability between both studies I do not report results for the improved 
scoring algorithm that Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) suggested recently. However, 
I analyzed both the present data and the Asendorpf et al. (2002) data with this new 
procedure but found only minimal changes (differences in correlations below .02). The 
main reason for the minimal between-procedure difference seems to be that the Asendorpf 
et al. (2002) procedure already included a major feature of the Greenwald et al. (2003) 
procedure, namely inclusion of the practice trials for the combined tasks into the analyses. 
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The gain in internal consistency and validity due to this variation from the original 
procedure used by Greenwald et al. (1998) was larger than the gain due to the remaining 
features of the Greenwald et al. (2003) procedure. 
Direct self-ratings. Concerning bipolar self-ratings in step (b), the same 10 shyness 
items as in Pilot Study 1 were used. These items were mixed with 30 conscientiousness, 
intellect, and irritability items in a fixed random order. In order to minimize transfer 
effects from the preceding indirect test, the shyness items occurred only among the last 20 
items. Self-ratings in step (e) started with a 32-item self-monitoring scale that should again 
minimize transfer effects from the preceding indirect test and was not analyzed for the 
purpose of the present study. The scale was followed by the 10 shyness and irritability 
items of step (b) and concluded with the social desirability scales of Pilot Study 1. The 
reliability of the direct self-ratings was separately calculated for the assessment center and 
the social perception condition and was above α = .84 in each case. 
Interview about the indirect procedures. All participants were interviewed by the 
experimenter about (a) problems with the IAT or IAP, and (b) whether they used particular 
strategies during the IAT or IAP in order to decrease error rate, increase speed, or make a 
favorable impression.  
Judgments of shy behavior. Four student judges who were blind to the 
experimental condition independently rated their overall impression of the participants' 
shyness. Each minute of the 3-minute secondary tapes was separately rated on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 7 = "shy" to 1 = "not shy". Beforehand, the judgments were anchored 
by two examples of extremely shy and extremely nonshy participants from Asendorpf et 
al.'s (2002) Study 1. For each participant the 12 ratings were averaged The reliability 
(interjudge agreement) was above α = .92 for both conditions.  
Codings of shy behavior. Codings were done on a PC using the Computer Aided 
Observation System (CAOS) software. This program synchronizes video player and PC 
and registers onset and offset of behavioral codings when the appropriate key is pressed. 
Codings were carried out for speech duration, body movements, and tenseness of body 
posture. Following Ekman and Friesen's (1972) classification body movements were coded 
as illustrators (movements illustrating speech), facial adaptors (self-stimulations of the 
face), and body adaptors (self-stimulations of the body). For data analysis body movements 
and speech duration were considered in terms of their relative duration of the 3 minute 
observation time. For statistical analyses body movement codings were log-transformed to 
Study 1 56 
correct for the skewed distribution. Tenseness of body posture was defined as deviation 
from a normally relaxed body posture and was coded on a 3-point scale as normal, slight, 
or strong tension. Using the weights of 0, 1, and 2, the durations of the three tension 
categories (in % of observation time) were summed, resulting in scores ranging from 0% to 
100%. From these 5 variables, indices of spontaneous and controlled shy behavior were 
computed as in Asendorpf et al.'s (2002) studies by aggregating the z-transformed scores of 
the three spontaneous behaviors facial adaptor duration, body adaptor duration, and tense 
body posture, and separately the 2 controlled non-shy behaviors speech duration and 
illustrator duration. Coding reliability was checked by independent codings of 45 
participants by another coder; the reliability was satisfactory for all 5 main behavioral 
indicators, r > .86 in each case. 
4.5 Results 
The first two sections of the Results section report the main effects of instruction 
(faking versus social perception) and position (before versus after the role play). Then, the 
effects of these experimental variations on the correlations between direct, indirect, and 
behavioral measures are explored. 
4.5.1 Effects of Instruction and Position on Indirect and Direct Measures 
In this section, the main indirect and direct measures are described, and effects of 
instruction (main faking effects, Hypothesis 1) and position (before versus after the role 
play, Hypothesis 2) are analyzed. 
IATs. For both IATs, the error rates in the two combined tasks were similar to 
those in Asendorpf et al. (2002), for the first IAT, M = 5.1%, SD = 3.6%; for the second 
IAT, M = 4.9%, SD = 3.8%. Inspection of the error distributions indicated three extreme 
scorers (in the faking condition, 1 participant in the first IAT, 25% error, and 1 in the 
second IAT, 26% error; in the control condition, 1 in the first IAT, 26% error). All other 
error rates were below 20%. Therefore, the IAT data of these 3 participants were excluded 
from all analyses. The distributions of the log-based IAT and IAT retest scores were not 
even marginally different from a normal distribution, Z < 1. Their overall internal 
consistency α, calculated across IAT scores that were separately determined for the trials 
3-20, 21-40, 41-60, and 61-80, was .78 for test and .76 for retest and highly similar for all 
conditions; in particular, it was not lower in the faking condition (.78 in the faking versus 
.73 in the control condition for test, and .78 versus .63 for retest, respectively). Thus, 
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internal consistency was acceptable for all conditions although it was slightly lower than in 
Asendorpf et al.'s (2002) studies. The retest reliability of the IAT was r = .68 and thus 
highly similar to the parallel test reliability of .66 reported by Asendorpf et al. (2002). 
 
Table 9 
Summary Statistics and Instruction Effect for the Main Variables 
 Faking 
n = 240a 
Control 
n = 60b 
Instruction effect 
df = 298c 
Variable (range of scores) M SD M SD t p d 
IAT -115 ms 194 ms -76 ms 169 ms 1.99 .05 .23
IAP -85 ms 134 ms -62 ms 142 ms 1.27 .21 .15
Bipolar shyness self-rating (1-7) 1.85 0.59 3.58 1.01 17.3 .001 2.00
- before role play 1.90 0.64 3.62 1.01 16.3 .001 1.89
- after role play 1.79 0.59 3.54 1.03 17.3 .001 2.00
Social desirability score (0-1) 0.85 0.14 0.48 0.17 17.8 .001 2.06
Observer shyness judgment (1-7) 3.72 1.19 4.11 1.26 2.29 .02 .27
Speech duration (%) 85.9 26.3 68.9 24.7 4.52 .001 .52
Illustrator duration (%) 6.22 5.85 4.82 5.97 1.70 .10 .20
Facial adaptor duration (%) 3.39 10.4 5.08 11.8 1.22 .22 .14
Body adaptor duration (%) 35.1 39.7 28. 6 39.9 1.25 .21 -.14
Tense body position (%)d 66.9 29.6 54.1 27.2 3.03 .01 -.35
Note. M and SD refer to raw scores, statistical tests to log-transformed scores in the case of 
the IAT and IAP latencies and the body movement codings. The effect sizes d were defined 
such that positive scores indicate less shyness in the faking condition.  
a n = 239 for IAT and IAP;    b n = 59 for IAT and IAP.  
c df = 294 for IAT and IAP, t = √F in case of ANOVAs.  
d Weighted duration of normal, slight, and strong tension. 
 
Effects of instruction, position, and their interaction on the IAT means were tested 
by a 2×2 ANOVA. A significant effect was found only for instruction, F(1,294) = 3.97, 
p < .05. Table 9 indicates that participants had lower IAT scores in the faking condition 
than in the control condition. Although the effect size was small, it suggested that some 
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participants might have manipulated the IAT in order to present themselves as nonshy. 
Therefore, the participants' reports about faking the IAT in the interview with the 
experimenter at the end of the study were related to their IAT scores. Of the 239 
participants in the faking condition, 58 reported attempts of influencing the direction of the 
IAT outcome. In 57 cases, they reported to bias their results by having taken the 
perspective of a nonshy job applicant; one other participant reported to have deliberately 
committed errors. A t test contrasting them with the other 181 participants in the faking 
condition confirmed the hypothesis that they had lower IAT scores, t(237) = 1.78, p < .05, 
one-tailed, d = .23. When these 58 participants were excluded from analysis, the remaining 
participants had only marginally lower IAT scores than those in the control condition, 
t(238) = 1.44, p < .08, one-tailed, d = .19. In terms of untransformed reaction times, the 
mean IAT score was –154 ms for fakers, -103 ms for assumed nonfakers, and –76 ms for 
control participants. Because some of the assumed nonfakers might have tried as hard as 
the fakers to influence the IAT, but did not report it, the instruction effect for the IAT 
seems to be due to the tendency of a minority of the participants to take the perspective of 
a nonshy job applicant. 
IAPs. For both IAPs, the error rates in the combined tasks were similar to those in 
the IAT (for the first IAP, M = 5.0%, SD = 5.3%; for the second IAP, M = 3.8%, 
SD = 3.5%). Inspection of the error distributions indicated two clear outliers (in the faking 
condition, 1 participant in the first IAP, 40% error; in the control condition, 1 in the first 
IAP, 45% error). These participants did not produce extreme scores in the IAT. All other 
error rates were below 24%. Therefore, the IAP data of these 2 participants were excluded 
from all analyses. The distributions of the log-based IAP and IAP retest were not even 
marginally different from a normal distribution, Z < 1. The internal consistency of the two 
IAPs was evaluated similarly to the IATs by computing Cronbach's α for the separately 
determined IAP scores for 4 blocks of trials (3-32, 33-64, 65-96, 97-128). The overall 
internal consistency was .83 for the test and .77 for the retest but was somewhat 
unsatisfactory in the control group for the retest. In particular, it was .82 in the faking 
versus .86 in the control condition for the test, and .81 versus .55 for the retest, 
respectively. Nevertheless, internal consistency was completely satisfactory for the first 
test at least. The retest reliability of the IAP was r = .65 and thus highly similar to the 
retest reliability of the IAT of .68. 
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Effects of instruction, position, and their interaction on the IAP means were tested 
by a 2×2 ANOVA. No significant effects were found. In particular, the instruction effect 
was not even marginally significant, F(1,294) = 1.61, p = .21. Thus, the IAP tended to be 
more robust than the IAT with regard to faking. This conclusion was also supported by an 
analysis of reported faking. Of the 239 participants in the faking condition, 68 reported 
attempts of influencing the IAP outcome. In 64 cases, they reported to have taken the 
perspective of a nonshy job applicant; 4 other participant reported to have deliberately 
committed errors. These figures were slightly higher than for the IAT. However, a t test 
contrasting them with the other 171 participants in the faking condition did not even reveal 
marginal differences, t < 1. In terms of untransformed reaction times, the IAP score was 
-91 ms for fakers, -83 ms for assumed nonfakers, and –62 ms for control participants. 
Although the rank-order of these means was identical with the results for the IAT, the 
differences between the means were minimal. 
Direct self-ratings. All self-rating scales showed a satisfactory internal 
consistency, α > .80. Both shyness means in the control condition were not even 
marginally different from those in Study 1 by Asendorpf et al. (2002), t < 1, which 
suggests that the sample of the control condition was not differently selected for shyness 
from the sample of this earlier study. Effects of instruction, position, and their interaction 
on the shyness self-ratings were tested by a mixed 2×2 ANOVA with instruction as a 
between-subjects factor and order as a within-subjects factor. A very large instruction 
effect was found, F(1,298) = 298.9, p < .001. As Table 9 indicates, participants in the faking 
condition reported shyness that was 2 standard deviations lower than in the control 
condition. In addition, a moderate position effect was found, F(1,298) = 13.25, p < .001, 
d = .40 (computed as √2(M1 – M2)/SD where SD is the standard deviation of the difference 
scores; see Cohen, 1988). Participants in the faking and in the control group reported 
somewhat less shyness after the role play than before (see Table 9). This may be attributed 
to the mastery of the role play that probably made participants to consider themselves as 
less shy than before. The position by instruction interaction was not significant, F < 1. 
It should be noted that position effects on direct shyness measures were analyzed in 
a within-subjects design whereas position effects on indirect shyness measures were 
analyzed between subjects (see the overall design in Table 8). Thus, comparing results for 
direct and indirect measures is not entirely fair, since the statistical tests had a higher level 
of power for the former than for the latter. However, analysis of means did not indicate any 
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common trend for position effects on indirect shyness measures. In terms of untransformed 
reaction times, the mean IAT score was -130 ms (SD = 214 ms) before and -85 ms 
(SD = 159 ms) after the role play. Thus, participants were more likely to attain higher 
shyness scores after the role play. The opposite was true for the IAP, -73 ms (SD = 146 ms) 
before and –88 (SD = 125 ms) after the role play. Given the standard deviations, though, 
none of these differences were significant and should be seen as chance variations. Thus, 
the indirect measures, in fact, seemed to be more robust against position effects. 
Most other direct self-ratings showed also large instruction effects, particularly the 
social desirability scale, d = 2.06, but also the bipolar self-ratings of conscientiousness, 
d = 1.34, and intellect, d = 1.23. Thus, the participants in the faking condition showed a 
strong, generalized tendency to present themselves in socially desirable ways. 
4.5.2 Effects of Instruction on Behavioral Shyness Measures 
In this section, the judgments and codings of shy behavior are described, and 
effects of instruction (main faking effects, Hypothesis 1) are analyzed. 
Judgments of shy behavior. In the control condition, the mean of the observer 
judgments of shyness was marginally higher than in Asendorpf et al.’s (2002) Study 1, 
t(196)  = 1.65, p < .10. Because the observers used a response scale that was anchored with 
extreme examples from this earlier study, this difference can be attributed to a slightly 
more successful induction of shyness by the role play. Table 9 indicates that the 
participants in the faking condition were judged as less shy than those in the control 
condition but this instruction effect (d = 0.27) was not large compared to the effect for the 
direct ratings. 
Codings of shy behavior. The durations of the 3 types of body movement were 
skewly distributed and therefore log(x+1)-transformed. Table 9 indicates that, as expected, 
the participants in the faking condition talked more and used somewhat more illustrating 
gestures (significant for a one-tailed test), thus showed less controlled shy behavior than 
those in the control condition. In contrast, they did not show less spontaneous shy behavior 
with regards to facial or body adaptors, and even showed higher body tension, when they 
were instructed to appear non-shy. This behavioral pattern completely replicates the pattern 
that Asendorpf et al. (2002) reported for a much smaller, female-only sample. Thus, the 
participants in the faking condition followed the instruction to present themselves as non-
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shy in their controlled behavior. However, they failed to suppress or even showed more 
spontaneous shy behavior than in the control condition. 
4.5.3 Correlational Analyses 
In the preceding analyses, I explored main effects of instruction (faking versus 
control) and position (before versus after the role play). In this section, I study differential 
effects of faking and position, that is, how faking and position affected interindividual 
differences and their correlates (Hypotheses 3-6). 
Position effects. Explored were position effects on the correlations between the 
implicit and direct self-concept measures, the observer judgments, and the behavior 
codings, both overall and within the faking and the control group. All order effects were 
small and not even marginally significant. Although relatively large samples are needed to 
detect significant differences between correlations, the sample size for the two positions 
for the faking condition was n = 120 and thus sufficient for detecting marginally significant 
between-correlation differences of approximately .30 or larger with a power of .80 (Cohen, 
1988). In particular, no systematic trend was found that the direct or indirect self-concept 
assessments before the role play were less strongly related to the behavioral observations 
than the same assessments after the role play. Furthermore, the self-ratings before and after 
the role play correlated above .83 in both the faking and the control condition, which is 
close to the reliability of these ratings. Therefore, the two bipolar shyness self-ratings were 
averaged for each participant, yielding one aggregated index of the explicit self-concept of 
shyness, and the position of the indirect measure was ignored in the following analyses. 
Table 10 indicates that IAT and IAP were moderately correlated in both the faking 
and the control group and showed highly similar correlations with the other main variables. 
Thus, all major IAT correlates were replicated with the IAP. Therefore, both IAP and IAT 
were z-transformed within experimental condition to make their scores comparable, and 
then averaged, yielding one aggregated index of the implicit self-concept of shyness. The 
remaining analyses of differential effects (Hypotheses 3 - 6) were restricted to the 
aggregated measures of the explicit and the implicit self-concept of shyness (lower right-
hand side of Table 10). Numerous observations can be made from this part of Table 10. 
First, as expected by Hypothesis 3, the implicit and explicit self-concept measures 
were significantly less strongly correlated in the faking condition than in the control 
condition, r = .19 vs. r = .50, z = 2.39, p < .01, one-tailed. The correlation of .50 in the 
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control condition was similar to the correlation of .44 between the indirect and direct 
measure in Asendorpf et al.'s (2002) Study 1. 
 
Table 10 
Correlations of the Main Variables by Instruction 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. IAT   .50***  .87***  .15* -.07  .14*  .04  .06 
2. IAP  .44***  .87***  .18** -.09  .10  .04  .03 
3. Implicit shynessa  .85*** .85***   .19** -.09  .14*  .05  .05 
4. Explicit shynessb  .35**  .49***  .50***  -.48***  .13* -.01  .06 
5. Social desirability -.13 -.09 -.13 -.17  -.08 -.04 -.03 
6. Observer judgment  .17  .28*  .27*  .36**  .16    .19** .47***
7. Spontaneous behaviorc  .04  .07  .07  .15  .04  .34**   .02 
8. Controlled behaviord  .10  .02  .07  .18  .05  .70*** .29*  
Note. Correlations above the diagonal refer to faking condition (n = 238), correlations below 
the diagonal to control condition (n = 58). * p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001. 
a Mean of z-transformed IAT and IAP. 
b Mean of the bipolar shyness self-ratings before and after the role play. 
c Average of z-transformed duration of facial and body adaptors and tense body posture. 
d Average of reversed z-transformed duration of speech and illustrators. 
 
Second, as expected by Hypothesis 4, the indirect measure did not correlate with 
social desirability neither in the faking nor in the control group, r = -.09 and r = -.13. In 
contrast, the direct measure correlated significantly more negatively with the social 
desirability index in the faking condition than in the control condition, r = -.48 vs. r = -.17, 
z = 2.41, p < .01, one-tailed. As pointed out in the introduction, this correlational 
difference confirms the undermining effect of differential self-presentation tendencies on 
the direct shyness ratings in the faking condition. 
Third, as expected by Hypothesis 5, the correlation of the observer judgments of 
shyness with the direct self-ratings of shyness decreased significantly under faking (from 
r = .36 to r = .13, z = 1.67, p < .05, one-tailed) whereas the correlation with the indirect 
measure did not (from r = .27 to r = .14, z = .92, n.s., one-tailed). Although the difference 
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in the decrease of the correlations was not significant, it should be noted that the indirect 
and the direct measure showed significant and equally strong associations with the 
observer judgment under faking. 
Because the indirect and direct measures were correlated, and to a different degree 
in the faking and the control group, I analyzed unique contributions of the indirect versus 
direct measures to the observer judgments, using multiple regression. In the control group, 
only the direct self-ratings explained significant unique variance of the observer 
judgments, β = .30, p < .05, whereas the unique contribution of the indirect measures was 
not significant, β = .11, p = .41. In the faking group, both measures explained similar 
unique but small variance that was significant for the direct self-rating, β =.13, p < .05, and 
marginal for the indirect measure, β =.11, p < .10. Thus, whereas the unique contribution 
of the direct self-ratings tended to be smaller in the faking than in the control group, the 
unique contribution of the indirect measure was the same in both groups. These findings 
suggest that the observers were to some extent resistant to participants' differential 
cheating. That was also indicated by the nonsignificant correlations between the observer 
judgments of shyness and the social desirability index in both groups (see Table 10). 
The correlation of .19 (p < .01) between participants' direct self-ratings and the 
indirect measure under faking suggests that these self-ratings were not completely invalid 
for participants' true self-concept. This assumption was supported by a similarly high 
correlation of .24 (p < .001) between the self-ratings of shyness that were completed under 
the faking versus the honesty instruction at the end of the experiment. Although this 
correlation is much lower than the retest correlation of .83 under faking, the rank order of 
the participants in self-reported shyness was preserved to some extent despite differential 
faking. Thus, the significant but low correlation of .13 between the observer judgments and 
the direct self-ratings under faking may reflect this valid portion of the direct self-ratings 
rather than a faking effect on the observer shyness judgment. 
Fourth, the indices of spontaneous and controlled shy behavior were significantly 
correlated with the observer judgment of shyness in both the faking and the control group. 
However, contrary to Hypothesis 6, both behavioral indices of shyness were not 
significantly correlated with the indirect and direct shyness measures in the control 
condition (both behavioral indices were significantly correlated with the indirect and the 
direct shyness measures in Asendorpf et al.'s, 2002, Study 1). Thus, although the observers 
interpreted these two behavioral indices as indicators of shyness, they were in fact 
Study 1 64 
unrelated to the self-concept of shyness. This lack of validity applied not only to the 
aggregated behavioral indices but also to each single behavioral variable. Because of these 
zero correlations, the expected double dissociation between the indirect and direct 
measures of shyness was not found for the control situation. 
Fifth, given this lack of validity of the behavioral measures for the control 
condition, it is not surprising that they lacked validity also in the faking condition. Again, 
the correlations between the indirect and the direct shyness measures and the two behavior 
composites (and each single behavior within the composites) were not significant. 
Therefore, the expected double dissociation between the indirect and direct measures of 
shyness was not found also for the faking condition. 
All in all, the 4 hypotheses concerning correlations between the implicit and the 
explicit self-concept of shyness, the social desirability index, and the observer judgments 
of shyness were at least marginally confirmed but not Hypothesis 6 because of the 
invalidity of both the spontaneous and the controlled behavioral measures for the role play 
situation. 
Exploration of alternative behaviors indicating shyness in the role play. The 
significant correlations between the observer judgments and the implicit and explicit self-
concept measures suggested that the observers were aware of interindividual differences in 
shyness but used different cues than those captured by the a priori defined spontaneous 
and controlled behavioral measures. Therefore, alternative behavioral measures of the self-
concept of shyness were systematically explored, using the videotapes of both the control 
condition and the Asendorpf et al. (2002) Study 1. As a safeguard against chance findings, 
given the post hoc nature of these analyses, only those behavioral measures were 
considered that correlated significantly with the implicit or explicit self-concept of shyness 
in both the control role play situation and in Asendorpf et al.'s (2002) Study 1. More than a 
dozen different nonverbal behaviors were explored for this purpose (e.g., body posture, 
facial cues, vocal cues, a detailed analysis of speech pauses of different length) but not a 
single behavior was found that survived this test. Thus, it seems that shyness is differently 
expressed in behavior in the role play situations of the present study than in the more 
naturalistic interactions with a confederate in Study 1 by Asendorpf et al. (2002). 
Nevertheless, it was not possible to identify the cues that the observers used for their valid 
shyness judgments. 
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4.6 Discussion 
4.6.1 Summary of the Main Findings 
Study 1 tested six hypotheses on the differential operation of indirect versus direct 
measures of the personality self-concept under naturalistic faking conditions. The indirect 
measures were an Implicit Association Test (IAT) and a newly developed Implicit 
Association Procedure (IAP). I discuss the results separately for each hypothesis, contrast 
the two indirect procedures with one another, and then briefly discuss general conclusions 
and open questions for the indirect assessment of personality self-concept. 
As expected in Hypothesis 1, the direct self-ratings of shyness, the social 
desirability scores and the controlled shy behaviors decreased under faking; the decrease 
was particularly strong for the questionnaire measures (approximately 2 standard 
deviations). Also in line with this hypothesis, the IAP scores and the spontaneous shy 
behaviors did not decrease, supporting their non-fakability, and replicating Asendorpf et 
al.'s (2002) Study 2 findings. There was a slight tendency of the IAT scores to decrease 
under faking, but a more detailed analysis showed that this decrease was restricted to a 
minority of participants who had spontaneously attempted to vividly imagine themselves 
as a nonshy job applicant. Comparable effects of mental imagery on IAT scores and 
priming measures have been reported in studies that experimentally induced mental 
imagery of counter stereotypes (Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001). It should be noted, however, 
that even for these participants the effect was only moderate (less than a quarter of a 
standard deviation).  
Whether the indirect tests were completed before or immediately after the shyness-
inducing role play had no effects on their mean level, confirming Hypothesis 2. In contrast, 
the direct self-ratings of shyness were lower after the shyness-inducing role play. This may 
be attributed to the mastery of the role play that decreased the direct shyness self-ratings. 
The higher robustness of the indirect measures against state effects is important for the 
interpretation of the indirect measures because they are assumed to refer to a relatively 
stable self-concept of personality, not to current states (cf. Schmukle & Egloff, 2003).  
Turning to the correlational hypotheses, the implicit and explicit self-concept 
measures were significantly less strongly correlated in the faking condition than in the 
control condition, which fully confirmed Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis was based on the 
assumption that the direct self-ratings were less valid in the faking condition than in the 
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control condition because they were distorted by differential tendencies of the participants 
to present themselves in socially desirable ways. 
This assumption was supported by the finding that the indirect measures did not 
correlate with participants' social desirability scores under both experimental conditions 
whereas the direct self-ratings correlated more negatively with the social desirability scores 
in the faking condition than in the control condition. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was fully 
confirmed. Together, these findings for the effect of faking on the correlations between the 
indirect measures of shyness, the direct self-ratings of shyness, and social desirability 
scores strongly support the view that the indirect measures were robust with regard to 
interindividual differences in faking attempts. 
Hypothesis 5 on the validity of the observer judgments of shyness was marginally 
confirmed. Whereas the observer judgments tended to correlate more strongly with the 
explicit than with the implicit self-concept of shyness in the control group, these 
correlations were virtually identical under faking. Moreover, the correlation between the 
indirect measures and the observer judgment was similar under both experimental 
conditions. The unique contribution of the direct self-rating under faking to the observer 
judgments, independent of the contribution of the indirect measure, does not necessarily 
indicate that the observers were influenced by participants' faking attempts because there 
were two indications that participants' true shyness perspired in their behavior in the faking 
condition: a significant correlation for the direct self-ratings of shyness between the faking 
and the honesty condition, and a significant correlation between the direct and indirect 
measure under faking. 
Together, these results suggest that observer judgments of temperamental traits in 
role play situations are not very much influenced by the role players' self-presentation even 
when they systematically try to fake the cues that the observers might use for their 
judgments (in this case, cues for non-shyness such as talking and gesturing). It seems that 
the observers use other cues that the participants cannot easily control. Unfortunately, it 
was not possible to identify such cues from the videotaped behavior.    
Turning finally to Hypothesis 6 on a double dissociation between indirect and direct 
measures, the observer judgments of shyness correlated significantly with both the 
spontaneous and the controlled indices of shy behavior under both experimental 
conditions. This validated the spontaneous and controlled indices as behavioral measures 
of shyness. However, these correlations were smaller than in Asendorpf et al.'s (2002) 
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Study 1, and contrary to these prior findings, controlled shy behavior was not significantly 
correlated with the direct shyness self-ratings, and spontaneous shy behavior was not 
significantly correlated with the indirect measures of shyness. Thus, although the observers 
interpreted these two behavioral indices as indicators of shyness, they were in fact 
unrelated to the self-concept of shyness in the control condition. Therefore, the expected 
double dissociation between the indirect and direct measures of shyness was not found for 
the control condition. 
Because the mean direct self-ratings of shyness in the control condition were not 
lower than in Asendorpf et al.'s (2002) Study 1, and the observers rated the participants in 
the control condition even slightly more shy than the participants in this earlier study, the 
lack of validity of the behavioral measures cannot be attributed to an insufficient induction 
of shyness by the role play procedure. Instead, it seems that the role play framework itself, 
the more structured situation (a clear communication goal was defined) and/or the clear 
status differences between the participants ("boss" versus "employee") apparently changed 
the meaning of behaviors that were found to be valid indicators of shyness in an 
unstructured interaction between strangers. 
Given this lack of validity of the behavioral measures for the control condition, it 
was not surprising that all correlations between the behavioral measures and the indirect 
and direct measures of the self-concept of shyness were not significant also in the faking 
condition. Therefore, the expected double dissociation between the indirect and direct 
measures of shyness was again not found. 
Thus, in my view the main problem of the present study did not concern the indirect 
procedures. Instead, it concerned the fact that valid behavioral cues for shyness in more 
naturalistic situations became completely invalid in a role play context, and could not be 
replaced by alternative valid cues. If the assessment of shy behavior in role play situations 
is not the focal point, as in the present study, future studies might try to circumvent this 
problem by motivating participants to fake non-shyness in dyadic interactions of the type 
used by Asendorpf et al. (2002), Study 1. I did not follow these lines because I feared that 
direct instructions to do so would be perceived by the participants as artificial and would 
therefore insufficiently bias their actual behavior. Alternatively, it might be possible to 
motivate participants more indirectly to fake non-shyness. 
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4.6.2 An Alternative Procedure: The IAP 
The Implicit Association Procedure (IAP) produced results that were highly similar 
to those found for the Implicit Association Test (IAT). The error response rate was similar 
to the IAT, the distribution of the scores was also close to a normal distribution, and the 
retest correlation was virtually identical. The internal consistency was slightly higher for 
the IAP which can be attributed to the fact that there were 256 trials in the critical blocks in 
the IAP, but only 160 trials in the IAT. The total test durations were not different, though, 
because there is no need in the IAP for attribute and reverse target discriminations. The 
two indirect tests showed substantial correlations of .50 (faking condition) and .44 (control 
condition), and their correlations with external variables were highly similar. A minor 
difference was that the IAP tended to be slightly more robust against faking. 
A disadvantage of the IAP is that it is more difficult to implement this procedure on 
standard computers than the IAT. A joystick is needed, the joystick has to be continuously 
calibrated, and the program routines for implementing the procedure are much more 
complex than for the IAT. All in all, then, the IAP may be considered less an alternative to 
the IAT than an useful addition to the IAT that allows one to replicate IAT-findings and to 
reduce method variance of the IAT by aggregating IAT and IAP scores. 
Let me conclude with a comment on the utility of indirect measures for the 
assessment of personality differences. On the positive side, the study showed that these 
indirect measures were fairly robust to faking attempts of the participants. Only 
participants who tried to bias their results by deliberately taking the perspective of a non-
shy person were able to bias their IAT scores (but not their IAP scores), and this bias was 
very small compared to the bias in their direct self-ratings. Also, it was possible to 
construct a new indirect assessment procedure, the IAP, which correlated .50 with the IAT 
and showed highly similar correlates. Between-procedure correlations of this size are 
rarely achieved for indirect procedures that assess the same construct (Bosson et al., 2000; 
Cunningham et al., 2001). This new method made it possible to increase the reliability and 
validity of the assessment of the implicit self-concept through the aggregation of both 
procedures. 
On the negative side, the direct self-ratings predicted the observer judgments in the 
control condition slightly better than the indirect measures, and in the faking condition not 
worse than the indirect measures. Although the direct self-ratings were strongly biased 
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with regard to their mean, there were multiple indications that they were not completely 
invalid with regard to their interindividual differences. Furthermore, the .50 correlation 
between the IAT and IAP is not high compared to the .70 correlations that are regularly 
achieved when the same personality dimension is self-rated on different questionnaire 
scales. Both the relatively low retest correlation of .65 - .68 for the IAP and IAT and their 
relatively low parallel test reliability of .50 indicate that the amount of specific method 
variance for these indirect procedures is much higher than the specific method variance for 
direct ratings.  
Much work may be required to increase these methodological weaknesses of the 
current indirect procedures for the assessment of stable interindividual differences to a 
psychometrically satisfactory level. Unless such a satisfactory level is reached, the indirect 
procedures can be considered interesting research instruments in need for improvement, 
not methods that are ready to be applied for practical assessment purposes. Another 
important aspect concerning practical implications is whether indirect measures, similar to 
direct measures, allow for the concurrent assessment of more than one personality trait. 
Therefore, the next study explores whether the IAT may be used to assess two traits, 
anxiousness and angriness, within one sample. 
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5 Study 2: Concurrent Assessment of the Implicit Self-Concept 
of Anxiousness and Angriness 
5.1 Introduction 
The results of Study 1 showed that indirect measures (shyness IAT and IAP) do not 
yet meet psychometric criteria that are necessary for individual diagnosis and that are 
typically shown for direct measures, that is, satisfactory test-retest stability and high 
convergent validity. The main purpose of Study 2 was to examine another important aspect 
concerning the practical implications of indirect assessment. Direct self-reports, for 
example, the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992), allow for the concurrent assessment of 
different traits within one questionnaire. Therefore, Study 2 explored whether IATs also 
allow for the assessment of two different traits within one sample when the IATs are 
applied as two consecutive tests. Although several studies employed more than one IAT 
within one sample (e.g., Gawronski, 2002; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002), there 
appears to be no research that would systematically carry out position effects on the IAT.  
Therefore, the sequence of an anxiousness and an angriness IAT was 
counterbalanced across participants in Study 2 and three main research questions were 
explored. First, it was expected that the validity of the IAT is affected if the IAT is 
preceded by another IAT. Second, it was expected that the IATs add incremental validity 
to the prediction of anxious and angry behavior. Third, it was explored whether social 
desirability does moderate the relationship between direct and indirect measures. These 
research questions are discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
5.1.1 Research Question 1: Position Effects on IATs 
The sequence of IATs is often counterbalanced in studies that explore several IATs. 
Usually, results are not discussed separately for the groups of different IAT order. 
Concerning test-retest comparisons, the study by Asendorpf et al. (2002) provided 
evidence that the second, parallel shyness IAT tended to show lower correlations with 
direct shyness measures and with shy behavior than the first IAT. Similarly, other studies 
found that the retest reliabilities of IATs are lower than their internal consistencies (cf. for 
an overview, Egloff, Schwerdtfeger, & Schmukle, 2003). Thus, IAT measures showed 
both a validity decrease for the second test and relatively low test-retest reliabilities. Both 
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aspects might be caused by the two factors, that is, state influences and changes in 
response strategies. 
State influences were ruled out in Study 1 and in the study by Schmukle and Egloff 
(2003) as a systematic bias in IAT results. Therefore, it is most likely that differences 
between the first and the second IAT measures are due to changes in response strategies. 
Working on the IAT, participants might develop cognitive strategies to respond faster, and 
try out different response styles, for example, avoiding errors because errors increase test 
duration. Recently, De Houwer (2003a) stated that changes in response strategies may 
emerge because participants try to make the IAT tasks as simple as possible. Therefore, 
participants recode the double discrimination task in terms of a simple discrimination (e.g., 
positive versus negative; see Mierke & Klauer, 2001). De Houwer pointed out that 
recoding in terms of a simple discrimination may be based on the associations one aims to 
measure (e.g., the associations of flowers and insects with positive and negative attributes). 
Alternatively, recoding may be based on any type of similarity between target and attribute 
concept (e.g., word length, color, etc.). Importantly, IAT effects are likely to be distorted if 
the similarity-based task-recoding is unrelated to the associations one tries to assess.  
Study 2 examined whether the completion of an IAT distorts the validity of the 
succeeding IAT due to any change in response strategies. Therefore, the order of the 
anxiousness and the angriness IAT was counterbalanced in Study 2, and results were 
inspected separately for both groups of different IAT order. 
5.1.2 Research Question 2: Prediction of Anxious and Angry Behavior 
Recently, a study by Egloff and Schmukle (2002) showed that self-reported state 
anxiety during a stressful speech was predicted by direct anxiousness measures but not by 
the anxiousness IAT. More importantly, the observer judgments of anxious behavior and 
several behavioral indicators of anxiety were predicted by the anxiousness IAT but not by 
direct anxiousness measures. Using the same rationale, Study 2 examined whether indirect 
measures significantly increase the prediction of behavior even if two traits are assessed 
within one study. It was expected that both, the anxiousness and the angriness IAT show 
predictive validity for anxious and angry behavior, respectively.  
Anxiousness and angriness were employed as traits under investigation because 
they were expected to be uncorrelated at least at the level of direct self-reports. 
Uncorrelated traits facilitate the study of convergent and discriminant validity between 
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direct, indirect, and behavioral measures (see Chapter 2.5 and the following). Additionally, 
anxiousness and angriness allow for the study of the predictive validity of direct and 
indirect measures because anxious and angry behavior may be observed after emotion 
inductions. 
5.1.3 Research Question 3: Social Desirability as a Moderator Variable 
One of the main reasons for research interest in indirect measures is that they are 
expected to circumvent the validity problems that are associated with direct measures 
(Greenwald et al., 2002). An example of a validity problem in direct measures is their 
susceptibility to social desirability concerns . For example, it was shown in Study 1 and in 
other studies (e.g., Asendorpf et al., 2002; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002) that direct self-report 
measures were, in contrast to IAT measures, significantly correlated with social 
desirability. Social desirability is a tendency to portray oneself in a favorable light (Crowne 
& Marlowe, 1960). Therefore, the more negative the correlations between direct measures 
and social desirability are, the more biased by social desirability the direct measures are 
assumed to be. 
More importantly, social desirability may also act as a moderator variable in the 
relationship between direct self-report and IAT measures. Individuals with a weak 
tendency to present themselves in a socially desirable way should show higher correlations 
between direct measures and IATs than the individuals with a strong tendency to socially 
desirable responding. Previous studies indicated that the correlations between direct 
measures and IATs were not moderated by social desirability (Egloff & Schmukle, 2003; 
Hofmann, Gschwendner, & Schmitt, 2003). In contrast, moderator variables were found to 
be significant if they asked for self-presentational motivation more directly with regard to 
the attribute that was measured (e.g., Banse & Gawronski, 2003; Hofmann, Gschwendner, 
et al., 2003; Nosek & Banaji, 2002). Nevertheless, social desirability was explored as a 
moderator variable in Study 2 in order to replicate the results from other studies for the 
anxiousness and the angriness IAT. 
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5.2 Hypotheses 
Study 2 tested the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 (Increase of state anxiety and state anger). Participants report more 
state anxiety and state anger after the emotion inductions as compared to the baseline. 
Hypothesis 2 (Validity of the bipolar anxiousness and angriness self-ratings). 
The bipolar anxiousness self-rating correlates with direct anxiousness but not with direct 
angriness measures whereas the opposite is true for the bipolar angriness self-rating. This 
validates the word material that was used in the IATs. 
Hypothesis 3 (Zero correlation between social desirability and the IATs). In 
contrast to direct self-ratings neither the anxiousness nor the angriness IAT are correlated 
with social desirability scores. 
Hypothesis 4 (Social desirability is not a moderator variable). Social desirability 
does not moderate the correlations between indirect and direct measures. 
Hypothesis 5 (Zero correlation between anxiousness and angriness). 
Anxiousness and angriness are neither correlated for the direct, nor the indirect or the 
behavioral measures, confirming their conceptualization as orthogonal dimensions. 
Hypothesis 6 (Validity decrease for the second IAT). The IAT tends to show 
smaller convergent validity with direct and behavioral measures when it is preceded by 
another IAT. 
Hypothesis 7 (Independent contribution of IATs to behavior prediction). The 
anxiousness and the angriness IAT predict behavioral anxiety and anger even when direct 
self-ratings are controlled for. In contrast, self-reported state anxiety and state anger are 
predicted by direct self-ratings but not by the anxiousness and angriness IAT. 
5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 Participants 
A total of 103 university students were recruited as participants on the campus of 
Humboldt University, Berlin, none of whom were psychology students or had participated 
in the lab’s previous studies. Most participants were directly approached by an 
experimenter (not identical with the experimenter at the lab). Some participants were 
recruited using postings at the university buildings. Participants were asked to take part in 
a study on concentration and personality. As a compensation, participants were offered € 
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10 (approximately US $ 10 at the time) for completing a questionnaire of about 15 minutes 
duration at home and for participating in a lab experiment of about one hour duration. In 
addition, they could receive individual feedback on their results after the study is complete. 
All participants claimed to be native German speakers. Three female participants refused 
to complete the speaking task during the lab session, and were therefore excluded from 
analysis. This led to a final sample of 100 participants (50 male, 50 female; age M = 24.0 
years, range 19-32 years).  
5.3.2 Assessments and Measures 
Overall procedure. The overall procedure of Study 2 is depicted in Table 11. All 
participants (a) judged themselves on several trait measures at home within one week 
before the lab session. After arrival at the lab they (b) completed a short form of the d2 
Attention-Stress Test, (c) judged themselves on a short optimistic risk perception measure 
(not relevant to this research), (d) completed the anxiousness IAT and the angriness IAT, 
(e) indicated their state anxiety and state anger on bipolar items, (f) received instructions 
for an anxiety-inducing speech, (g) completed a retest of (e), (h) prepared their speech, (i) 
were video-taped during their speech, (j) were videotaped during an anger-inducing 
computer crash, (k) completed a retest of (e), (l) were interviewed about the experiment, 
and (m) were completely debriefed. 
The anxiousness and angriness items of the two IATs were included as direct self-
ratings in step (a), (e), (g), and (j). The order of the anxiousness IAT and the angriness IAT 
in step (d) was varied between participants such that half of the participants completed the 
anxiousness IAT first and the other half completed the angriness IAT first. The assignment 
to the two orders was balanced for gender and alternated between successive participants. 
In contrast, the order of the anxiety and the anger induction was fixed, such that the anxiety 
induction always came first, because of the faked computer crash during the anger 
induction. 
Finally, the participants were thanked and asked to give their consent for the 
evaluation of the videotapes (all agreed). They were also paid and promised individual 
feedback about their results. Four months after finishing data collection, participants 
received a letter containing the principal findings of the study along with an invitation for 
an individual feedback session, where they were informed about their personal results. 
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Table 11 
Overall Procedure of Study 2 
Cover story: Concentration and personality Duration(Min.)
At home: 
(a) Direct trait measures 
- Trait form of the STAI, STAXI, and two subscales of the TAI-G 
- Speaking Anxiety Scale 
- Bipolar self-ratings of anxiousness, angriness, conscientiousness, and intellect 
- Social desirability scales and MAS 
- Biographical data 
15 
At the lab: 
(b) d2 Attention-Stress Test 5 
(c) Optimistic risk perception measure 2 
(d) Anxiousness and angriness IAT (counterbalanced for order across participants) 20 
(e) Direct state measures (baseline) 
Bipolar self-ratings of anxiety, anger, and conscientiousness 
1 
(f) Anxiety induction: Instructions for the speech 2 
(g) Direct state measures 
Bipolar self-ratings of anxiety, anger, and conscientiousness 
1 
(h) Preparation of the speech  3 
(i) Behavior observation: Speech before video camera 5 
(j) Anger induction and behavior observation: Computer crash, which was 
(1) pretended to be caused by the participant 
(2) destroyed all his / her data 
(3) made payment of the reward impossible 
5 
(k) Direct state measures 
Bipolar self-ratings of anxiety, anger, and conscientiousness 
1 
(l) Interview: Identification of participants who doubted the computer crash 5 
(m) Debriefing about the true purpose of the study 5 
 70 
Note. STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAXI = State Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory, TAI-G = German version of the Test Anxiety Inventory, MAS = Manifest 
Anxiety Scale, IAT = Implicit Association Test. 
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Trait measures. In order to minimize transfer effects between direct and indirect 
measures, direct trait measures were mailed to the participants within one week before the 
lab session. The instructions explained to participants that the study was about 
concentration and personality and consisted of two parts: a set of questionnaires 
concerning several personality traits, that was attached and had to be completed at home, 
and a subsequent lab session assessing attention and concentration. I avoided to tell 
participants that the study was about anxiousness and angriness because I (a) did not want 
anxious persons to avoid participation in the study, and (b) had to keep participants naive 
about the anger induction, as most people would not get angry knowing that it was 
intended to provoke their anger (Stemmler, Heldmann, Pauls, & Scherer, 2001). 
The mailed questionnaire contained the following measures (test references list the 
used German version first, and the English equivalent second, if such equivalent existed). 
The questionnaire started with the trait forms of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory STAI 
(Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & Spielberger, 1981; Spielberger, Grousch, & Lushene 
1970) and the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory STAXI (Schwenkmezger, Hodapp, & 
Spielberger, 1991; Spielberger, 1988) together with the subscales Interference and Lack of 
Confidence (without the item “Ich bin überzeugt, dass ich gut abschneiden werde.” [“I am 
sure, that I will receive good marks.”]) of the Test Anxiety Inventory TAI-G (Hodapp, 
1991; expanded German version of the TAI, Spielberger, 1980). These questionnaires 
assess enduring symptoms of anxiousness, angriness, and test anxiousness on a 4-point 
scale (1 = Almost never, 4 = Almost always) with 20, 10, and 11 items, respectively. The 
TAI-G subscales were added, and all scales were mixed in a fixed random order, because 
participants of a pilot study doubted the cover story when the STAI and the STAXI were 
presented separately. When both scales were mixed with the TAI-G, the STAI and the 
STAXI were less salient cues for the true content of the experiment.  
The trait measures proceeded with the second series of the Speaking Anxiety Scale 
(Spitznagel, Schlutt, and Schmidt-Atzert, 2000). This questionnaire assesses habitual 
emotionality (e.g., “I am quite nervous”) and worries (e.g., “I fear negative consequences”) 
immediately before giving a speech with 8 items each. Items were presented on a 4-point 
scale (1 = I do not agree at all, 4 = I agree completely).  
Subsequently, participants had to rate their conscientiousness, intellect, 
attentiveness, anxiousness, and angriness on 33 bipolar adjective pairs (e.g., “ self-
confident 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 anxious”). The pairs were mixed in a fixed random order and 
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presented with a trait instruction. The 10 intellect and 10 conscientiousness pairs were the 
same as in Asendorpf et al.’s Study 1 (2002). I further added 3 attentiveness pairs to make 
the cover story more plausible. The first pair was “aufmerksam” [“attentive”] versus 
“durcheinander” [“jittery”] that was adapted from the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule PANAS (Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). Two additional pairs were synonymous.  
The 5 anxiousness pairs (anxious versus self-confident) and the 5 angriness pairs 
(angry versus self-controlled) were constructed on the basis of 430 unipolar and 179 
bipolar adjective items provided by Ostendorf (1990). He had factor analyzed them and 
reported their loadings on the first five factors that could be interpreted as the factors of the 
Five Factor Model of personality. Within the Five Factor Model (see Chapter 2.6.2), 
anxious versus self-confident was conceptualized as being strongly related to neuroticism, 
moderately related to introversion, and as being unrelated to agreeableness. In contrast, 
angry versus self-controlled was conceptualized as being weakly related to neuroticism and 
extraversion, but as being strongly negatively related to agreeableness.  
Consequently, concerning the anxious pole, I selected unipolar items with factor 
loadings above .25 on both introversion and neuroticism, and below .10 on agreeableness. 
For the opposite pole, self-confident, unipolar items representing the inverse factor 
loadings were selected. Concerning the angry pole, I selected unipolar items with factor 
loadings above .20 on extraversion and neuroticism, and below -.25 on agreeableness. For 
the opposite pole, self-controlled, unipolar items representing the inverse factor loadings 
were selected. 9 items met these requirements. Then, I searched for bipolar adjective pairs 
that showed the same pattern of factor loadings, and received another 13 adjectives. 
Finally, I added 6 self-generated, semantically similar adjectives. This procedure resulted 
in a list of 7 bipolar items describing anxious versus self-confident, and 7 bipolar items 
describing angry versus self-controlled. These items were pre-tested in a student sample 
(N = 42; age M = 22.6 years, range 19-39 years) together with three scales of seven bipolar 
adjectives from the 179 items list, which had the highest factor loadings on either the 
neuroticism, the extraversion, or the agreeableness factor and cross-loadings below .30. 
Within the 7 anxiousness pairs, 5 showed significant negative correlations with 
extraversion (r < -.32 p < .05); the two noncorrelating items were excluded. The resulting 5 
item bipolar anxiousness scale showed acceptable internal consistency, α = .84, and 
correlated strongly with neuroticism (r = .82; p < .001), intermediately with extraversion 
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(r = -.45; p = .003), and nonsignificantly with agreeableness (r = -.19). From the seven 
angriness pairs, two pairs that showed significant positive correlations with the 
anxiousness scale were excluded. The resulting 5 item bipolar angriness scale showed 
acceptable internal consistency, α = .77 and correlated marginally with neuroticism 
(r = .21; p = .18) and extraversion (r = .22; p = .17), highly with agreeableness (r = -.78; 
p < .001), and was not correlated with the 5 item anxiousness scale (r = .01). All items of 
the bipolar anxiousness and angriness scale were used as word material within the IATs 
and are listed in Table 12. 
Finally, the questionnaire concluded with the social desirability scales by Lück and 
Timaeus (1969; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) and Stöber (1999; without the Item “Have you 
ever consumed drugs”). These scales contain 16 and 23 items, respectively, and measure 
socially desirable responding by asking for socially desirable but infrequent or socially 
undesirable but frequent behaviors on a true-false format. Items of both scales were 
presented in a fixed random order together with the Manifest Anxiety Scale MAS (Lück & 
Timaeus, 1969; Taylor, 1953). The 23 items of this scale assess various symptoms of 
anxiousness (e.g., “I work under a great deal of tension”). The reliability of all trait 
measures was satisfactory and is reported in Table 13 of the Results section. 
After answering these personality items, participants had to report their age, sex, 
height, dominant hand, academic subject, length of time spent at university, whether they 
were still students (all were), and whether they had a permanent partner. 
Lab session. Upon arrival at the lab participants were reminded that the experiment 
was about attention and concentration. The experimenter briefly explained that the lab 
session contained different concentration tests, two of which were on the computer, and 
one being a paper-and-pencil test, as well as a situation demanding attention and 
concentration that would be videotaped. Subsequently, participants received instructions 
for the first concentration test. Because men might repress their anger facing a woman, and 
women might avoid getting angry with a physically superior man, the experimenter was 
always of the same gender as the participant. 
d2 Test. Instructions and procedures of the d2 Test (Attention-Stress Test, 
Brickenkamp, 1994) corresponded to the test manual but I only presented the first 5 rows 
instead of the complete 14 rows version. During the d2 Test participants are given 20 
seconds per row with 47 stimuli each to cross out relevant stimuli (letter “d” with exactly 
two lines) and ignore irrelevant stimuli (letter “d” with more or less than two lines and any 
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letter “p”). The test score is calculated as the difference between processed stimuli and 
errors (false alarms and misses). The d2 Test was primarily used to give a better 
justification for the cover story. Therefore, results for the d2 Test will not be reported here. 
Optimistic risk perception measure. After the d2 Test and before the IATs I 
presented a German translation of the optimistic risk perception measure from Lerner and 
Keltner (2001, Study 4) as a short break from concentration tasks. The questionnaire was 
presented on the computer and was added for the purpose of another study. The internal 
consistency of this 15-item questionnaire was low, α = .58. 
Anxiousness and angriness IAT. The procedures for the anxiousness and the 
angriness Implicit Association Test (IAT) were identical to the shyness IAT in Study 1. 
Consequently, both IATs were the same except for the attribute dimension, being anxious 
versus self-confident within the anxiousness IAT, and angry versus self-controlled within 
the angriness IAT. Task sequence and stimuli are depicted in Table 12. IAT scores were 
computed as D measures with an error penalty of 600 ms, and without the exclusion of 
trials below 400 ms (for details on the complete algorithm, see Greenwald et al., 2003). 
Like conventional scores, D measures were based on the difference between mean 
response latencies in sequence 5 and sequence 3 (see Table 12), but were scaled in units of 
the individuals’ standard deviations and included an error penalty for incorrect responses. 
In contrast to Greenwald et al. (2003), all trials were considered equally and the first 20 
trials were not weighed as more important as the succeeding trails, because I (a) did not 
declare the first 20 trials as training trials and (b) had 60 instead of 40 succeeding trials.1 
The measures were coded so that high scores represented quicker associations of Me-
anxious and Others-self-confident relatively to Me-self-confident and Others-anxious, or of 
Me-angry and Others-self-controlled relatively to Me-self-controlled and Others-angry, 
respectively. Internal consistencies are reported in the Results section. 
 
                                                 
1 Different procedures of weighing the first 20 trials more than the succeeding trials did only 
minimally change the results. 
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Table 12 
Implicit Association Tests for Anxiousness and Angriness: Task Sequence and Stimuli 
   Response key assignment 
Sequence N of trials Task Left key Right key 
1 40 Target discrimination Me Others 
2 40 Attribute discrimination Anxious 
(angry) 
Self-confident  
(self-controlled) 
3 80 Initial combined task Me, anxious 
(angry) 
Others, self-confident
(self-controlled) 
4 40 Reversed target 
discrimination 
Others Me 
5 80 Reversed combined task Others, anxious 
(angry) 
Me, self-confident 
(self-controlled) 
Stimuli 
  Anxiousness IAT Angriness IAT 
Me Others Anxious Self-confident Angry Self-controlled 
I  they anxious self-confident angry self-controlled 
self  them timid daring hot-tempered thoughtful 
My your insecure secure undercontrolled self-disciplined 
Me you worried unconcerned hot-headed adaptable 
Own other overly cautious carefree irritable calm 
Note. The procedures of the anxiousness and the angriness IAT were identical. Words in 
parentheses refer to the task sequence within the angriness IAT. The original German 
single word stimuli are listed in the appendix. 
 
State measures. As a manipulation check for the emotion inductions I used bipolar 
items for anxiousness and angriness together with a state instruction. These items were 
mixed in a fixed random order with 3 attentiveness and 7 out of 10 conscientiousness 
items. The items were presented in a paper-pencil version, and were identical to those 
completed as a trait measure at home. 3 conscientiousness items were dropped, because I 
expected them not to match the state instruction (e.g., “fleißig” [“industrious”] versus 
“faul” [“lazy”]). State measures were presented after the IATs (baseline), the instructions 
for the speech (anxiety induction), and after the computer crash (anger induction). 
Reliabilities for the state measures were satisfactory, internal consistencies were for the 
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anxiety scale α = .89, for the change in anxiety (speech minus baseline) α = .78, for the 
anger scale α = .80, and for the change in anger (computer crash minus baseline) α = .74. 
Anxiety induction. Participants received instructions for the speech on a piece of 
paper. The paper informed participants that they should give a speech that would be 
videotaped and later on analyzed by experts. The duration of the speech was asked to be 
five minutes. Directly after this announcement participants completed the state measures. 
Subsequently, they were told about the subject of the speech (terminal illness and 
euthanasia: immoral or humane; adapted from Schmukle & Egloff, 2003) and were given 
three minutes for preparation. Participants were allowed to make notes during preparation, 
but the speech was supposed to be given without notes. Then, participants gave their 
speech directly in front of the video camera that was operated by the experimenter from a 
nearby room. Exactly after five minutes the experimenter thanked the participants and 
informed them that this was enough. When participants stopped talking before the five 
minutes were over, the experimenter prompted them to continue talking until full five 
minutes were up. The time period before participants continued their speech was defined as 
missing. For the judgments and codings of anxious behavior secondary tapes were 
prepared that contained the first three minutes of noninterrupted speech. The speech task 
was followed by the anger induction. 
Anger induction. The general procedure was adapted from Wiedig (2003) and is 
similar to a procedure used by Bargh et al. (1996, Experiment 3). Participants completed a 
STROOP-Test on the computer. Again, participants were videotaped and were told that 
this was to evaluate their eye-blink-rate as an indicator of concentration. In fact, this was to 
give good reason for videotaping the interaction with the experimenter. Three minutes after 
starting the STROOP, the screen froze and the words “FATAL ERROR” appeared in the 
center of the screen. In addition, a short but intensive error sound was given, whenever a 
key was pressed. The experimenter, then, approached the participant and pretended to be 
astonished by the accident. The subsequent interaction between experimenter and 
participant comprised 3 different provocations. First, the experimenter accused the 
participant of causing the crash by incorrectly using the enter-key. Second, she or he said 
that all computer-based data of the participant were now destroyed. Third, due to loss of 
data participants could not receive any money for the experiment. After this, participants 
were asked to complete the state measures, waiting for a computer expert who may help to 
save the data. For the judgments and codings of angry behavior secondary tapes were 
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prepared. The recording started when the computer crashed and ended when participants 
began completing the state measures. For the anger judgments, a three second blue screen 
interval was inserted after the end of each of the 3 provocations to enable separate ratings 
for each provocation.  
Interview. The aim of the interview was to identify participants who doubted the 
computer crash. Participants were first asked whether they had difficulties with any part of 
the experiment. Afterwards they had to say whether they noticed anything remarkable 
during the experiment and whether anything in the experiment seemed strange to them. All 
participants (11 females and 12 males) who were suspicious about the computer crash 
being part of the experiment were excluded from the analysis of the anger induction. These 
participants did not differ significantly from the remaining participants on any of the 
anxiousness and angriness measures. 
Debriefing. Finally, participants were completely and thoroughly debriefed about 
the true purpose of the study. It was made sure that participants had an opportunity to relax 
after the disturbing computer crash, and would not leave the lab angry or upset. In the 
beginning of debriefing, the participants were offered some sweets by the experimenter as 
a compensation for a rather harsh preceding interaction. Then, participants were informed 
that the study was not on concentration and attention but on anxiousness and angriness, 
and aimed to validate new computer based measures for these traits. Thereby, the 
experimenter went through the crucial parts of the study (direct and indirect measures, 
emotion inductions) and explained why these procedures were designed to assess 
anxiousness and angriness. In order to keep the true purpose of the study undisclosed for 
the subsequent participants, the experimenter asked the participants to keep the information 
about the study confidential until they would receive a letter from the experimenter. This 
letter was sent out four months after finishing data collection and comprised the main 
findings of the study together with an invitation for an individual feedback session. 
Judgments of anxious and angry behavior. Four student judges that were 
unfamiliar with the participants and blind to their data independently rated their overall 
impression of the participants' anxiety and anger on 7-point scales. On these scales, 7 was 
labeled "very anxious" or "very angry" and 1 was labeled "not at all anxious" or "not at all 
angry". For the anxiety judgment each minute of the 3-minute speech was judged. For the 
anger judgment each of the 3 provocations after the computer crash (alleged misuse of the 
enter key, loss of data, no money) was judged separately. This resulted in 12 anxiety and 
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12 anger judgments for all participants that were averaged in each case. Similarly, two 
judges independently rated the anxiety and the anger within the participants' voices with 
three ratings per scene but without watching participants. This resulted in 6 anxious and 6 
angry voice judgments that were averaged in each case. The anxiety judgments (both 
overall and voice judgments) were anchored by a female and a male example of extremely 
anxious and extremely nonanxious participants from the study by Egloff and Schmukle 
(2002). In the same way, the anger judgments were anchored by extremely angry and 
nonangry examples from a study by Wiedig (2003). Interrater reliability was satisfactory 
for all judgments (see Results section). 
Codings of anxious behavior. All Codings were done on a PC using the Computer 
Aided Observation System (CAOS) software. This program synchronizes video player and 
PC, and registers onset and offset of behavioral codings when the appropriate key is 
pressed. Anxiety codings were carried out for body movements and nervous mouth 
movements. Following Ekman and Friesen's (1972) classification, body movements were 
coded as illustrators (movements illustrating speech), facial adaptors (self-stimulations of 
the face), and body adaptors (self-stimulations of the body). For data analysis body 
movements were considered in terms of their relative duration of the 3 minute speech. 
Nervous mouth movements were coded according to Egloff and Schmukle (2002) defined 
as lip biting, lip licking, twitches of the mouth, and pressing of the lips. As the nervous 
mouth movements were short and discrete events, Egloff and Schmukle (2002) examined 
their frequency rather than their duration. I also considered their frequency, because their 
duration might in this case be overly confounded by the noise in the coders’ reaction time 
during the on-off coding. In order to control cross-lab reliability with the Egloff and 
Schmukle (2002) coding system, one coder first coded 10 female and 10 male participants 
of Egloff and Schmukle's Study 4. This coder correlated highly with the mean of two 
coders of Egloff and Schmukle's (2002) study and showed therefore substantial agreement 
between the coding in both labs, r = .80. In addition, within-lab reliability of all anxiety 
codings was assessed by a second coder with independent codings of 20 randomly selected 
participants and was satisfactory in all cases (see Results section).  
Codings of angry behavior. Anger codings were completed for emotional facial 
expressions of the Ekman and Friesen's (1978) coding system that were shown to co-occur 
with anger (Friesen & Ekman, 1984). These were the Action Units brow lower (AU 4), 
upper lip raise (AU 10), lip funnel (AU 22), lip tight (AU 23), lip press (AU 24), and chin 
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raise (AU 17), that were coded in independent runs. As the coded facial expressions were 
short and discrete events, I further considered their frequency per minute rather than their 
relative duration of observation time. Reliability estimates were provided by independent 
codings of 20 participants by another coder. Reliability was not satisfactory for the AU 10, 
22, and 17, because they occurred so rarely (mean frequency less than 0.25 times per 
minute) that intercoder reliability was hard to obtain. Therefore, these Action Units were 
not considered for data analyses. Reliability for the other three Action Units was 
acceptable (see Results section).  
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Efficacy of Emotion Inductions 
To investigate whether the speech and the computer crash were apt to observe 
anxious and angry behavior, I first needed to examine the efficacy of these emotion 
inductions. As expected by Hypothesis 1, participants reported more state anxiety after the 
announcement of the speech (M = 3.39) than at the beginning of the experiment (M = 
3.02), t(99) = 4.11, p < .001, d = .58. Similarly, participants reported more state anger after 
the computer crash (M = 2.53) than at the beginning of the experiment (M = 2.35), 
t(76) = 1.98, p < .05, d = .31. It should be noted that the degrees of freedom were smaller for 
the anger induction because I had to exclude participants who were suspicious about the 
computer crash. Considering the increase in self-reported state measures, both of the 
emotion inductions worked. 
5.4.2 Validity of the Bipolar Anxiousness and Angriness Self-Ratings and 
the IAT Stimuli 
This section inspects the convergent and discriminant validity of the bipolar 
anxiousness and angriness self-ratings that were also used as word material IATs. The 
reliabilities and correlations of all direct trait measures are depicted in Table 13. Reliability 
(Cronbach’s α) was satisfactory for all measures, in particular it was .84 for the bipolar 
anxiousness and .80 for the bipolar angriness self-rating. As one can see in the first two 
rows of Table 13, the bipolar anxiousness self-rating correlated highly with the Manifest 
Anxiety Scale and the trait form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, and intermediately 
with the subscales of the Speaking Anxiety Scale. These subscales assess habitual 
emotionality and worries immediately before giving a speech and, in contrast to general 
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anxiousness questionnaires, are more situation-specific. The bipolar anxiousness self-rating 
also showed a small correlation with the trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory. 
 
Table 13 
Correlations between the Trait Measures in Study 2 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Bipolar anxiousness self-rating  .84 -.08  .30** .35***.72*** .73*** .23* -.08 
2. Bipolar angriness self-rating   .80 -.05 -.05 .12 .07 .45*** -.30**
3. Speaking Anxiety Emotionality    .88 .72***.36*** .28** .13 -.16 
4. Speaking Anxiety Worries     .84 .44*** .40*** .23* -.23* 
5. Manifest Anxiety Scale     .82 .78*** .39*** -.30**
6. State Trait Anxiety Inventorya      .90 .37*** -.25* 
7. State Trait Anger Expression Inventorya     .78 -.34*** 
8. Social Desirability       .81 
Note. N = 100. Internal consistencies (Cronbach’s α) are printed in italics along the diagonal. 
a Trait form.          +p < .05  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001. 
 
In contrast, the bipolar angriness self-rating did not even marginally correlate with 
any direct anxiousness measure and correlated intermediately with the trait form of the 
State Trait Anger Expression Inventory. Thus, the correlation for the angriness self-rating 
with the corresponding trait measure was somewhat lower than for the anxiousness self-
rating. Nevertheless, a Steiger’s (1980) test of correlation differences revealed that the 
bipolar angriness self-rating correlated marginally higher with the trait form of the State 
Trait Anger Expression Inventory, r = .45, than the bipolar anxiousness self-rating, r = .23, 
t(97) = 1.65, p = .05 (one-tailed). Moreover, the trait form of the State Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory did not only correlate with the bipolar anxiousness self-rating but 
also with other direct anxiousness measures. This indicated a lack of discriminant validity 
for the trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory rather than for the bipolar 
anxiousness self-rating. This may further account for the only intermediate correlation 
between the bipolar angriness self-rating and the trait form of the State Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory. As a result, as expected by Hypothesis 2, convergent and 
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discriminant validity with established measures were shown for both bipolar self-ratings. 
This validated the word material I used as attributes within the IATs, at least at the level of 
direct measures. 
5.4.3 Descriptive Statistics for the Anxiousness, the Angriness IAT, and the 
Behavioral Measures 
Before I explore the correlations of the IATs and the behavioral measures, I will 
discuss briefly their descriptive statistics. The mean raw score (in milliseconds) of the 
anxiousness IAT was M = -171.1, SD = 156.9, and ranged from -640.6 to 179.2. Only 9 (6 
female, 3 male) out of 100 participants had positive IAT scores. Thus, most of the 
participants were quicker to combine Me+self-confident and Others+anxious than for the 
reverse mapping. The mean raw score of the angriness IAT was M = -186.6, SD = 133.2, 
and ranged from –533.3 to 161.0. Only 4 (1 female, 3 male) out of 100 participants had 
positive scores. Thus, most of the participants were quicker to combine Me+self-controlled 
and Others+angry than for the reverse mapping. Mean error rates were for the anxiousness 
IAT M = 4.2%, SD = 2.6%, and for the angriness IAT M = 3.6%, SD = 2.3%. In any IAT, 
no participant had error rates higher than 15% or more than 10% of the latencies faster than 
300 ms. The distributions of the improved and individually standardized D measures were 
not even marginally different from a normal distribution in both IATs, Z < 1. Internal 
consistency was computed across the two test halves and was acceptable for the 
anxiousness IAT, α = .72, but somewhat unsatisfactory for the angriness IAT, α = .66. 
The descriptive statistics of the behavioral measures are depicted in Table 14. It 
should be noted that the reliability of several behavioral anger indicators was below .70. 
Nevertheless, the reliabilities of the global observer judgments for anxiety and anger were 
completely satisfactory.  
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Table 14 
Descriptive Statistics of the Behavioral Measures in Study 2 
Behavioral anxiousness measure 
(range of scores) 
Na M SD Range Reliabilityb 
Observer anxiety judgment (1-7) 100 3.27 1.06 1.33-6.42  .89 
Anxious voice rating (1-7) 100 3.68 1.01 1.83-6.33  .72 
Nervous mouth movements (per 
minute) 
100 5.49 2.72 0.33-15.66 .87 
Facial adaptor duration (%) 100 1.69 4.97 0 – 27  .99 
Body adaptor duration (%) 100 13.52 23.10 0 – 96  .99 
Illustrator duration (%) 100 8.55 14.66 0 – 72  .96 
Behavioral angriness measure 
(range of scores) 
  
Observer anger judgment (1-7) 77 3.80 .83 1.75-6.08  .87 
Angry voice rating (1-7) 77 2.96 .92 1.50-5.67  .69 
Lips tight (per minute) 76 2.36 1.82 0-7.94  .65 
Lips pressed (per minute) 76 0.44 .64 0-3.60  .82 
Brows lower (per minute) 76 0.39 .69 0-2.77  .64 
Note. M, SD and range refer to raw scores, reliabilities to log-transformed scores in the 
case of the behavior codings.  
a sample size is smaller for anger indicators because participants, who realized that the 
anger induction was part of the experiment, had to be excluded from the analyses of the 
anger induction. One participant stood up during the anger induction, and his facial 
expression could, therefore, not be coded.  
b agreement α of 4 observers for observer judgments, and of 2 observers for voice ratings, 
correlation r between 2 independent codings for behavior codings (n = 20). 
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5.4.4 Correlations of Direct, Indirect and Behavioral Measures with Social 
Desirability 
The correlations between the direct anxiousness and angriness measures and social 
desirability are depicted in the last column of Table 13. As expected by Hypothesis 3, 
almost all direct measures showed small to intermediate correlations with social 
desirability. On the contrary, the anxiousness and the angriness IAT were not significantly 
correlated with social desirability, r = .02, r = .-08. Likewise, the observer anxiety and 
anger judgments showed no substantial correlations with social desirability, r = .06, 
r = .-05. 
Unexpectedly, the bipolar anxiousness self-rating did not, in contrast to the 
Manifest Anxiety Scale and the trait form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, 
significantly correlate with social desirability, r = -.08. A possible explanation might be 
that, although the anxious pole of the bipolar self-rating represents socially undesirable 
traits, the opposed self-confident pole does not clearly stand for socially desirable traits. 
Conceptually, social desirability scales aim to assess the degree to which persons describe 
themselves in socially desirable terms (e.g., “I am always polite.”). Therefore, social 
desirability is strongly related to agreeableness. Thus, although traits like self-confident, 
secure and unconcerned have a clear positive valence (cf. Chapter 0), these traits do not 
refer to socially adaptive and considerate behaviors. In contrast, the angry pole of the 
bipolar angriness self-rating clearly represents socially undesirable traits, and the opposed 
self-controlled pole clearly stands for socially desirable traits. This was consequently 
reflected in the negative correlation between the bipolar angriness self-rating and social 
desirability, r = -.30, p < .01. 
5.4.5 Moderation of the Relationship between Direct and Indirect Measures 
by Social Desirability 
To examine whether social desirability moderated the relationship between direct 
and indirect measures according to Hypothesis 4 I conducted stepwise multiple regression 
analyses. In these regressions, the direct anxiousness or angriness measures were the 
criteria. In the first step, social desirability and the anxiousness or angriness IAT were 
entered as predictors. In the second step, the interaction term (cross product) of both 
variables (each scored as deviation of the original scale from its own mean) was added as a 
predictor. The results for every direct anxiousness and angriness measure are depicted in 
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Table 15. As indicated by the zero-order correlations (Table 13), direct anxiousness 
measures were predicted by the anxiousness IAT, and direct anxiousness and angriness 
measures were predicted by social desirability in almost every case. However, when the 
interaction term of social desirability and the IAT was entered in step 2, there was never a 
significant increment in the explained variance. Thus, as expected from Hypothesis 4 
social desirability did not moderate the relationship between either direct and indirect 
anxiousness or direct and indirect angriness measures. The results were the same when 
regression analyses were conducted separately for both groups of different IAT order.  
 
Table 15 
Moderation of the Relationship between Direct and Indirect Measures by Social 
Desirability 
 Step 1 Step2 
Direct measure R2 F(2, 97) 
IATb
β 
SD 
β ∆R2 F(1, 96) 
IATb × SD
β 
Bipolar anxiousness self-rating .071* 3.72*  .26* -.08 .000  .04 -.02 
Speaking Anxiety Emotionality .025 1.23 -.01 -.16 .000  .00  .00 
Speaking Anxiety Worries .086* 4.59*  .18+ -.24* .019 2.00  .14 
State Trait Anxiety Inventorya .094** 5.03**  .18+ -.25* .005  .51  .07 
Manifest Anxiety Scale .135*** 7.60***  .22* -.30** .000  .00  .00 
Bipolar angriness self-rating .097** 5.22**  .09 -.29** .000  .05 -.02 
State Trait Anger Expression 
Inventorya 
.118** 6.51**  .00 -.34*** .000  .01  .01 
Note. N = 100. IAT = Implicit Association Test, SD = social desirability.    a trait form.  
b Anxiousness IAT for prediction of direct anxiousness measures and angriness IAT for 
prediction of direct angriness measures.      +p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001. 
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5.4.6 Zero Correlation between Anxiousness and Angriness 
Conceptualizing anxiousness and angriness as orthogonal dimensions, it was 
expected by Hypothesis 5 that both these traits were not correlated. Hypothesis 5 was 
confirmed for the correlation between the bipolar anxiousness and angriness self-rating, 
r = -.08, n.s., and the observer anxiety and anger judgment, r = .00, n.s.. Nevertheless, the 
trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory showed intermediate correlations 
with the trait form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory and the Manifest Anxiety Scale, and 
small correlations with the bipolar anxiousness self-rating (see Table 13). This replicated 
the results of some previous studies (Schwenkmezger et al., 1992), that showed that the 
State Trait Anger Expression Inventory was correlated with anxiousness because 
individuals high in neuroticism are more concerned with their anger expression than those 
individuals who are emotionally stable. When anxiousness and angriness were 
conceptualized as orthogonal dimensions, the bipolar self-ratings did not correlate with 
each other, and the angriness self-rating was not correlated with any direct anxiousness 
measure. 
In contrast, Hypothesis 5 was not confirmed for the correlation between the 
anxiousness and the angriness IAT that was significantly positive, r = .32 p < .01. 
Moreover, order effects affected this correlation. The sequence of the anxiousness and the 
angriness IAT was counterbalanced across participants such that two groups with different 
IAT orders could be compared with each other. In the group that completed the 
anxiousness IAT as first test, both IATs were substantially correlated, r = .49, p < .001, 
whereas they were not even marginally correlated in the group that completed the 
angriness IAT first, r = .17, n.s.. This correlation difference was marginally significant, 
z = 1.77, p < .10 (two-tailed). The discrepancy might not be attributed to sample effects, as 
anxiousness and angriness were neither correlated for the bipolar self-ratings nor for the 
observer judgments in both groups, all r < .17, n.s.. 
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A possible explanation might be that anxiousness normally shows higher 
correlations with neuroticism than angriness. This was also the case in the pilot study that 
was performed to select the bipolar items. In that pilot study (N = 42), anxiousness and 
neuroticism were strongly correlated, r = .82, p < .001, whereas angriness and neuroticism 
showed only a weak correlation, r = .21, p = .18. Working on the anxiousness IAT, 
participants could have possibly developed a classification heuristic, discriminating 
anxious versus self-confident as neurotic versus non-neurotic or even as positive versus 
negative attributes. In other words, participants recoded the IAT task because a 
discrimination of positive versus negative is easier than a discrimination of anxious versus 
self-confident (cf. De Houwer 2003a). This task-recoding was salient during the 
anxiousness IAT. Upon completion of the anxiousness IAT the task-recoding could have 
been transferred onto the angriness IAT, which would lead to a positive correlation 
between both IATs. In contrast, the angriness IAT is less likely to elicit to a positive-
negative task-recoding, because angry versus self-controlled is less associated with 
neuroticism. Consequently, when the angriness IAT was the first test, the participants did 
not use a positive-negative classification, and the IATs did not correlate with each other. 
To examine whether a positive-negative dimension is more salient in anxious versus 
self-confident than in angry versus self-controlled judgments, participants of two different 
groups rated the valence of the IAT stimuli. Instructions for the self-relevant group 
(41 undergraduate psychology students) asked to estimate how positive or negative one 
would rate a trait if it was one’s own. This was done because the self-concept IATs ask 
participants to combine ‘Me’ with personality traits, for example, anxious. “Anxious” may 
be judged more negatively when it refers to oneself rather than to anxiousness in general. 
Instructions for the control group (10 PhD psychology students) simply asked respondents 
to rate the positiveness or negativeness of traits in general. In both groups, the anxiousness 
and angriness traits were presented in a paper-pencil questionnaire, and respondents judged 
the valence of those traits on a 7-point scale (negative [---] [--] [-] [0] [+] [++] [+++] positive). 
Answers were coded such that higher values indicated more positive valence. The results 
are shown in Table 16. 
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Table 16 
Valence Ratings of the IAT Stimuli from Two Different Samples 
 Undergraduates
(n = 41) 
PhD students 
(n = 10) 
Group difference
(df = 49) 
Attributes M SD Range M SD Range t p d 
Anxious (ängstlich) 2.68 1.15 1-6 2.20 .79 1-3 1.25 .22 .36
Timid (furchtsam) 2.49 1.08 1-5 2.20 .92 1-4 .78 .44 .22
Insecure (unsicher) 2.20 .84 1-4 2.50 1.18 1-5 -.95 .35 -.27
Worried (besorgt) 3.78 1.44 1-6 3.80 1.55 3-8 -.04 .97 -.01
Overly cautious (übervorsichtig) 2.17 1.00 1-5 2.20 .63 1-3 -.09 .93 -.03
Mean anxious attributes 2.66 .83 1.2-5.0 2.58 .60 1.6-3.6 .30 .77 .09
Self-confident (sicher) 6.02 .82 4-7 6.10 .74 5-7 -.27 .79 -.08
Daring (wagemutig) 4.85 1.20 3-7 4.10 1.10 3-6 1.81 .08 .52
Secure (selbstvertrauend) 6.37 .66 5-7 6.60 .52 6-7 -1.04 .30 -.30
Unconcerned (sorglos) 4.24 1.56 1-7 4.00 1.25 2-6 .46 .65 .13
Carefree (unbeschwert) 5.44 1.23 2-7 5.40 1.07 4-7 .09 .93 .03
Mean self-confident attributes 5.39 .69 3.6-6.6 5.24 .52 4.6-6.0 .62 .54 .18
Angry (ärgerlich) 3.07 1.27 1-6 3.00 1.33 1-6 .16 .87 .05
Hot-tempered (aufbrausend) 2.34 1.28 1-6 2.60 1.43 1-5 -.56 .58 -.16
Undercontrolled (unbeherrscht) 1.88 .87 1-4 1.90 .88 1-3 -.07 .94 -.02
Hot-headed (hitzköpfig) 2.83 1.30 1-7 2.20 1.03 1-4 1.42 .16 .41
Irritable (motzig) 1.95 1.09 1-6 1.80 .79 1-3 .41 .68 .12
Mean angry attributes 2.41 .70 1.4-4.6 2.30 .60 1.6-3.4 .47 .64 .14
Self-controlled (kontrolliert) 4.76 1.37 2-7 4.30 1.34 2-6 .95 .35 .27
Thoughtful (bedächtig) 4.73 .92 3-7 4.90 .88 3-6 -.52 .60 -.15
Self-disciplined (selbstbeherrscht) 4.98 1.19 3-7 5.00 1.15 2-6 -.06 .95 -.02
Adaptable (fügsam) 2.46 1.16 1-6 2.40 .52 2-3 .17 .87 .05
Calm (friedlich) 5.54 1.05 3-7 5.70 1.16 3-7 -.43 .67 -.12
Mean self-controlled attributes 4.49 .61 3.4-6.0 4.46 .65 3.4-5.4 .15 .88 .04
Note. The scale format was a 7-point scale with 1 indicating negative, 4 indicating neutral, 
and 7 indicating positive valence. 
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As it can be seen from Table 16, the valence of the traits was not judged differently 
by the undergraduates and the PhD students, although the undergraduates rated the valence 
as if the traits were their own. “Daring” was judged marginally more positive by the 
undergraduates. However, given the amount of tests performed, this might may very well 
be a chance finding. It should be noted that the design of this valence check confounded 
group membership (undergraduates versus PhD students) and instruction (self-relevant 
versus control). However, it is unlikely to expect that the PhD students and the 
undergraduates had a different self-concept in anxiousness or angriness. Thus, the direct 
valence estimates seemed to be unaffected by the instruction to judge the traits as if one’s 
own. More importantly, the group differences did not consistently point in the same 
direction, neither for the positively (M > 4) nor for the negatively (M < 4) evaluated traits. 
Since the sample size of the undergraduate group was larger, and the undergraduate group 
is more similar to the sample of Study 2, the results of this group will be discussed in 
regards to the valence estimates.  
As one may recall, the category label of the attribute concept was anxious versus 
self-confident for the anxiousness IAT, and angry versus self-controlled for the angriness 
IAT, respectively. Since the category label has a chief influence on the IAT effect 
(cf. Chapter 2.4.2), the valence estimates for the category labels as well as for the category 
means were compared. Concerning the labels, anxious was rated more negatively than self-
confident, d = 3.17. (The effect size d for repeated measures was computed as 
√2(M1 - M2)/SD where SD is the standard deviation of the difference scores; see Cohen, 
1988). Similarly, angry was rated more negatively than self-controlled, d = 1.33, but the 
effect size was less than half than for anxious versus self-confident. Thus, a positive-
negative dimension was stronger for anxious versus self-confident than for angry versus 
self-controlled. More importantly, self-confident was also rated more positively than self-
controlled, d = 1.17. “Anxious” was not judged more negatively than angry, t(40) 1.41, 
p = .17, d = .31, although the effect pointed in the expected direction (see the first column 
of Table 16). 
Concerning the category means, the five anxious attributes were rated more 
negatively than the five self-confident attributes, d = 3.03. However, the five angry 
attributes were also rated more negatively than the five self-controlled attributes, d = 3.31. 
Thus, at the level of category means, a positive-negative dimension was as strong for 
anxious versus self-confident as for angry versus self-controlled. The five self-confident 
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attributes were judged more positively than the five self-control attributes, d = 1.50. The 
five anxious attributes were not judged more negatively than the five angry attributes, 
t(40) = -1.35, p = .18, d = -.31, and the effect did not even point in the expected direction 
(see the first column of Table 16). 
In summary, the positive-negative difference was stronger for anxious versus self-
confident than for angry versus self-controlled. This was true only at the level of the 
category labels but not at the level of the category means. Nevertheless, self-confident was 
judged more positively than self-controlled concerning the category labels as well as the 
category means. More importantly, within the self-control attributes, one attribute 
(adaptable) was judged negatively when it was tested against the neutral scale midpoint, 
t(40) = -8.45, p < .001. In contrast, none of the anxious attributes was judged positively, and 
none of the self-confident attributes was judged negatively.  
Altogether, a positive-negative dimension was less clear in the angriness IAT than 
in the anxiousness IAT concerning both the level of category labels and the level of 
category exemplars. Consequently, a positive-negative dimension was less salient within 
the angriness IAT. As a result, there might have been a transfer effect from the anxiousness 
IAT on the angriness IAT, but not vice versa. In the next section, I present the effects of 
different IAT order on the correlations of the anxiousness and the angriness IAT 
concerning the correlations with direct self-ratings and the observer judgments.  
5.4.7 Order Effects on IAT Correlations 
It was expected by Hypothesis 6 that the second IAT tended to be less valid than the 
first IAT. Given the transfer effect from the anxiousness on the angriness IAT this should 
be especially true for the angriness IAT. Table 17 depicts the overall correlations and the 
correlations by IAT order for both IATs. Concerning the anxiousness IAT, all correlations 
with direct anxiousness measures declined in the second test, except for the trait form of 
the State Trait Anxiety Inventory. When the anxiousness IAT was the first test, it showed 
significant or marginally significant correlations with several direct anxiousness measures, 
whereas these correlations were not even marginally significant when it was the second 
test. This correlation decrease was marginally significant for the subscale Worries of the 
Speaking Anxiety Questionnaire, z = 1.39, p < .10 (one-tailed), and not even marginally 
significant for the correlations of the anxiousness IAT with other direct anxiousness 
measures, all z < 1.12, n.s. (one-tailed). Contrary to Hypothesis 6, the correlation with the 
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observer anxiety judgment tended to be higher, and was significant only when the 
anxiousness IAT was the second test. However, this correlation difference was small and 
nonsignificant, z = -.58, n.s. (one-tailed). In regards to the anxiousness IAT, a pattern of 
reduced validity for the second test was confirmed for the correlations with direct 
anxiousness measures but not for the correlation with the observer judgment. 
 
Table 17 
Overall and Correlations by IAT Order for the Anxiousness and the Angriness IAT 
(Study 2) 
 Anxiousness IAT Angriness IAT 
   Overall 1st test 2nd test Overall 1st test 2nd test
Angriness IAT  .32**  .49***  .17 - - - 
Bipolar anxiousness self-rating  .25*  .28*  .23 -.04 -.18  .15 
Bipolar angriness self-rating -.03 -.06  .03  .11  .16  .06 
Speaking Anxiety Emotionality -.01  .02 -.08 -.03 -.24+  .20 
Speaking Anxiety Worries  .17+  .27+ -.01  .05 -.16  .27+ 
Manifest Anxiety Scale  .21*  .31*  .09  .00 -.15  .22 
State Trait Anxiety Inventorya  .17+  .17  .20  .02 -.06  .12 
State Trait Anger Expression Inventorya -.01 -.01  .01  .03 -.16  .25+ 
Social Desirability  .02 -.07  .16 -.08  .02 -.20 
Observer anxiety judgment  .26**  .22  .33* -.07 -.05 -.09 
Observer anger judgment -.09b -.04c -.17d -.11b -.23d  .00c 
Note. N = 100 for overall correlations, n = 50 for correlations by different IAT order. 
IAT = Implicit Association Test. a trait form.   b n = 77.   c n = 41.   d n = 36.  
+p < .10  *p < .05  ***p < .001. 
 
In regards to the correlations of the angriness IAT, the pattern was less clear. This 
might be due to the fact that the angriness IAT showed only small convergent validity with 
direct angriness measures already in the first test. As expected by Hypothesis 6, the 
correlation with the bipolar angriness self-rating decreased when the angriness IAT was the 
second test. However, this correlation difference was small and nonsignificant, z = .49, n.s. 
(one-tailed). Moreover, the opposite was true for the trait form of State Trait Anger 
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Expression Inventory. When the angriness IAT was the second test, its correlation with the 
trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory was marginally significant and 
higher than in the first test, z = -2.02, p < .05 (two-tailed). The correlation with the 
observer anger judgment was even nonsignificantly negative when the angriness IAT was 
the first test and zero when it was the second test, but did not differ significantly between 
both groups, z = -1.14, n.s. (one-tailed). Thus, a pattern of reduced convergent validity for 
the second test was not found for the angriness IAT, and validity was small in both cases. 
With regard to discriminant validity, the anxiousness IAT did not correlate with 
direct angriness measures in any case. In contrast, the angriness IAT correlated with the 
anxiousness IAT and tended to correlate with direct anxiousness measures, when it was the 
second test. Thus, there was a marginally positive correlation with the subscale Worries of 
the Speaking Anxiety Scale (see Table 17). On the other hand, these correlations tended to 
be negative, when the angriness was the first test. Specifically, there was a marginally 
negative correlation with the subscale Emotionality of the Speaking Anxiety Scale. 
Possibly, for some participants, the category self-controlled, that was the opposite of angry 
within the angriness IAT, was more related with high rather than low anxiousness. 
Therefore, the small negative correlation between the angriness IAT and direct anxiousness 
measures might have appeared. In contrast, when the angriness was the second test, it 
tended to positively correlate with direct anxiousness measures due to the assumed transfer 
effect from the anxiousness IAT onto the angriness IAT. The correlation differences (two-
tailed tests) between both groups were significant for the two subscales of the Speaking 
Anxiety Scale (in both cases z > 2.12, p < .05), marginally significant for the Manifest 
Anxiety Scale (z = 1.82, p < .10), and nonsignificant for the bipolar anxiousness self-rating 
and the trait form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (in both cases z < 1.61, n.s). 
Consequently, the increase in correlation with direct anxiousness measures provides 
further evidence for a transfer effect from the anxiousness IAT on the angriness IAT.  
The positive correlations of direct anxiousness measures with the angriness IAT in 
the second test might also lead to the positive correlation between the angriness IAT and 
the trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory. Table 13 shows that the trait 
form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory was positively correlated with direct 
anxiousness measures. Thus, the positive correlation between the angriness IAT and the 
trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory might be mediated by the 
correlation of both measures with direct anxiousness measures. However, when the 
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correlation between both measures was controlled for their correlation with direct 
anxiousness measures the partial correlation was only a little smaller than the zero-order 
correlation, r = .20, n.s. versus r = .25, p < .10. Thus, the angriness IAT seemed to show at 
least some convergent validity with the trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory.  
Altogether, the anxiousness IAT showed a pattern of reduced validity for the 
second test with respect to direct measures but not for the observer anxiety judgment. The 
angriness IAT showed small convergent validity in general, and was affected by a transfer 
effect from the anxiousness IAT. This led to positive correlations between both IATs, and 
a trend to positive correlations between the angriness IAT and direct anxiousness 
measures.  
5.4.8 Prediction of the State and the Behavioral Measures by Direct and 
Indirect Measures 
In this section, I report the results of hierarchical regression analyses that explored 
whether state and behavioral measures of anxiety and anger were predicted by direct and 
indirect measures. According to Hypothesis 7, it was expected that self-reported state 
measures were predicted by self-reported trait measures, and that the IATs added 
incremental validity to self-reported measures to the prediction of behavior. 
To examine the prediction of anxiety I performed separate hierarchical regressions 
with self-reported state anxiety and behavioral anxiety as criteria. Predictors were direct 
and indirect anxiousness measures, as well as direct state anxiety and its change when 
behavioral anxiety was the criterion. Direct measures (the bipolar anxiousness self-rating, 
the subscales Emotionality and Worries of the Speaking Anxiety Questionnaire, the trait 
form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, the Manifest Anxiety Scale, plus, for the 
prediction of anxious behavior, the bipolar state anxiety self-rating and its change) were 
entered in one step, and the anxiousness IAT was entered in the other step.  
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Table 18 
Predictions of the State Anxiety Measures and the Behavioral Anxiety Indicators by Direct 
Measures and the Anxiousness IAT 
 Hierarchical regression 
 Step 1: Direct measuresa Step 2: Anxiousness IAT 
Measure R2 ∆R2 
Bipolar state anxiety self-rating    
  Speech .448*** .000 
  Change (speech minus baseline) .131* .001 
Behavioral anxiety indicators   
  Observer anxiety judgment .171* .072** 
  Anxious voice rating .131+ .043* 
  Facial adaptor duration .083 .003 
  Body adaptor duration .080 .006 
  Illustrator duration .055 .004 
  Nervous mouth movements (frequency) .054 .000 
Note. N = 100. IAT = Implicit Association Test.  
a For the regression analysis on direct state anxiety all direct anxiousness measures (the 
bipolar anxiousness self-rating, the subscales Emotionality and Worries of the Speaking 
Anxiety Questionnaire, the trait form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, and the 
Manifest Anxiety Scale) were entered. For regression analysis on behavioral anxiousness 
indicators all direct anxiousness plus the state anxiety measures (bipolar self-rating and its 
change) were entered.    +p < .10  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001. 
 
In order to evaluate the contribution of every single predictor and to control for 
suppressor effects, I carried out different regressions considering the following points: (a) 
The contribution of each direct measure was individually analyzed in a separate regression 
entering the direct measure in one step, and the IAT in the other step. (b) Both orders of 
these hierarchical regressions were organized such that the direct measure was entered in 
Step 1 and the IAT in Step 2, as well as the opposite order of both steps . (c) Predictive 
validity of the IAT was inspected separately for both groups of different IAT order 
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(anxiousness IAT as first versus as second test). To avoid accumulation of α-error I first 
performed overall hierarchical regressions entering all direct measures in Step 1 and the 
IAT in Step 2. Then, I performed further analyses following points (a) to (c). To report the 
results for each criterion I begin with the overall analysis, as depicted in Table 18. Results 
are then outlined more clearly with the findings of points (a) to (c). I conclude with 
examining the standardized βs of all predictors in Step 2 of the overall analysis. To keep 
these analyses manageable I did not consider marginally significant results. 
As it can be seen in the first row of Table 18, direct anxiousness measures 
significantly accounted for self-reported state anxiety immediately before the speech, 
whereas the anxiousness IAT did not. This was (a) true for every single direct anxiousness 
measure, (b) independent of the regression order, and (c) not affected by different IAT 
orders. However, although all direct anxiousness measures share significant portions of 
variance with self-reported state anxiety (see Table 19), they did not independently 
contribute to the criterion. When all predictors were entered into the overall regression 
(Step 2 in Table 18), only the bipolar anxiousness self-rating and the Emotionality subscale 
of the Speaking Anxiety Scale were significant predictors, β = .41, t = 3.42, p < .001, 
β = .43, t = 3.89, p < .001, all others |β| < .09, |t| < .70, n.s.. 
Direct anxiousness measures also predicted state anxiety change after the anxiety 
induction, whereas the anxiousness IAT did not. This was (a) only true for the 
Emotionality subscale of the Speaking Anxiety Questionnaire, and independent of (b) 
regression order and (c) IAT order. Accordingly, only the Emotionality subscale accounted 
for the increase in state anxiety in the overall analysis (Step 2 in Table 18), β = .46, 
t = 3.22, p < .01, all others |β| < .27, |t| < 1.81, n.s.. 
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Table 19 
Correlations of State Anxiety (Study 2) 
 Bipolar state anxiety self-rating 
State anxiety Speech 
Change 
(speech minus baseline)
Bipolar state anxiety self-rating (speech) -  .66*** 
Anxiousness measures   
Bipolar anxiousness self-rating .56***  .09 
Speaking Anxiety Emotionality .52***  .29** 
Speaking Anxiety Worries .40***  .09 
Manifest Anxiety Scale .47***  .13 
Trait form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory .45***  .03 
Anxiousness IAT .11  .00 
Behavioral anxiety   
Observer anxiety judgment .38***  .23* 
Anxious voice rating .30***  .14 
Facial adaptor duration .07 -.02 
Body adaptor duration .16  .07 
Illustrator duration .09  .19+ 
Nervous mouth movements (frequency) .15  .06 
Note. N = 100. IAT = Implicit Association Test.  
+ p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001.  
 
As it can be seen in Table 18 the observer anxiety judgment was predicted by direct 
and indirect measures. (a) This was true for the bipolar anxiousness self-rating, the 
Emotionality subscale, the bipolar state anxiety self-rating, and the change in state anxiety. 
The trait form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory and the Manifest Anxiety Scale 
contributed marginally to the observer anxiety judgment. The Worries subscale was not 
even a marginal predictor. The anxiousness IAT accounted for the observer anxiety 
judgment independently from all direct measures. (b) When the anxiousness IAT was 
entered first, only the Emotionality subscale, the self-reported state anxiety and its change 
additionally contributed to the observer judgment. (c) As indicated by the zero-order 
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correlations (Table 20), the anxiousness IAT showed significant correlations with, and 
was, therefore, a significant predictor for the observer anxiety judgment when it was 
preceded by the angriness IAT. When the anxiousness IAT was the first test it marginally 
predicted the observer anxiety judgment. To conclude, only the Emotionality subscale, the 
bipolar state anxiety self-rating, and the anxiousness IAT were significant predictors in the 
overall analysis, β = .33, t = 2.26, p < .05, β = .36, t = 2.05, p < .05, β = .29, t = 2.94, 
p < .01, all others |β| < .27, |t| < 1.81, n.s.. 
 
Table 20 
Correlations of Behavioral Anxiety Measures in Study 2 
  Anxiousness IAT Explicit anxiousness Speaking Anxiety
Behavioral measure  Observer 
judgment
1st 
test
2nd 
test
Both Bipolar 
self-rating
MAS STAI Emotio-
nality 
Worries
Observer judgment -  .22  .33*  .26**  .22*  .19+ .19+  .29**  .15 
Anxious voice rating  .61***  .23  .19  .22*  .14  .06  .13  .23*  .22* 
Facial adaptor duration -.14 -.11 -.01 -.07 -.01 -.16 -.09 -.02 -.07 
Body adaptor duration  .26**  .02  .13  .06  .07 -.06 -.03  .07 -.05 
Illustrator duration  .02  .23 -.15  .05  .00 -.01 -.05 -.05 -.11 
Nervous mouth 
movements (frequency) 
 .22*  .00  .11  .04  .13 . 07  .15 -.03  .00 
*Note. N = 100 (n = 50 for different IAT orders). IAT = Implicit Association Test, 
MAS = Manifest Anxiety Scale, STAI =  trait form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory.  
* p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001.   
 
The anxious voice rating was marginally predicted by direct measures and 
significantly predicted by the anxiousness IAT. (a) With regards to single direct measures, 
the Worries and the Emotionality subscale, as well as the bipolar state anxiety self-rating 
were significant predictors. The anxiousness IAT marginally contributed to the anxious 
voice rating, when entered after the bipolar anxiousness self-ratings, the Worries subscale, 
or the state anxiety self-rating. The anxiousness IAT was always a significant predictor, 
when entered after any other direct measure. (b) When the direct measure was entered after 
the anxiousness IAT, the Emotionality subscale as well as the self-reported state anxiety 
were significant predictors and the Worries subscale was a marginal predictor. (c) As it 
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may be seen in Table 20, the anxiousness IAT significantly correlated with the anxious 
voice rating only when both groups with different IAT order were pooled. When the 
groups were inspected separately, sample sizes were smaller, and the small positive 
correlations failed to reach the significance criterion although the effect sizes were almost 
the same. This was also true for the regression analysis. Thus, the IAT was a significant 
predictor only when the groups with different IAT order were analyzed simultaneously. 
Finally, in the overall regression only the anxiousness IAT was a significant predictor 
β = .22, t = 2.17, p < .05. The bipolar state anxiety self-rating marginally accounted for the 
anxious voice rating, β = .37, t = 1.98, p < .10, all others |β| < .27, |t| < 1.54, n.s.. 
The duration of facial adaptors, body adaptors, and illustrators as well as the 
frequency of nervous mouth movements was neither predicted by direct measures nor by 
the anxiousness IAT. (a) When entered as single predictors, only the increase in state 
anxiety was a marginal but surprisingly positive predictor for illustrator duration. 
However, the effect was only small and might be due to chance. All other direct measures 
were not even marginal predictors for any of the anxiety codings. This pattern was not 
affected by (b) regression or (c) IAT order. In the overall analyses, neither any direct 
measure nor the anxiousness IAT was a significant predictor, all |β| < .19, |t| < 1.19, n.s.. 
This was the case even though nervous mouth movements and the duration of body 
adaptors showed small correlations with the observer anxiety judgment (see Table 20). 
Thus, although the observers interpreted nervous mouth movements and body adaptors as 
anxious behavior, these codings were not related to self-reported anxiousness and anxiety 
measures or the anxiousness IAT (see Table 20). It should be noted that the observer 
anxiety judgments showed a large correlation with the anxiety rating of the participants’ 
voices (see Table 20). Therefore, important anxiety indicators might not be found in the 
gestures or the facial expressions, but in the verbal expression and the sound of the 
participants’ voices. 
To summarize these findings, self-reported state anxiety was predicted by direct 
anxiousness measures but not by the anxiousness IAT. This confirmed Hypothesis 7. 
Important predictors for state anxiety were the bipolar anxiousness self-rating and the 
Emotionality subscale of the Speaking Anxiety Scale. In contrast, the anxiousness IAT 
added incremental validity over direct measures to the prediction of the observer anxiety 
judgment and the anxious voice rating. This confirmed, again, Hypothesis 7. It should be 
noted that the observer anxiety judgment and the anxious voice rating was also predicted 
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by direct measures. Important predictors were, again, the Emotionality subscale and the 
self-reported state anxiety. Codings of anxious behavior were neither predicted by direct 
measures nor by the anxiousness IAT. 
To examine the prediction of anger, I carried out the same hierarchical regressions 
as for the prediction of anxiety but with self-reported state anger and behavioral anger as 
criteria. Predictors were direct and indirect angriness measures as well as direct state anger 
and its change when behavioral anger was used as the criterion. Again, direct measures 
(the bipolar angriness self-rating, the trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory, plus, for the prediction of angry behavior, the bipolar state anger self-rating and 
its change) were entered in one step, while the angriness IAT was entered in the other step. 
Results are reported considering the same aspects as for the prediction of anxiety. I start 
with the results of the overall analysis as depicted in Table 21. Then, I explore (a) the 
contribution of single direct measures, (b) different regression orders, and (c) different IAT 
orders. Finally, I examine the standardized βs of all predictors in Step 2 of the overall 
analysis. 
As it is shown in Table 21, the bipolar state anger self-rating after the computer 
crash and the state anger change as compared to the baseline were neither predicted by 
direct angriness measures nor by the angriness IAT. This was (a) the same for the trait 
form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory and the bipolar angriness self-rating, 
and not affected by (b) regression or (c) IAT order. Thus, in both overall analyses neither 
direct angriness measures nor the angriness IAT were significant predictors, all |β| < .18, 
|t| < 1.64, n.s.. 
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Table 21 
Predictions of the State Anger Measures and the Behavioral Anger Indicators by Direct 
Measures and the Angriness IAT  
 Hierarchical regression 
 Step 1: Direct measures Step 2: Angriness IAT 
Measure R2 ∆R2 
Bipolar state anger self rating    
  Computer crash .044 .000 
  Change (computer crash minus baseline) .003 .006 
Behavioral angriness indicators   
  Observer anger judgment .224*** .015 
  Angry voice rating .154* .014 
  Lips tight (frequency) .029 .144*** 
  Lips pressed (frequency) .020 .023 
  Brows lower (frequency) .110+ .003 
Note. N = 77. IAT = Implicit Association Test.  
a For the regression analysis on direct state anger all direct angriness measures (the bipolar 
angriness self-rating and the trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory) were 
entered. For regression analysis on behavioral angriness indicators all direct angriness plus 
the state anger measures (bipolar self-rating and its change) were entered.    +p < .10  
*p < .05  ***p < .001. 
 
The observer anger judgment was predicted by direct measures but not by the 
angriness IAT. (a) This was true for the trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory and for the bipolar angriness self-rating but not for self-reported state anger or its 
change. This pattern was not affected by (b) regression or (c) IAT order. The only 
significant predictor in the overall analysis was the bipolar angriness self-rating, β = .34, 
t = 2.94, p < .01. The trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory and the self-
reported change in state anger were only marginally significant predictors, β = .21, 
t = 1.87, p < .10, β = .25, t = 1.90, p < .10. The self reported state anger did not 
significantly account for the observer anger judgment, β = -.12, t = -.87, n.s.. 
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Table 22 
Correlations of State Anger (Study 2) 
 Bipolar state anger self-rating 
State anger Computer crash 
Change (computer  
crash minus baseline) 
Bipolar state anger self-rating (computer crash)   -  .60*** 
Angriness Measures   
Bipolar angriness self-rating  .18 -.04 
State Trait Anger Expression Inventorya  .17  .02 
Angriness IAT -.06 -.08 
Behavioral Anger   
Observer anger judgment  .14  .18 
Angry voice rating  .28*  .28* 
Lips tight (frequency)  .03 -.03 
Lips pressed (frequency) -.07 -.08 
Brows lower (frequency) -.04  .20+ 
*Note. N = 100, n = 77 for behavioral anger measures. IAT = Implicit Association Test. 
a Trait form.    + p < .10  * p < .05  *** p < .001. 
 
Similarly the angry voice rating was predicted by direct measures but not by the 
angriness IAT. (a) When direct measures were analyzed individually, the bipolar angriness 
self-rating, the bipolar state anger self-rating, and its change significantly accounted for the 
angry voice rating. In contrast, the trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory 
failed to be a significant predictor. This pattern was not affected by (b) regression or (c) 
IAT order. In the overall analysis the bipolar angriness self-rating was the only even so 
marginally significant predictor, β = .24, t = 1.96, p < .10, whereas all others were |β| < .23, 
|t| < 1.66, n.s.. 
The frequency of putting the lips tight was predicted by the angriness IAT but not 
by direct measures. However, contrary to expectations, the angriness IAT and the 
frequency of tight lips were negatively correlated (see Table 23). When (a) direct measures 
were inspected individually or (b) the regression order was varied, results were the same. 
Nevertheless, this pattern was true only when (c) the angriness IAT was the first test. As 
already indicated by the zero-order correlations (Table 23), the frequency of tight lips and 
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the angriness IAT share common portions of variance only when the angriness IAT was 
completed before the anxiousness IAT. Concerning the overall analysis, only the angriness 
IAT was a significant, although negative predictor, β = -.38, t = -3.48, p < .001, all others 
were |β| < .14, |t| < 1.19, n.s.. 
 
Table 23 
Correlations of Behavioral Anger Measures in Study 2 
  Angriness IAT Explicit angriness  
Behavioral measure Observer 
judgment
1st test 2nd test Both Bipolar 
self-rating 
STAXI 
Observer anger judgment   -.23  .00 -.05  .38**  .33** 
Angry voice rating  .51*** -.17 -.10 -.10  .25*  .16 
Lips tight (frequency)  .08 -.55** -.21 -.34**  .05  .16 
Lips pressed (frequency) -.05 -.28+  .00 -.13  .00 -.11 
Brows lower (frequency)  .08 -.12  .00 -.12 -.07 -.21+ 
Note. n = 77 (n = 36 for angriness IAT as first test, and n = 41 for angriness IAT as second 
test). IAT = Implicit Association Test.    + p < .10  * p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001. 
 
The frequency of pressing the lips together (lips pressed) was neither predicted by 
direct measures nor the angriness IAT. This pattern (a) was true for every single direct 
measure. When the angriness IAT (b) was entered before the direct measures and (c) was 
the first test, it marginally accounted for the frequency of pressed lips. However, as it is 
indicated by the correlations in Table 23, the angriness IAT was then, once more, a 
negative predictor. In the overall analysis, none of the predictors was even marginally 
significant, all |β| < .15, |t| < -1.31, n.s.. 
The frequency of frowns (brows lower) was marginally predicted by direct 
measures but not by the angriness IAT. (a) Concerning single direct measures, this was 
true for the change in bipolar state anger and the trait form of the State Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory. However, the prediction was positive only for the former and again 
surprisingly negative for the latter (see the zero-order in Table 22 and in Table 23). This 
pattern was neither affected by (b) regression nor (c) IAT order. In the overall regression, 
only the change in state anger was a significant predictor, β = .32, t = 2.27, p < .05, all 
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others |β| < .20, |t| < 1.64, n.s.. Since the frequency of frowns did not correlate with the 
observer anger judgment, and the effects of the direct measures were small and 
contradictory, these results might be due to chance. 
To summarize these findings, Hypothesis 7 was not confirmed with regard to the 
prediction of state anger through direct angriness measures. Hypothesis 7 was also not 
confirmed with regard to the incremental validity of the angriness IAT for the prediction of 
angry behavior. The negative correlation of the angriness IAT with the frequencies of tight 
and pressed lips was contrary to expectations, and true only when the angriness IAT was 
the first test. Moreover, as it can be seen from Table 23, none of the anger codings were 
correlated with the observer anger judgment. Therefore, the anger codings might not be 
valid indicators for angry behavior. However, the observer anger judgment correlated 
substantially with the anger rating of the participants’ voices (see Table 23). Thus, 
important anger indicators might not be found in the facial expressions, but in the verbal 
expression and the sound of the participants’ voices. Finally, the observer anger judgment 
and the angry voice rating were only predicted by direct measures, whereby the bipolar 
angriness self-rating was the most important predictor. 
5.5 Discussion  
In the Discussion section, I first summarize the main findings of Study 2, and then 
briefly refer to gender differences. Subsequently, I discuss the differences between direct 
and indirect measures concerning the prediction of anxious and angry behavior. Finally, I 
refer to the conceptualization of angriness within the present study. 
5.5.1 Summary of the main findings 
Study 2 explored the psychometric properties of an anxiousness and an angriness 
IAT. Thereby, the sequence of the IATs was counterbalanced. The IATs’ convergent and 
discriminant validity was examined both for self-reported anxiousness and angriness, as 
well as for anxious versus angry behavior after emotion inductions. Study 2 tested seven 
hypotheses.  
First, the efficacy of the emotion inductions for anxiety and anger was reflected in 
an increase of self-reported state anxiety and state anger, respectively. Second, the 
anxiousness and angriness attributes of the IATs were validated by their correlations with 
established questionnaire measures. Third, in contrast to direct self-ratings, the anxiousness 
and the angriness IAT were not correlated with social desirability. Fourth, social 
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desirability did not moderate the correlation between direct and indirect measures. Fifth, 
the bipolar anxiousness and angriness self-ratings, as well as the observer judgments for 
anxiety and anger did not correlate with each other. In contrast, the anxiousness and the 
angriness IAT were correlated when the anxiousness IAT was the first test, r = .49, but not 
when the angriness IAT was the first test, r = .17. This correlation difference was 
marginally significant, and was attributed to a task-recoding in terms of a positive-negative 
self-dimension that was transferred from the anxiousness IAT onto the angriness IAT. 
Sixth, the validity of the anxiousness and the angriness IAT was marginally affected, if the 
test was the second rather than the first indirect test. Seventh, the anxiousness, but not the 
angriness IAT, added incremental validity over direct measures to the prediction of 
behavior.  
5.5.2 Gender Differences 
The sample in Study 2 was counterbalanced for gender. However, sex was not 
introduced as an independent variable in the results section because female and male 
participants did not differ significantly from each other with respect to the correlational 
analyses (Hypotheses 2-7). The only significant influence of gender was found in the 
anxiety induction effect (bipolar state anxiety items after the announcement of the speech 
minus baseline, F(1, 98) = 17.71, p < .001) that was qualified by an interaction effect with 
gender, F(1, 98) = 5.58, p < .05. Post hoc comparisons with Bonferoni correction (p < .025) 
indicated that the increase in state anxiety was true only for women, t(49) = 4.35, p < .001, 
but not for men, t(49) = 1.41, n.s.. This finding is different from Spitznagel et al. (2000) who 
found that women generally report more speech anxiety than man, but do not differ with 
respect to the increase in state anxiety. However, the studies from Spitznagel et al. used a 
different scale that asked for self-reports of habitual speech anxiety before, during, and 
after an imagined speech without a real anxiety induction. In the present study, there was 
no main effect of gender on any direct, indirect, or behavioral measure. 
5.5.3 Behavior Prediction Through Direct and Indirect Measures 
In Study 2, the observer judgments of anxious and angry behavior were predicted 
by the direct self-ratings. Additionally, the observer judgment of anxious behavior was 
predicted by the anxiousness IAT, and correlated with the duration of body adaptors and 
the frequency of nervous mouth movements. However, none of the behavioral anxiety and 
anger codings correlated significantly with either the direct measures or the IATs. The 
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same pattern of results was found for the shyness measures in Study 1. Thus, it is a 
difficult task to identify valid behavioral indicators that correlate with the observer 
judgments and direct or indirect personality self-concept measures. There might be several 
reasons why Study 2 failed to succeed in the search for valid behavioral cues. 
Concerning the behavioral anger measures, the interaction between the 
experimenter and the participant after the computer crash was probably too short for 
aggregating sufficient anger indicators. The mean duration was 117 (SD = 21) seconds and 
ranged from 72 to 168 seconds. In contrast, the duration of the speech was three minutes 
for all participants. Importantly enough, the duration of the anger sequence did not 
correlate with either the observer anger judgment, direct or indirect angriness measures, or 
any of the anger codings (that were coded in frequencies per minute). Thus, behavioral 
anger measures were not confounded with the duration of the anger sequence. 
Nevertheless, the anger sequence was relatively short, and most behavioral anger 
indicators were so infrequent that even intercoder reliability was unsatisfactory. This does 
not, however, imply that the anger induction was inapt for the observation of angry 
behavior since the direct angriness measures showed predictive validity for the observer 
anger judgment. As many earlier attempts to study anger in the lab (e.g., Pauls & 
Stemmler, 2003; Wiedig, 2003), the present study only partially solved the problem that 
the anger sequence has to be both (a) long enough and (b) unrecognized by the 
participants. 
Concerning the behavioral anxiety measures, the results from Egloff and 
Schmukle’s (2002) Study 4 were only partially replicated in the present study. In both 
studies the anxiousness IAT added incremental validity over direct measures to the 
prediction of anxious behavior. In contrast, the observer anxiety judgment was 
significantly predicted by direct anxiousness measures in the present study but not in 
Egloff and Schmukle’s Study 4. This might be due to the fact, that more direct anxiousness 
measures were included in the present study. The situation-specific direct measures, that is, 
the emotionality subscale of the Speaking Anxiety Questionnaire and the bipolar state 
anxiety items, were particularly strong predictors for the observer anxiety judgment in the 
present study. Yet, the trait form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory also correlated 
marginally with the observer anxiety judgment, r = .19, p < .10, whereas this was not true 
for Egloff and Schmukle’s study, r = .12, n.s.. However, this correlation difference was 
only small, and the lack of predictive validity of the direct anxiousness measure in Egloff 
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and Schmukle’s Study 4 might also be attributed to the relatively small sample size 
(N = 33). Thus, the present study is in line with the expectation that direct measures show 
small to moderate validity for the prediction of behavior (Funder, 1999). 
Differently from Egloff and Schmukle’s Study 4, the frequency of nervous mouth 
movements was not predicted by the anxiousness IAT in the present study. This could not 
have been attributed to a lack of cross-lab reliability of the behavioral coding since 
consistency between both labs was completely satisfactory. However, the anxiousness 
IATs of both studies differed with respect to the attribute categories and the attribute 
exemplars. Attribute categories were anxiety versus calmness in Egloff and Schmukle’s 
studies, and anxious versus self-confident in the present study. A possible post hoc 
explanation is that behavioral nervousness is more directly linked to a lack of calmness 
than to a lack of self-confidence. Therefore, the anxiety versus calmness IAT from Egloff 
and Schmukle might have shown better predictive validity. 
Additionally, the participants in Egloff and Schmukle’s Study 4 showed more 
nervous mouth movements than the participants in the present study, t(131) = 2.74, p < .01. 
Possibly, behavioral anxiety was higher in Egloff and Schmukle’s Study 4 due to the more 
evaluative nature of the speech task that asked the participants to summarize a scientific 
text instead of talking about euthanasia. Importantly enough, participants of both studies 
differed only marginally on the trait form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory. Thus, 
differences between the studies should not be attributed to a general sample effect. In 
summary, it seems that interindividual differences in the personality self-concept of 
anxiousness are observed best, if one maximizes the evaluative character of the anxiety 
induction. 
Altogether, the search for valid behavioral codings was not successful in Study 2. 
However, I refrained from further behavioral analysis due to the position effects and the 
lack of convergent and discriminant validity that were found in the angriness IAT. 
Nevertheless, the high correlations between the voice ratings and the observer judgments 
indicate that valid cues for interindividual differences in anxiousness and angriness may be 
found within the vocal expression of participants. Future studies of more objective vocal 
cues should explore this possibility. 
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5.5.4 Angriness, Agreeableness, Anger Expression, and Approach Behavior 
Study 2 explored the implicit and explicit representations of the personality self-
concept of anxiousness and angriness. Explicit representations were assessed with bipolar 
anxiousness and angriness self-ratings. Implicit representations were assessed by using the 
same words as stimuli within the IATs. The convergent validity of the bipolar anxiousness 
self-ratings with widespread anxiousness scales was high, r > .70. In contrast, the 
correlation between the bipolar angriness self-ratings and the trait form of the State Trait 
Anger Expression Inventory was only moderate, r = .45. This might be due to the 
conceptualization of anxiousness and angriness in the present study as orthogonal factors 
within the Big Five model of personality.  
Conceptually and empirically, anxiousness versus self-confidence was strongly 
related to neuroticism, and unrelated to agreeableness. Angriness versus self-control was 
weakly related to neuroticism, and strongly related to agreeableness. In contrast, the trait 
form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory is intermediately related with 
emotional instability or neuroticism (Spielberger, 1988), and was also significantly 
correlated with all direct anxiousness measures in the present study. Differently from the 
trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory, the present conceptualization of 
angriness refers more to agreeableness and less to emotional instability or neuroticism. 
This may account for the moderate correlation between the bipolar angriness self-ratings 
and the trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory. Nevertheless, the scale 
was labeled as angriness because it is less broad than the Big Five dimension of 
agreeableness. 
Alternatively, angriness versus self-control may be considered as a combination of 
high anger-out and low anger-control, which are strongly negatively correlated. Moreover, 
anger-out and anger-control show the same intermediate correlations with the trait form of 
the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory as the bipolar angriness self-ratings 
(Schwenkmezger et al., 1992). Thus, the bipolar angriness self-ratings may more directly 
refer to styles of anger expression than the trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory. A more direct relation to angry behavior within the bipolar angriness self-
ratings is also suggested by the somewhat higher correlations with the observer anger 
judgment and the angry voice rating than it was obtained for the trait form of the State 
Trait Anger Expression Inventory (see Table 23). 
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Anger is a negative emotion that is related to approach behavior (see Chapter 
2.6.1). In contrast, anxiety is related to avoidance behavior that is true for most of the 
negative emotions (e.g., sadness, disgust). Due to the relation of state anger to approach 
motivation, anger is associated with different EEG activation than anxiety (Harmon-Jones 
& Sigelman, 2001). Possibly, the automatic categorization of stimuli within the angriness 
IAT was somehow obstructed because angry versus self-control combines approach-
related words (e.g., angry) with negative valence, and avoidance-related words (e.g., self-
control) with positive valence. In contrast, avoidance-related words (e.g., anxious) are 
combined with negative valence, and approach-related words (e.g., self-confident) with 
positive valence in the anxiousness IAT. Generally, positive valence is more strongly 
associated with approach motivation whereas negative valence is more strongly associated 
with avoidance motivation (e.g., Neumann, Förster, & Strack, 2003). However, within the 
angriness IAT motivational direction and valence of the stimuli are inversely related. This 
might distort the automatic categorization of angry versus self-controlled, and further 
accounts for (a) the lower internal consistency within the angriness IAT (.66) than within 
the anxiousness IAT (.72), (b) the lack of convergent validity of the angriness IAT, and (c) 
the susceptibility of the angriness IAT to the transfer effect from the anxiousness IAT. 
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6 Study 3: Transfer Effects in Indirect Assessment 
6.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of the following study was to explore whether the unexpected 
positive correlation between the anxiousness and the angriness IAT in Study 2 was due to 
the salience of a positive-negative self-dimension. If participants classified the attributes 
within both IATs according to evaluative rather than semantic features, the transfer effect 
from the anxiousness IAT onto the angriness IAT can be explained. Therefore, I aimed to 
replicate the transfer effect of the preceding study with a different sample and to check 
whether the transfer effect could be blocked or strengthened using interventions that block 
or strengthen a positive-negative self-dimension, respectively. Additionally, I examined 
whether the anxiousness and the angriness IAT were correlated with a contingency-based 
color IAT, that assesses method-specific variance due to task-switching costs (Mierke & 
Klauer, in press). These research questions are discussed in the following sections. 
6.1.1 Research Question 1: Interventions for Blocking and Strengthening 
the Transfer Effect 
Study 2 provided evidence that a positive-negative self-dimension was more salient 
in the anxiousness IAT than in the angriness IAT. Therefore, a task-recoding in terms of a 
positive-negative self-dimension seemed to be more likely to occur in the anxiousness than 
in the angriness IAT. The task-recoding in the anxiousness IAT was assumed to cause the 
transfer effect from the anxiousness onto the angriness IAT. Two different interventions 
were examined in Study 3 in order to block the transfer effect.  
One intervention employed anagrams of evaluatively neutral nouns. Participants 
had to identify the misplaced letters in given nouns thereby come up with the correct noun. 
The other intervention employed the procedure of the contingency-based IAT from Mierke 
and Klauer (in press). The contingency-based IAT asks for the categorization of 
geometrical objects and imposes an artificial contingency between the genuinely 
unassociated target category (color of stimuli) and the attribute category (size of stimuli) 
(see Chapter 2.4.2). I used meaningless strings instead of geometrical objects as stimulus 
material because they were easier to implement in the ERTS routines. This modification of 
the geometrical objects IAT was called color IAT. The detailed procedure is described in 
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the Methods section. The color IAT was expected to block the transfer effect because its 
stimuli cannot be categorized in terms of a positive-negative self-dimension. 
In contrast, a positive-negative self-dimension is salient in direct self-esteem and 
mood measures. The transfer effect was expected to be strengthened if self-esteem and 
mood scales were presented between the anxiousness and the angriness IAT. Additionally, 
the blocking of the transfer effect through the color IAT or the anagrams seemed likely to 
be reversed if the self-esteem and the mood scales were presented before the angriness 
IAT. 
6.1.2 Research Question 2: Method-Specific Variance in the IATs 
Recently, Mierke and Klauer (in press) showed that method-specific variance due 
to task-switching can be assessed with a contingency-based IAT (see Chapter 2.4.2). As 
noted before, the contingency-based IAT was slightly modified for Study 3 and was used 
as an intervention to block the positive-negative self-dimension. The modified version, the 
color IAT, employed the same rationale as the geometrical objects IAT from Mierke and 
Klauer. It was expected that the results of the geometrical objects IAT were replicated in 
the color IAT. The color IAT should correlate with the absolute scores of the anxiousness 
and the angriness IAT when the IAT scores are calculated as conventional measures. In 
contrast, the color IAT should be uncorrelated with the anxiousness and the angriness IAT 
when the IAT scores are calculated as D measures (Greenwald et al, 2003). This would 
indicate that the improved D measures control for the method-specific variance that is 
produced by task-switching costs. Additionally, this would show that the positive 
correlation between the anxiousness and the angriness is not mediated by the method-
specific variance that is assessed by the color IAT. 
6.2 Hypotheses 
Study 3 tested the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 (Higher negative correlations of self-esteem and mood with direct 
anxiousness than with direct angriness measures). 
Self-esteem and positive mood show higher negative correlations with direct 
anxiousness than with direct angriness measures. Therefore, a positive-negative dimension 
is more salient within the anxiousness IAT than within the angriness IAT. This accounts 
for the asymmetry of the transfer effect from the anxiousness IAT onto the angriness IAT 
but not vice versa. 
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Hypothesis 2 (Negative correlations of self-esteem and mood with the angriness 
IAT). When mood and self-esteem are assessed directly before the angriness IAT they 
show negative correlations indicating the influence of a positive-negative self-dimension 
on the angriness IAT. 
Hypothesis 3 (Zero correlations of the D measures with the Color IAT). The 
improved IAT D measures do not correlate with the color IAT indicating that the 
correlation between the anxiousness and the angriness IAT is not mediated by the method 
specific variance that is assessed by the color IAT. 
Hypothesis 4 (Replication of the transfer effect). The transfer effect from the 
anxiousness IAT onto the angriness IAT, that is, positive correlations between both IATs 
and a trend for the angriness IAT to correlate with direct anxiousness measures, is 
replicated in Study 3. 
Hypothesis 5 (Intervention effects). The positive-negative self-dimension and, 
thus, the transfer effect is blocked through interventions that require the categorization of 
evaluatively neutral stimuli during an IAT or the processing of evaluatively neutral nouns. 
Hypothesis 6 (Positive-negative self-dimension produces transfer effect). The 
transfer effect is strengthened or its blocking is reversed through self-ratings on a mood 
and a self-esteem scale that comprise a positive-negative self-dimension. 
6.3 Methods 
6.3.1 Participants and Design 
180 participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 3 (intervention type: 
color IAT, anagrams, without intervention) x 2 (mood and self-esteem scale: with, without) 
between subjects design. Assignment was balanced for gender. Most participants were 
directly approached on the campus of Humboldt University, Berlin. The rest of the 
participants were recruited by postings at the university buildings. Participants were 
nonpsychology university students, native German speakers, and had not participated in 
the lab’s previous studies. Their mean age was M = 23.13 years and ranged from 19 to 33 
years. Participants were offered € 6 (approximately US $ 6 at the time) for taking part in a 
45 minute lab experiment on personality traits.  
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Table 24 
Overall Procedure and Design of Study 3 
Cover story: Personality traits Duration(Min.) 
(a) Direct trait measures - Trait form of the STAI and STAXI  
- Speaking Anxiety Scale 
- Bipolar self-ratings of anxiousness, angriness, 
conscientiousness, and intellect 
- Social desirability scales 
- Biographical data 
10
(b) IAT Anxiousness IAT 10
(c) Intervention Color IAT Anagrams Without 0/5
(d) Mood and self-esteem scale + - + - + - 0/2
(e) IAT Angriness IAT 10
 n 30 30 30 30 30 30 ~41
Note. STAI = State Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAXI = State Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory, IAT = Implicit Association Test, + = with, - = without. 
 
6.3.2 Assessments and Measures 
Trait measures. Trait measures were identical to Study 2 except that some scales 
were dropped, and the items were answered on the computer in the lab. (For more detailed 
information about scale formats and item numbers see Methods section of Study 2.) The 
questionnaire started with the trait forms of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory STAI (Laux et 
al., 1981; English version: Spielberger et al. 1970) and the State Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory STAXI (Schwenkmezger et al., 1991; English version: Spielberger, 1988). Items 
of both questionnaires were randomly mixed and were followed by the second series of the 
Speaking Anxiety Scale (Spitznagel et al., 2000). Next, participants had to rate their 
conscientiousness and intellect on 10, and their anxiousness and angriness on 5 bipolar 
adjective pairs each. Pairs were mixed in a fixed random order and presented with a trait 
instruction. The questionnaire concluded with the Social Desirability Scales by Lück and 
Timaeus (1969) (English version: Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) and Stöber (1999; without 
the Item “Have you ever consumed drugs”). Internal consistencies of all trait measures 
were satisfactory, α > .75 for all scales. At the end of the questionnaire participants had to 
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report their age, sex, dominant hand, academic subject, length of time spent at university, 
whether they were still students (all were), and whether they had a permanent partner. 
Mood Scale. This scale was version A of the Positive-Negative Mood Scale 
borrowed from the Multidimensional Comfort Questionnaire [Multidimensionaler 
Befindlichkeitsfragebogen, Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz, & Eid, 1997]. On 5-point scales 
(1 = not at all, 5 = very much) it assesses positive and negative mood with 2 unipolar items 
each (e.g., “fine”). Items were presented with a state instruction (“At the moment I 
feel …”) and answers were coded so that higher values indicated more positive mood. 
Internal consistency of the Mood Scale was satisfactory, α = .88 
State Self-Esteem Scale. This scale was a short form of the State Self-Esteem 
Scale from Heatherton and Polivy (1991) that was translated into German by Riketta and 
Dauenheimer (2002). The scale deals with self-evaluations (e.g., “I feel satisfied with the 
way my body looks right now”) that should be answered with regard to how a participant 
feels at the moment. Answers are given on a 5-point scale (1 = not true at all, 5 = perfectly 
true), with higher values indicating higher self-esteem. Out of the 20 item original scale I 
selected 8 items that showed corrected item-total correlations of r > .48 in two student 
samples (N = 142 and N = 115) of Riketta and Dauenheimer (personal communication, 
October 17, 2002). Internal consistency of the resulting scale was satisfactory, α = .80.  
Anxiousness and angriness IAT. The procedures were identical to Study 2. 
Color IAT. The procedure of the color IAT was identical to the anxiousness and 
the angriness IAT, but the stimuli closely followed the geometrical objects IAT presented 
in Mierke and Klauer (in press). While target (color of stimuli) and attribute (size of 
stimuli) categories were equal to Mierke and Klauer, I used meaningless strings rather than 
geometrical objects as stimulus material. Task sequence, stimuli, and task description are 
depicted in Table 25. The geometrical objects IAT was developed to asses interindividual 
differences in task-switching performance that were shown to reliably contaminate 
conventional IAT measures (Mierke & Klauer, in press) but not the improved IAT D 
measures (Greenwald et al., 2003). The geometrical objects IAT imposes an artificial 
contingency between the genuinely unassociated target category (color) and attribute 
category (size), so that all blue stimuli are big and all red stimuli are small. I employed the 
color IAT in order to use a evaluatively neutral IAT procedure for studying its ability to 
block transfer effects between different IATs. Therefore, my procedure strictly followed 
the anxiousness and angriness IAT. That was also true for the aspect that (contrary to 
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Mierke & Klauer, in press) within the combined tasks the stimuli alternated between target 
and attribute. The IAT score was computed as the difference between mean response 
latencies in the incompatible and the compatible pairing (sequence 3 – sequence 5, see 
Table 25). 
 
Table 25 
Color Implicit Association Test: Task Sequence and Task Description 
   Response key assignment 
Sequence N of trials Task Left key Right key 
1 40 Target discrimination Red Blue 
2 40 Attribute discrimination Big Small 
3 80 Initial combined task Red, big Blue, small 
4 40 Reversed target discrimination Blue Red 
5 80 Reversed combined task Blue, big Red, small 
Tasks 
Target discrimination: Color of strings Attribute discrimination: Size of strings 
Blue versus red Big (22, 24) versus small (11, 12) fonts  
Nonrelevant size of targets:  
Big (22, 24) or small (11, 12) fonts 
Nonrelevant colors of attributes:  
Yellow, green, or pink 
Note. The Color IAT imposed an artificial contingency between target (color) and attribute 
(size) discrimination so that all blue strings were big and all red strings were small. Strings 
were xyxyx, yxyxy, yxxxy, xyyyx, and xxyxx. 
 
Anagrams. Out of a list of 800 nouns that were analyzed by M. Schwibbe, Raeder, 
G. Schwibbe, Borchardt, and Geiken-Pophanken (1981) I selected 35 nouns the valences 
of which were rated as neutral, .08 > M > -.08, SD < .60, referring to a 5-point scale 
ranging from -3 = negative to +3 = positive. The places of two letters were switched within 
each of these nouns and the nouns were presented on the screen. Participants were 
instructed to type in the correct noun as quick as possible. If participants did not complete 
the full 35 nouns within five minutes the presentation of the remaining anagrams was 
stopped in order to keep time comparable for all participants. 
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6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Correlations of Direct Measures 
The correlations between the state self-esteem scale and the direct anxiousness and 
angriness measures are depicted in the last column of Table 26. As it was expected from 
Hypothesis 1, self-esteem showed higher negative correlations with direct anxiousness than 
with direct angriness measures. Although correlations tended to be negative for both, they 
ranged from intermediate to large for direct anxiousness, and were not even marginally 
significant for the direct angriness measures. The correlation differences (Steiger, 1980) 
were nonsignificant when comparing the correlations of the bipolar anxiousness and 
angriness self-rating, t(87) = 1.17, n.s. (one-tailed), and significant when comparing the 
correlations of the trait forms of the State Trait Anxiety and Anger Expression Inventories, 
t(87) = 2.44, p < .01 (one-tailed). Although the self-esteem scale was presented with a state 
instruction, and anxiousness and angriness were assessed as traits, the correlational pattern 
with trait self-esteem might be very similar, as state and trait self-esteem are highly 
correlated (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). 
Concerning the correlations of the positive mood scale with direct anxiousness and 
angriness measures, the same pattern was true (see column 8 of Table 26). Whereas the 
anxiousness measures showed marginal or significant negative correlations with positive 
mood, the correlations of the angriness measures with positive mood were not even 
marginally significant. However, the correlation differences were nonsignificant when 
comparing the correlations of the bipolar anxiousness and angriness self-rating, t(87) = .97, 
n.s. (one-tailed), and marginally significant when comparing the correlations of the trait 
forms of the State Trait Anxiety and Anger Expression Inventories, t(87) = 1.50, p < .10 
(one-tailed). Together, these findings illustrate that a positive-negative self-dimension was 
represented to a greater extent in direct anxiousness rather than in direct angriness 
measures. This confirmed the explanation for the transfer effect, and further demonstrated 
the asymmetry of the transfer effect from the anxiousness IAT onto the angriness IAT, but 
not vice versa.  
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Table 26 
Reliabilities and Correlations of the Trait and State Measures in Study 3 
   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
1. Bipolar anxiousness .83 .06 .30*** .40*** .69*** .12 -.11 -.18+ -.31*** 
2. Bipolar angriness  .81 .13+ .15* .19* .59*** -.23** -.04 -.15 
3. Speaking Anxiety Emotionality  .87 .67*** .28*** .20** -.12  .04 -.19+ 
4. Speaking Anxiety Worries  .86 .40*** .28*** -.13 -.04 -.36*** 
5. State Trait Anxiety Inventorya   .90 .30*** -.23** -.34*** -.59*** 
6. State Trait Anger Expression Inventorya   .75 -.34*** -.16 -.15 
7. Social desirability      .80  .27**  .37*** 
8. Mood scale (state instruction)       .87  .48*** 
9. State self-esteem        .80 
Note. N = 180, n = 90 for mood and self-esteem scales. Internal consistencies (Cronbach’s α) 
are printed in italics along the diagonal.  
a Trait form.   +p < .05  *p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001. 
 
Considering the other correlations in Table 26, the findings of Study 2 were clearly 
replicated. Again, the bipolar anxiousness and angriness self-ratings did not correlate with 
each other. The bipolar anxiousness self-rating correlated highly with the trait form of the 
State Trait Anxiety Inventory, and weakly with the trait form of the State Trait Anger Ex-
pression Inventory, whereas the opposite was true for the bipolar angriness self-rating. 
Finally, direct anxiousness and angriness measures tended to correlate with social 
desirability that was especially the case for direct angriness measures. 
6.4.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Anxiousness and the Angriness IAT 
Before I explore the correlations of the IATs, I will discuss briefly their descriptive 
statistics. The mean raw score (in milliseconds) of the anxiousness IAT was M = -173.4, 
SD = 176.5, and ranged from -748.7 to 310.0. Only 24 (13 female, 11 male) out of 180 
participants had positive IAT scores. Thus, most of the participants were quicker to 
combine Me+self-confident and Others+anxious than the reverse mapping. The mean raw 
score of the angriness IAT was M = -153.2, SD = 124.7, and ranged from –513.6 to 123.0. 
Only 15 (3 female, 12 male) out of 180 participants had positive scores. Thus, most of the 
participants were quicker to combine Me+self-controlled and Others+angry than the 
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reverse mapping. The mean raw score of the color IAT was M = 352.1, SD = 162.3, and 
ranged from 66.2 to 789.4. Thus, all participants were quicker in the compatible rather than 
in the incompatible pairing. 
Mean error rates were for the anxiousness IAT M = 5.0%, SD = 3.6%, for the 
angriness IAT M = 3.7%, SD = 3.1%, and for the color IAT M = 4.1%, SD = 3.5%. One 
participant had an error rate of 21.9% in the angriness IAT. Because exclusion of this 
participant would not affect the correlational pattern, his data were not discarded from 
analysis. Error rates for all other participants were below 20% in any IAT. No participant 
responded quicker than 300 ms in more than 10% of the trial responses in any IAT. The 
distributions of the D measures were not even marginally different from a normal 
distribution in all IATs, Z < 1. For every test, internal consistency was computed across the 
two test halves, and was acceptable for the anxiousness IAT , α = .77, but only marginal 
for the angriness IAT, α = .60, and the color IAT, α = .59. 
6.4.3 Correlations of the Anxiousness and the Angriness IAT with Self-
Esteem and Mood 
As it was expected from Hypothesis 2, the angriness IAT correlated negatively with 
the self-esteem and the mood scale that half of the participants (n = 90) completed just 
before the angriness IAT. Correlations were small but significant for both the self-esteem 
and the mood scale, r = -.23, p < .05, r = -.21, p < .05. This illustrated once more that 
categorization of stimuli within the angriness IAT was influenced by a positive-negative 
self-dimension. The anxiousness IAT, that was completed beforehand, correlated not even 
marginally with the self-esteem scale and marginally with the mood scale, r = -.10, n.s., 
r = -.18, p < .10. As one may recall, the opposite was true for direct anxiousness and 
angriness measures. Only direct anxiousness measures correlated significantly with the 
mood and self-esteem scale whereas direct angriness measures were not even marginally 
correlated (see Table 26). Thus, the negative correlation of the angriness IAT was rather an 
indicator of its susceptibility to a positive-negative self-dimension rather than an indicator 
for its validity. 
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6.4.4 Correlations of the Anxiousness and the Angriness IAT with the Color 
IAT 
As it was expected from Hypothesis 3, the D measures of the anxiousness and the 
angriness IAT were not correlated with the method-specific variance assessed by the color 
IAT, r = -.10, n.s., r = .07, n.s., n = 60. For these correlations, the absolute magnitude of 
the D measures was employed, and scores for the color IAT were computed on the basis of 
untransformed response latencies to maximize the amount of method-specific variance in 
such scores (Mierke & Klauer, in press). The observed zero correlations indicated that the 
correlation between the anxiousness and the angriness IAT was not due to their shared 
reliable contamination by the method-specific variance.  
With regard to conventional measures, the absolute magnitude of the untransformed 
and the log-transformed scores of the angriness IAT correlated significantly with the color 
IAT, r = .38, p < .01, r = .27, p < .05. This pattern exactly replicated the findings that 
Mierke and Klauer (in press) obtained for an extraversion IAT and a flower-insect attitudes 
IAT. However, it was not true for the anxiousness IAT. For this test, the absolute 
magnitude of neither the untransformed scores nor the log-transformed scores correlated 
significantly with the color IAT, r = .09, n.s., r = .06, n.s.. Thus, even so the conventional 
measures of the angriness IAT showed considerable method-specific variance due to task-
switching costs, the anxiousness IAT did not. Consequently, these findings illustrated that 
the correlation between the anxiousness and the angriness IAT is unlikely to be mediated 
by the method-specific variance that was assessed by the color IAT. 
The different correlations of the anxiousness IAT and the angriness IAT with the 
color IAT might be attributed to a position effect, since the color IAT was always 
presented after the anxiousness and before the angriness IAT. Nevertheless, in Mierke and 
Klauer’s Experiment 3 (in press) an extraversion IAT correlated with method-specific 
variance that was assessed by a geometrical objects IAT, although the geometrical objects 
IAT was completed after the extraversion IAT. Therefore, it should be the subject of future 
studies to explore whether the method-specific variance due to task-switching increases 
with the number of IATs that are completed. 
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6.4.5 Correlations of the Anxiousness and the Angriness IAT by Intervention 
Contrary to Hypothesis 4, the transfer effect from the anxiousness IAT onto the 
angriness IAT was not replicated when there were no intervention and no self-ratings on 
the mood and self-esteem scale before the angriness IAT. As it can be seen for 
condition (1) in Table 27 the correlation between both IATs tended to be positive but was 
not even marginally significant. 
 
Table 27 
Correlations of the Anxiousness and the Angriness IAT by Interventions (Study 3) 
Intervention No intervention Color IAT Anagrams 
Mood + SE without  with  without  with  without  with  
Condition (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IAT 
 Anx.  Angr. Anx. Angr. Anx. Angr. Anx.  Angr. Anx.  Angr. Anx. Angr.
Angr. IAT .24 - .38* - .46** - .53** - .38* - .53** - 
Bip. anx. .54** -.04 .24 -.03 .54** .19 .34+ .23 .46* -.07 .35+ .30 
Bip. angr. .10 .42* -.23 -.06 .20 .04 -.08 -.18 -.25 .27 .04 .06 
Emotionality .15 -.06 .08 -.05 .19 .19 .00 .00 .27 .01 .16 .27 
Worries .35+ -.13 .25 .09 .34+ .15 -.07 -.01 .33+ .14 .05 .21 
STAI .47** .07 .21 .10 .50** .24 .33+ .02 .28 -.22 .43* .78*** 
STAXI .15 .52**-.08 -.02 .14 .10 .11 -.03 .07 .47** .29 .25 
SD -.17 -.26 -.03 .13 .32+ .14 -.11 .04 .35+ -.01 -.04 -.14 
Note. n =30.  Mood + SE = Mood and self-esteem scale (state instruction), Angr. = Angri-
ness, Anx. = Anxiousness, Bip. anx. = Bipolar anxiousness self-rating, Bip. angr. = Bipolar 
angriness self-rating, Emotionality = Speaking Anxiety Emotionality, Worries = Speaking 
Anxiety Worries, STAI = Trait form of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, STAXI = Trait 
form of the State Trait Anger Expression Inventory, SD = Social desirability. 
Correlations that differed significantly due to the presentation of the mood and self-esteem 
scale are underlined (p < .05, one-tailed).    + p < .10    * p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001. 
 
More importantly, the angriness IAT showed sizeable convergent validity with the 
bipolar angriness self-rating and the trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression 
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Inventory. Inspection of the scatterplots revealed homogenous distributions. Thus, the 
angriness IAT did not correlate significantly with either the anxiousness IAT or with direct 
anxiousness measures. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 was not confirmed. 
With regard to Hypothesis 5, I explored the groups that completed the color IAT or 
the anagrams but not the mood and self-esteem scales before the angriness IAT. Contrary 
to Hypothesis 5, the color IAT that required a categorization of senseless strings according 
to color and size was not sufficient to block the transfer effect. As it can be seen for 
condition (3) in Table 27, the anxiousness and angriness IAT correlated considerably in 
this group. The angriness IAT did not correlate with direct angriness but showed small 
positive correlations with direct anxiousness measures that nonetheless failed to reach 
significance. In contrast, in the anagram group, the angriness IAT tended to show weaker 
correlations with the anxiousness IAT, and instead correlated with direct angriness 
measures. As it is shown for condition (5) in Table 27, the angriness IAT correlated 
weakly, but due to the small sample size nonsignificantly, with the bipolar angriness self-
rating, and intermediately with the trait form of the State Trait Anger Expression 
Inventory. However, the angriness IAT still correlated significantly with the anxiousness 
IAT. Thus, Hypothesis 5 was confirmed, demonstrating that the anagrams increased the 
convergent validity of the angriness IAT. Nevertheless, the anagrams were incapable of 
entirely eliminating the correlation between the anxiousness and the angriness IAT. On the 
other side, the color IAT was generally inappropriate to block the transfer effect 
Concerning the effects of the mood and self-esteem scale that should promote a 
positive-negative self-dimension, Hypothesis 6 was successfully confirmed. When these 
scales were presented between the anxiousness and the angriness IAT, the convergent 
validity of the angriness IAT was diminished, and both IATs tended to correlate more 
highly with each other. Although this correlation increase was not significant, the pattern 
was replicated in all three groups (see condition (2), (4), and (6) in Table 27). More 
importantly, the decrease of convergent validity with direct angriness measures was 
significant for the no intervention group (see condition (2) in Table 27). In addition, there 
was a significant increase in the correlation between the angriness IAT and the trait form 
of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory in the anagram group (see condition (6) in Table 27). 
It should be noted that the latter correlation showed a homogenous scatterplot and was not 
driven by outliers. Altogether, the transfer effect was clearly strengthened through the 
presentation of the mood and self-esteem scales. 
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6.5 Discussion 
This section first summarizes the main findings of Study 3. Then I discuss why the 
transfer effect might not have been replicated in the no-intervention group and refer to the 
problem of small sample sizes. 
6.5.1 Summary of the Main Findings 
Study 3 explored whether the unexpected positive correlation between the 
anxiousness and the angriness IAT that was found in Study 2 was caused by a task-
recoding in terms of a positive-negative self-dimension. Therefore, the salience of the 
positive-negative self-dimension was manipulated, and the effects on the correlations of 
the angriness IAT were studied. Study 3 tested six hypotheses. 
First, direct anxiousness measures showed a pattern of stronger correlations with 
negative self-esteem and negative mood than direct angriness measures. Thus, a positive-
negative self-dimension was more salient in the stimuli of the anxiousness IAT than of the 
angriness IAT. This explains the asymmetry of the transfer effect from the anxiousness 
IAT onto the angriness IAT. Second, the angriness IAT correlated significantly with both, 
negative self-esteem and negative mood, if they were presented directly before the 
angriness IAT. This indicated that a positive-negative dimension influenced the angriness 
IAT. Third, in contrast to the conventional scores, the improved D measure of the 
angriness IAT did not correlate with the method-specific variance that was assessed by the 
color IAT. Fourth, unexpectedly, in the no-intervention group, the transfer effect from the 
anxiousness IAT onto the angriness IAT was not replicated and the IATs were only weakly 
correlated. This lack of replication is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.5.2. Fifth, only 
the anagrams but not the color IAT were capable of reducing the transfer effect and 
securing the convergent validity of the angriness IAT. However, even the anagrams did not 
entirely eliminate the correlation between the anxiousness and the angriness IAT. Sixth, 
when a positive-negative self-dimension was made salient through the presentation of self-
esteem and mood scales, the transfer effect was strengthened. This was apparent from a 
pattern of higher correlations between the anxiousness and the angriness IAT, and from a 
lack of convergent and discriminant validity of the angriness IAT. 
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6.5.2 Lack of Replication of the Transfer Effect in the No-Intervention 
Group 
Surprisingly, the transfer effect from the anxiousness IAT onto the angriness IAT 
failed to be replicated in the no-intervention group of Study 3. The transfer effect was 
explained by the salience of a positive-negative self-dimension. However, there may be 
three reasons why a positive-negative self-dimension was weaker in Study 3 than in 
Study 2. 
First, in Study 2 direct anxiousness and angriness measures were completed at 
home within one week before the lab experiment. In contrast, in Study 3, direct 
anxiousness and angriness measures were completed during the lab experiment and before 
the anxiousness and the angriness IAT. Previous studies showed that correlations between 
IATs and direct measures are affected by the order in which direct measures and the IATs 
are presented (Bosson et al., 2000), and that correlations between IATs and direct measures 
are not affected by the presentation order (Nosek et al., 2003). However, a recent meta-
analysis (Hofmann, Gawronski, et al., 2003) suggests that first administering the direct 
measures increases correlations between IATs and direct measures. More importantly, it is 
theoretically plausible that direct-indirect correlations increase when the direct measures 
are completed first, because this makes the existing associations more accessible (Fazio, 
1995; Strack & Deutsch, in press). It is possible that the angriness IAT in Study 3 was 
more robust against the transfer effect from the anxiousness IAT because the presentation 
of the direct angriness measures made the implicit self-concept of angriness more 
accessible. The presentation of the direct measures before the IATs seemed to have had at 
least some effect, as direct-indirect correlations tended to be generally higher in Study 3 
than in Study 2. For instance, the overall correlation of the anxiousness IAT with the 
bipolar anxiousness self-ratings tended to be higher in Study 3 (r = .39, p < .001, N = 180) 
than in Study 2 (r = .25, p < .05, N = 100). Similarly, the correlation of the angriness IAT 
with the bipolar angriness self-ratings tended to be higher in Study 3 (r = .23, p < .05, 
n = 90) than in Study 2 (r = .11, n.s., N = 100).  
Second, the cover story in Study 3 was “personality traits”, whereas in Study 2 it 
was “concentration and personality”, since the cover story in Study 2 had to be discreet in 
regards to the emotion inductions. Especially during the lab experiment of Study 2, the 
focus was on concentration tests. Therefore, some participants may have categorized 
anxious versus self-confident (within the anxiousness IAT) and angry versus self-
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controlled (within the angriness IAT) in terms of distracted versus concentrated. This 
might have strengthened the transfer effect. It could also explain why the direct-indirect 
correlations in Study 2 were, on the whole, lower than in Study 3. Nevertheless, a task-
recoding in terms of distracted versus concentrated is unlikely to explain the transfer effect 
alone because the transfer effect was asymmetrical.  
Third, in Study 2 participants completed an optimistic risk questionnaire directly 
before the IATs. In this questionnaire participants rated the probability of positive (e.g., “I 
married someone wealthy.”) and negative (e.g., “I had a heart attack before age 50.”) 
events during their lifetime. Items were recoded such that high scores indicated optimism. 
The optimistic risk questionnaire did not correlate with either the anxiousness IAT, the 
angriness IAT, or explicit angriness measures. Yet, it showed significant negative 
correlations with all explicit anxiousness measures (r < -.25). Therefore, the optimistic risk 
questionnaire might have made a positive-negative dimension in Study 2 more salient, and, 
thus, strengthened the transfer effect from the anxiousness onto the angriness IAT. 
Altogether, it is clear that correlations between the IATs and direct measures are 
dependent on the context (cf. the special issue of the Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 71, 2001). Particularly, direct-indirect correlations seem to be affected by the 
aspects of the personality self-concept that are activated before the IATs. In Study 3, a 
positive-negative self-dimension was probably weakened by presenting the direct 
angriness measures beforehand, by focusing on personality traits, and by omitting the 
optimistic risk questionnaire. Therefore, the transfer effect might have not been replicated 
in the no intervention group. Nevertheless, it may be assumed that the evaluatively neutral 
anagrams still contributed to the reduction of the transfer effect in the anagram group for 
two reasons. First, the transfer effect was replicated in the group that completed the color 
IAT. Second, the transfer effect was strengthened by the presentation of the self-esteem 
and the mood scales, that made, in contrast to the evaluatively neutral anagrams, a 
positive-negative self-dimension more salient. 
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6.5.3 Small Sample Sizes 
The aim of Study 3 was to test correlational hypotheses about blocking and 
strengthening of the transfer effect from the anxiousness IAT onto the angriness IAT. The 
sample sizes for the 6 experimental conditions were quite small (n = .30). It was expected 
by Hypothesis 5 that the neutral anagrams, as well as the color IAT would block the 
transfer effect. Results showed that this was true only for the former but not the latter. 
Therefore, these groups could not be pooled. Additionally, the transfer effect was not 
replicated in the no-intervention group, and the correlations of the anxiousness and the 
angriness IAT varied considerably among the groups that completed the self-esteem and 
the mood scale before the angriness IAT (see Table 27). Consequently, the experimental 
conditions were discussed individually. 
In any correlational study, large sample sizes, at least N ≥ 50, but better N ≥ 100, 
are called for. Otherwise, results may be driven by a few uncharacteristic participants who 
are unidentifiable as outliers. I looked for outliers who might have distorted the 
correlations, and I examined all of direct and indirect measures in every experimental 
condition individually. However, this search was unsuccessful. Similarly, the inspection of 
the scatterplots revealed that the correlations showed homogenous distributions. Still, the 
importance of large sample sizes might be illustrated by the fact that the correlation 
between the anxiousness IAT and the bipolar anxiousness self-ratings varied considerably 
between the conditions, from r = .24 to r = .54. This was true although the experimental 
conditions were identical up to the presentation of the anxiousness IAT. Thus, results of 
small samples such as in the present study should be considered with caution. 
Nevertheless, a pattern of three important results became evident in all 
experimental conditions. First, in contrast to the bipolar anxiousness and angriness self-
ratings, the correlation between the anxiousness IAT and the angriness IAT was positive 
and different from zero. Second, the correlation between the IATs was higher if a positive-
negative self-dimension was made salient through the self-esteem and the mood scales. 
Third, the convergent and the discriminant validity of the angriness IAT with direct self-
report measures was distorted by the presentation of the self-esteem and the mood scales.  
More importantly, a different study with a larger sample size (N = 97) replicated the 
position effect on the angriness IAT that was found in Study 2 (Teige, Schnabel, Banse, & 
Asendorpf, in press). In that study, the sequence of the shyness and the angriness IAT was 
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counterbalanced across participants. The correlations between the shyness and the 
angriness IAT tended to be higher when the shyness IAT was completed as first rather than 
second test, r = .34 versus r = -.01, z = -1.73, p < .10 (two-tailed). Similar to the 
anxiousness IAT, the shyness IAT may have made a positive-negative self-dimension more 
salient, because shyness and anxiousness were highly correlated concerning direct self-
reports (r = .69). The study provided further evidence that the transfer effect on the 
angriness IAT is (a) asymmetrical and (b) most likely caused by the salience of a positive-
negative self-dimension. 
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7 General Discussion 
The present research comprised 3 studies. In Study 1, the shyness IAT and a new 
indirect procedure, the shyness IAP, showed considerable convergent validity. Both of the 
indirect measures were much less susceptible to faking instructions than the direct self-
ratings. Additionally, under faking instructions, the correlations of direct and indirect 
measures with shy behavior decreased more strongly for the direct rather than for the 
indirect measures. However, there was a lack of valid behavioral codings for controlled 
and spontaneous shy behavior. Therefore, the double dissociation pattern of Asendorpf et 
al.’s (2002) Study 1 was not replicated. In Study 2, the anxiousness IAT added incremental 
validity over direct anxiousness measures to the prediction of anxious behavior. However, 
the angriness IAT was affected by a transfer effect from the anxiousness IAT. Study 3 
provided further evidence that this transfer effect was due to the salience of a positive-
negative self-dimension.  
The General Discussion refers to three aspects of these findings. First, to what 
extent are indirect measures influenced by the semantic meaning or by the positive and 
negative valence of the stimuli? Second, why are direct and indirect measures of the 
personality self-concept different from each other? Third, what can be learned from the 
present and other findings for the assessment of the implicit personality self-concept? 
7.1 Semantic Meaning versus Valence 
The findings of Study 2 and Study 3 suggested that the positive correlation between 
the anxiousness IAT and the angriness IAT was attributable to a task-recoding in terms of 
a positive-negative self-dimension. This raises a question about the extent to which IAT 
measures are driven by the semantic meaning as opposed to the positive or negative 
valence of the stimuli. If IATs mainly reflect the ease with which one combines positive 
versus negative stimuli with Me, then the IATs represent self-esteem IATs (e.g., 
Greenwald & Farnham, 2000) rather than indirect measures of different personality traits. 
Can the empirical findings of different self-concept IATs be re-interpreted in terms of 
implicit measures of self-esteem? 
Concerning the anxiousness IAT, the answer might be ‘yes’. In the studies by 
Egloff and Schmukle (2002), the anxiousness IAT predicted performance decrement due to 
failures in a concentration test, and anxious behavior during an evaluative speech task. 
Both behaviors may also be predicted by a ‘pure’ self-esteem IAT that does not directly 
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refer to anxiousness (cf. Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). The results from the anxiousness 
IAT in Study 2 of the present research may be re-interpreted using the same logic. The 
same reasoning can be applied to the shyness IAT (Asendorpf et al., 2002; Study 1 of the 
present research) as well, such that shy behavior could be predicted by low self-esteem. 
Already at the level of direct measures, shyness and anxiousness are negatively correlated 
with self-esteem (Cheek & Melchior, 1990; Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002). Thus, 
it is difficult to disentangle valence and semantic meaning in anxiousness and shyness 
because a valid portion of these traits already contains negative valence. 
There are at least three indicators that the semantic meaning of the stimuli may 
influence IAT scores. First, self-esteem IATs show that most people are quicker in 
combining Me with positive attributes than in combining Me with negative attributes. 
Thus, most individuals have positive implicit self-esteem (Greenwald & Farnham, 2000). 
This pattern did not hold to be true in the shyness IAT of Asendorpf et al.’s (2002) 
Study 1. The shyness IAT indicated that about 40 % of the participants are more shy than 
non-shy. If the shyness IAT could be re-interpreted as self-esteem IAT, one would expect 
fewer participants to show positive scores in the shyness IAT.  
Second, the research on priming procedures provides evidence that semantic and 
affective priming procedures show effects even with very short SOA (stimulus onset 
asynchrony, i.e., the interval between start of prime and start of target stimulus) 
(Greenwald, Draine, & Abrams, 1996; Klauer & Musch, 2003). Thus, both semantic and 
evaluative information is processed very quickly. Importantly, affective priming seems to 
depend on whether respondents have to identify evaluative or non-evaluative target 
attributes. Affective priming does usually not occur when targets are classified on the basis 
of non-evaluative features. (De Houwer et al., 2002, Klauer & Musch, 2003). To my 
knowledge, the present evidence of affective and semantic priming does not indicate that 
priming effects are more influenced by either valence or semantic meaning of stimuli. In 
contrast, the characteristics of the priming task seem to influence whether valence 
information or semantic information causes priming effects.  
Third, in two experimental groups of Study 3, the angriness IAT showed 
convergent validity for direct angriness measures (up to r = .52) in addition to discriminant 
validity for direct anxiousness measures (all r < .14). This finding could not have been 
explained had the participants classified stimuli within the angriness IAT only in terms of a 
positive-negative dimension.  
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On the other hand, task-recoding in terms of a positive-negative self-dimension 
cannot be completely ruled out in self-concept IATs due to a relatively strong connection 
between the concept of self and positive valence (Greenwald et al., 2002). Thus, the 
categorization of Me versus Others may automatically activate the positive-negative 
dimension. Self-concept IATs with two positive or two negative traits as target attributes 
could block the positive-negative dimension. For instance, one could employ a self-
concept IAT with anxiousness versus angriness as attribute categories. However, this IAT 
should, then, show identical results for those individuals who score high on anxiousness 
and angriness and those who score low on both traits. The results of recent studies provide 
evidence that it is difficult to separate the IATs’ measure of relative associations into two 
independent measures (Nosek et al., 2003).  
The positive-negative self-dimension may alternatively be weakened by the 
following factors. First, the positive or negative valence of IAT stimuli and IAT attribute 
categories should not be too extreme (cf. Footnote 4 from De Houwer, 2001; Steffens et 
al., 2003). For instance, although shyness is a negatively valenced trait, it is only so to a 
moderate extent. Likewise, with regard to anxiousness and angriness, one should consider 
stimuli with more positive valence, for example, cautious and resistant, respectively. 
Second, one should make an effort to highlight the semantic meaning of stimuli and to 
block a positive-negative self-dimension. The presentation of evaluatively neutral 
anagrams seemed to be successful in Study 3. 
7.2 Dissociations between Direct and Indirect Measures of the 
Personality Self-Concept 
There would be no interest in researching indirect measures if indirect and direct 
assessment procedures measured identical constructs. In order to differentiate between 
operationalizations and constructs, in this work, the terms direct and indirect measures 
were used to label procedures, and the terms explicit and implicit representations were 
used to label the constructs. Similarly, there may be two sources for dissociations between 
direct and indirect measures of the personality self-concept: (a) theoretically-based 
dissociations between explicit and implicit representations at the construct level; 
(b) method factors in direct and indirect measures at the assessment level. 
Concerning the construct level, explicit representations were regarded as 
propositional categorizations within the Reflective System, and implicit representations as 
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associative clusters within the Impulsive System of the Reflective-Impulsive Model from 
Strack and Deutsch (in press) (see Chapter 2.2). Thus, explicit representations should be 
better predictors of controlled behavior, and implicit representations should be better 
predictors of spontaneous behavior. Recently, Asendorpf et al. (2002) carried out a double 
dissociation procedure between the explicit and implicit personality self-concept of 
shyness. A direct shyness questionnaire uniquely predicted controlled (but not 
spontaneous) shy behavior, whereas a shyness IAT uniquely predicted spontaneous (but 
not controlled) shy behavior. However, the results of the present studies, Study 1 and 
Study 2, showed that it is difficult to differentiate between indicators of spontaneous and 
controlled behavior.  
Attempts to show predictive validity of indirect measures often follows an 
incremental validation strategy. This means that the studies usually explore whether 
indirect measures predict variance in relevant criteria in addition to direct measures of the 
same construct (for a review, cf. Fazio & Olson, 2003). In Study 2 of the present research, 
the anxiousness IAT added incremental validity over direct self-ratings to the prediction of 
the observer anxiety judgments. Conceptually, the incremental validity of the indirect 
measures might be attributed to two differences between explicit and implicit 
representations, (a) implicit representations have more direct access to the associative store 
than explicit representations, (b) explicit representations might be biased due to social 
desirability concerns (cf. Chapter 2.3). 
Biases based on social desirability also affect method factors of direct and indirect 
measures. For instance, whereas direct self-ratings are certainly fakable (cf. Study 1), there 
is a controversy about IATs being fakable or not (cf. Chapter 2.4.1). Study 1 provided 
evidence that the shyness IAT was to some extent fakable by. However, effects were much 
smaller than for direct self-ratings.  
Another methodical issue could refer to the question of whether the indirect 
procedure employs negation or not. For instance, the typical target categories of self-
concept IATs are Me versus Others. For the IAP in Study 1, target categories were Me 
versus Notme. According to Strack and Deutsch (in press), the Impulsive System is not 
able to negate information. More precisely, the Impulsive System is not able to assign a 
true or a false value to the relation between two concepts. Instead, the Impulsive System 
only connects or does not connect concepts using episodic and semantic links that are 
available within the associative store. Therefore, it may be an interesting topic for further 
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research to explore whether indirect measures that employ negation (e.g., the GNATs 
“Go/No-Go Association Tasks”, Nosek & Banaji, 2001; the shyness IAP of Study 1) are 
influenced by the Reflective System more than indirect measures that do not employ 
negation. However, the shyness IAP employed in Study 1 did not seem to be more 
controllable than the shyness IAT since the IAP was even less susceptible to faking 
instructions. Additionally, the IAT and the IAP contained a negation for the attribute 
category, that is, Shy versus Nonshy. 
Another characteristic of indirect measures is that they can be influenced by the 
category frame of the categorization task and by individual stimulus features (cf. Fazio & 
Olson, 2003). In contrast, direct self-ratings, for example, bipolar adjectives, are judged 
individually, that is, they are only influenced by individual stimulus features. To obtain the 
mean scale, the bipolar items are combined such that every item is weighed equally. 
Concerning IATs, there is some evidence that individual stimulus features have an effect 
on the IAT score, while the category frame is more influential (cf. Chapter 2.4.2). 
Finally, dissociations between direct and indirect measures may also be caused by 
the context dependency in indirect measures. Although indirect measures seem to be not 
affected by emotion inductions (Schmukle & Egloff, 2003; cf. Study 1 of the present 
research), they were shown to be influenced by other contextual variables (cf. Mitchell et 
al., 2003). Importantly enough, the present research revealed evidence that self-concept 
IATs are affected by the salience of a positive-negative self-dimension (see Chapter 7.2). 
In summary, dissociations between direct and indirect self-concept measures might 
be attributed to differences at the construct and at the measurement level. At the construct 
level, implicit representations differ from explicit representations because of their more 
direct access to the associative store and a more direct effect on spontaneous behavior. At 
the measurement level, there are method factors that are characteristic of indirect 
procedures rather than of direct procedures. Indirect procedures are less fakable, 
presumably less apt to assess negated concepts, are influenced by the category frame and 
stimulus features, and are susceptible to contextual variables, particularly to the salience of 
a positive-negative self-dimension. 
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7.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
This section summarizes some aspects of indirect measures, particularly of IATs, 
that may help future research on the implicit personality self-concept to be more 
successful. First, IAT D measures (Greenwald et al., 2003) were shown to control for 
method-specific variance due to task-switching (cf. Hypothesis 3 from Study 3). Therefore, 
future data reduction procedures should employ D measures.  
Second, it would be most useful to standardize the IAT procedure, that is, using a 
standardized number of trials in the five different IAT tasks, and even using a standardized 
number of stimulus items per IAT category. Although the effects of such variations may be 
insignificant (Nosek et al, 2003), it could make research on IATs much more comparable. 
Particularly, it was shown that the effect of task order (IAT effects are larger if the 
compatible pairing is completed before the incompatible pairing) was reduced by 
increasing trials in the reversed target discrimination task (see Table 3). A number of 40 
trials (like in the present studies) seems to be optimal for the reversed target discrimination 
(Nosek et al., 2003). This finding is important for the assessment of the personality self-
concept because the task order effect seems to maximize interindividual differences for 
participants with positive IAT scores (see Chapter 2.4.2) 
Third, the order of the compatible and incompatible IAT pairing should not be 
counterbalanced for the assessment of the personality self-concept. Otherwise, order 
variance is confounded with interindividual variance. Fourth, correlations between direct 
measures and the IAT seem to be higher if the direct measures are completed before the 
IATs (Hofmann, Gawronski, et al., 2003; cf. Chapter 6.5.2; for findings revealing no order 
effect, cf. Nosek et al., 2003). Thus, if one aims to maximize consistency between direct 
and indirect measures, one should apply direct measures first. 
Fifth, results of the present studies indicate that IATs may be influenced by the 
semantic meaning and by the positive or negative valence of IAT stimuli. Therefore, 
personality self-concept IATs should try to use moderately valenced stimuli and to block 
the salience of a positive-negative self-dimension.  
Sixth, there are promising results for self-concept IATs that use stimuli that 
describe behaviors (e.g., fistcuff) rather than personality traits (e.g., aggressive) (Banse & 
Fischer, 2002). Within the Reflective-Impulsive Model from Strack and Deutsch (in press), 
behavioral motor schemata are subsumed into the Impulsive System. Thus, it seems 
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plausible that stimuli describing behavior are more strongly represented in the associative 
clusters of the Impulsive System rather than abstract personality traits. Therefore, IATs 
with behavior describing items may provide a more direct access to the associative store.  
Seventh, one should include the stimuli of the indirect measures as direct self-
ratings. This allows for a fair comparison between direct and indirect measures. 
Additionally, the internal consistency of the stimuli that represent one trait can also be 
checked at the direct level. This could indicate whether the stimuli fit well in the 
superordinate category. 
Eighth, if one employs more than one IAT in order to assess different traits within 
one study, one should take into consideration that transfer effects between the IATs might 
distort the IAT effects. Study 2 and Study 3 provided evidence that the position effect on 
the angriness IAT was due to a task-recoding in terms of a positive-negative self-
dimension that was transferred from the anxiousness IAT. A positive-negative task-
recoding might be quite salient in self-concept IATs due to the strong connection of Me 
with positive valence (Greenwald et al., 2002). In addition, there may be other 
superordinate categories for other traits, for example, male-female, young-old, intelligent-
unintelligent, that can bias the IAT scores. 
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8 Discover Id: The Conclusion 
When Freud (1923) named the deep, inaccessible part of personality the id, this was 
certainly an original term. Employing a model from more scientific-empirical Social 
Cognition research, I differentiated between explicit and implicit representations of one’s 
own personality and considered them as elements of reflective and impulsive information 
processing, respectively (Strack & Deutsch, in press). Using the traits of shyness, 
anxiousness, and angriness as examples, I assessed implicit representations of the 
personality self-concept with the Implicit Association Tests (IATs, Greenwald et al., 1998) 
and the new Implicit Association Procedures (IAPs) as the tools for indirect measures. In 
contrast to direct questionnaire measures that assess the explicit personality self-concept, 
indirect measures are chronometric procedures that avoid asking direct self-judgment 
questions. 
The results showed four important dissociations between direct and indirect 
measures in the assessment of the personality self-concept. First, indirect measures were 
more robust against faking than direct measures. Second, the convergent validity between 
indirect measures was lower than that between direct measures. Third, indirect measures 
added incremental validity to the prediction of behavior. Fourth, indirect measures were 
less apt for the concurrent assessment of two traits within one sample than direct measures.  
The latter factor was explained by the fact that indirect measures are influenced by 
the semantic meaning and the positive versus negative valence of stimuli. Whether the 
former or the latter most likely affected the results depended on whether a positive-
negative self-dimension was made salient. The angriness IAT was particularly distorted by 
the salience of a positive-negative self-dimension. This may be explained by the fact that 
angriness, though negatively valenced, is related to approach behavior, whereas negative 
valence is usually associated with avoidance behavior (Neumann et al., 2003). Therefore, a 
positive-negative self-dimension might have been weaker in the angriness IAT, and the 
angriness IAT was more affected by a positive-negative self-dimension in the context. 
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In my opinion, an important aspect of present indirect measures, such as the IATs, 
is that they allow participants to refuse cooperation. I consider this aspect a justification for 
further research rather than a deficiency, because the results of such research cannot be 
employed against the will of examinees. From my point of view, the main purpose of 
indirect measures is not that they may circumvent the self-presentational strategies of 
respondents, but that indirect measures lead to a better understanding of the information 
processes that underlie implicit and explicit representations. 
In conclusion, the unresolved issue of semantic meaning and valence being 
confounded, and the relatively low convergent validity between indirect measures provided 
evidence that indirect measures are not yet ready to be used as standard instruments for 
personality assessment. On the other hand, the development of indirect measures such as 
the IATs (Greenwald et al., 1998) represents a ground-breaking work for two reasons. 
First, IAT measures assess interindividual differences with internal consistencies that are 
satisfactory and much higher than the internal consistencies of other indirect procedures, 
for instance, priming measures (e.g., Banse, 2001; Bosson et al., 2000; Kawakami & 
Dovidio, 2001). Second, in the present and in other studies, IAT measures were shown to 
increase the prediction of behavior (e.g. Asendorpf et al., 2002; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; 
McConnell & Liebold, 2001). Indirect measures, even in their infancy, are an 
indispensable research instrument to assess implicit representations of the personality self-
concept in order to draw a more holistic picture of personality. 
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Appendix 151 
10 Appendix 
10.1 German IAT Stimuli 
 
Ich Andere  Schüchtern Nichtschüchtern 
selbst andere  gehemmt ungezwungen 
meine eure  unsicher sicher 
eigen fremd  zaghaft wagemutig 
mir euch  zurückhaltend freimütig 
ich ihr  verschlossen kontaktfreudig 
 
 
Ängstlich Sicher Ärgerlich Kontrolliert 
ängstlich sicher ärgerlich kontrolliert 
furchtsam wagemutig aufbrausend bedächtig 
unsicher selbstvertrauend unbeherrscht selbstbeherrscht 
besorgt sorglos hitzköpfig fügsam 
übervorsichtig unbeschwert motzig friedlich 
 
 
Appendix 152 
10.2 Experimental Set-Up and Screen Design of the IAP 
in Pilot Study 2 and in Study 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
